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General Introduction
This dissertation consists of three chapter, each of which can be read independently. Each
chapter analyzes a topic broadly related to labor markets or the role of the government in
the labor market: the first chapter is concerned with the optimal design of unemployment
insurance programs, the second chapter with the effects of reforms to the progressivity of
the income tax and the third with women’s occupational choice over the life-cycle.
How governments should design the tax and transfer system and social insurance programs
is a complicated question. Many issues are controversial, both in the academic and popular
debate. How high should unemployment benefits be and for how long should they be paid?
Should government increase income tax progressivity, given high levels of inequality? The
first two chapters of the thesis add to these debates by studying specific aspects of these
policies. Chapter 1 studies how unemployment insurance affects the hiring prospects of the
long-term unemployed, by influencing firm decisions about which job candidates to invite for
interviews and hire. The second chapter considers how income tax progressivity affects the
within-family allocation of consumption and leisure, in addition to the well-studied effects
on the across-family distribution, as well as marriage and divorce. In both chapters, the
analysis is based on quantitative models, which allows to study large-scale hypothetical
reforms and to assess their welfare implications.
The third chapter deals with fertility and women’s careers. Having children has a substantial
impact on women’s labor supply and earnings, which has recently received renewed attention
in the literature. We add to this literature by studying the tasks that women perform in
their occupation. Tasks have been shown to be intricately linked to earnings and human
capital. How do the tasks women perform evolve over the life-cycle and across cohorts? Do
long career breaks lead to occupational ’downgrading’? Do women with long career breaks
eventually perform different tasks than before childbirth? We empirically analyze these
questions using large German datasets on labor market histories and fertility as well as on
tasks that different occupations require.
In the following, I will present each of the three chapters in more detail.
1
Chapter 1: Employer Screening and Optimal Unemploy-
ment Insurance
This chapter (which is co-authored with Mario Meier) studies how firms’ screening behavior
affects the optimal design of unemployment policies. In our model, firms receive multiple
applications and make selective interview decisions among applicants, combining the informa-
tion from a noisy signal about productivity and unemployment duration. UI benefits change
the search effort of workers, the pool of applications that firms receive and how informative
duration is relative to the signal. We estimate the model using German administrative
employment records and information on job search behavior, vacancies and applications.
The model matches the observed decline in search effort, job finding rates and interview
rates with increased unemployment duration. We find that allowing for employer screening
is quantitatively important for the optimal design of unemployment insurance. Benefits
should be paid for a longer period of time and be more generous in the beginning, but more
restrictive afterwards, compared to the case where we treat the hiring and interview decisions
of firms as exogenous.
Chapter 2: The Marriage Market, Inequality and the
Progressivity of the Income Tax
This chapter studies how the progressivity of the income tax affects intra-household inequality
and the marriage market. Tax progressivity increases the after-tax earnings of the lower-
earning spouse and improves their bargaining position in marriage. This mechanism reduces
inequality in consumption and leisure within households. In addition, tax progressivity
can change who is single and who marries whom. I study these effects in an equilibrium
search and matching model with intra-household bargaining, labor supply and savings.
The model is calibrated to data from the Netherlands and used to study a hypothetical
reform which increases progressivity by 40% relative to the current system. The reduction
of intra-household inequality accounts for 24.77% of the reduction in inequality in private
consumption due to the reform, and 11.43% of the reduction in inequality in utility from
private and public consumption, leisure and home production. Changes in the composition
of couples and singles, due to endogenous marriage and divorce, have small implications for
inequality.
2
Chapter 3: Fertility and Women’s Occupational Choice:
Germany, 1975 - 2007
This chapter (which is co-authored with Hans-Martin von Gaudecker and Holger Stichnoth)
studies the relationship between fertility and women’s occupational choice. We combine
German administrative data on employment, earnings and fertility with detailed survey data
on the tasks that workers typically perform in an occupation. We use the data to study
life-cycle profiles of employment and the intensity of analytical, interactive, routine and
manual tasks. We analyze the dynamics of task intensities around childbirth in an event-study
framework. Our findings suggest that mothers, on average, increase their analytical task
intensities less than predicted in the absence of children. A simple back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that this could generate a 7% reduction in the hourly wage. Compared
to childless women, mothers switch their occupation more often, particularly those with a
long career break, switch more towards family-friendly occupations, and eventually have a
greater distance between their current and their pre-birth tasks.
3
4
Chapter 1
Employer Screening and Optimal
Unemployment Insurance
1.1 Introduction
Most governments provide substantial levels of insurance against unemployment. Commonly,
unemployment insurance systems pay benefits for a finite period of time and individuals
move to more restrictive assistance schemes after benefits have expired. How high benefits
should be, and for how long they should be paid, is controversial. While benefits typically
expire after six months in the US, they are often paid for years in European countries. At
the same time, several European countries have reformed their unemployment insurance
system and substantially lowered the benefits for the long-term unemployed.1
Recent evidence from field experiments shows that employers take unemployment duration
into account when deciding which applicants to interview for vacancies. Kroft et al. (2013)
document that the probability of being invited for an interview falls by almost 50% within the
first six months of unemployment in the US and find that this result can best be explained
as screening behavior, which refers to the notion that firms infer lower productivity of a
worker from a long unemployment spell. An aspect that has received little attention in
the literature on UI design is that such statistical discrimination against the long-term
unemployed could be endogenous to the UI system. Since UI policy affects the search effort
of workers, the beliefs of firms and the pool of applicants they can choose from, and therefore
their interviewing decisions, could adjust as well in equilibrium. The goal of this chapter is
to study the impact of screening on the optimal schedule and in particular the role of the
1During the labor market reforms between 2000 and 2005, Germany reduced the benefit level for the
long-term unemployed from 50-60% of the pre-unemployment wage to a fixed payment, which is 404 euros
for singles in 2016, not including additional rent support. In Sweden, the unemployed get 80% of their
pre-unemployment wage forever, but the payment is capped. In 2001, the government introduced duration-
dependent caps, with a lower cap for the long-term unemployed (see Kolsrud et al. (2018) for details). In
2010, Denmark reduced the potential benefit duration from 4 to 2 years (afterwards, individuals may still
receive welfare benefits).
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equilibrium effects. We build a quantitative model of the job search and recruitment process
and use the model to analyze optimal UI schedules.
The key feature of our model is that firms receive multiple applications from workers and only
observe unemployment duration and a noisy signal about productivity. Firms rank workers
by their expected productivity and workers with a long unemployment spell are less likely
to be considered for interviews. Workers decide on their search effort and savings. Hiring
and interview decisions are endogenous. They depend on how many applications a vacancy
receives, the unemployment duration and the noisy signal of each application, and firms’
beliefs about the productivity of the long-term unemployed. UI benefits influence how many
applications firms receive on average as well as the composition of these applications, since e.g.
low-productivity types react more strongly to benefit increases for the long-term unemployed.
In addition, generous UI benefits reduce the information contained in unemployment duration,
since they make it more likely that high-productivity types stay unemployed longer. Thus,
in equilibrium the interview decisions of firms adjust as well in equilibrium when the search
behavior of workers changes.
We estimate the model using German administrative data on job finding rates and survey data
on search effort, vacancies, applications and savings. In particular, we use a comprehensive
survey of establishments (the German Job Vacancy Survey) which contains information
about the recruitment process. Vacancies on average receive 15 applications. When there is
just one applicant for a vacancy, the probability that the applicant is interviewed is close to
one. However, this probability drops to about 55% when there are 5 applicants, which is the
median number of applications, and to 35% at the mean number of applications of 15. The Job
Vacancy Survey also provides direct survey evidence that firms take workers’ unemployment
duration into account. About 45% of the establishments that consider unemployment
applicants state that they are not willing to consider individuals with durations higher than
12 months. Our estimated model can match the empirical features of the job search and
hiring process, namely the decline in job finding rates, the applications-per-vacancy ratio,
the decline in interview rates and the decline in the job search effort of agents. We then use
the estimated model to analyze the optimal unemployment insurance system and investigate
the role of the equilibrium effects.
Our policy analysis is concerned with three features of an unemployment insurance system:
the initial benefit level (first level), the length for which individuals are allowed to receive
this level (potential benefit duration), and a second level for the long-term unemployed
(second level). Benefit levels are always replacement rates in terms of the past wage. We
find that the optimal schedule pays 73% for 42 months and drops close to zero afterwards.
If we restrict the model to allow only for one application per vacancy, which shuts down
the information friction, the optimal schedule pays 63% for 20 months and 27% afterwards.
Thus, our first main result is that introducing employer screening matters substantially for
optimal policy, relative to the case without screening.
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We then use the model to assess how important the equilibrium channels of changing
unemployment insurance benefits are relative to partial equilibrium effects. The equilibrium
effects refer to changes in the probability of being hired conditional on applying to a firm.
Our model features three channels through which unemployment policy can affect hiring
probabilities. First, the information contained in unemployment duration depends on how
different the shares of low and high types at that duration are. When changes to the
unemployment insurance system increase the relative share of applications at high durations
that come from high types, firms will take this into account and interview individuals
with high durations more often. Second, unemployment insurance policy affects the overall
applications-to-vacancy ratio. When there are more applications per vacancy, the long-
term unemployment have worse job prospects because it becomes more likely that the
firm has at least one applicant with a higher expected productivity. Third, unemployment
insurance policy affects the composition of the pool of applicants, holding the overall ratio
of applications per vacancy and firms’ beliefs about productivity constant. For example, if
policy reduces the search effort of individuals with low durations, this will increase the job
prospects of individuals with high durations. In addition to these equilibrium adjustments,
the partial equilibrium trade-off is between providing insurance and distorting the search
effort of workers. Introducing employer screening, relative to a case with full information,
interacts with this trade-off even in the absence of equilibrium effects. Moral hazard is
represented by the responsiveness of workers to benefits and as workers anticipate their
lower job chances in the future due to screening, or actually experience them after becoming
long-term unemployed, their responsiveness to benefits changes.
To isolate the role of equilibrium effects, we analyze the case where hiring probabilities decline
with duration as under the current German benefit schedule, but are assumed to be invariant
to policy. This corresponds to the partial equilibrium effects of employer screening, where
falling hiring probabilities change workers’ search incentives, but these hiring probabilities
itself are treated as exogenous. Calculating the optimal schedule yields 64% for 26 months
and 21% afterwards. Also allowing hiring rates to adjust, which was our previous experiment,
leads to 73% for 42 months and almost 0 afterwards. Under the current schedule, the hiring
probability declines from 0.3 to 0.15 after 12 months. Under the optimal schedule, this
decline is more gradual and hiring rates decline to about 0.22 after 12 months. Our second
main result is therefore that the equilibrium effects - the adjustment of hiring rates - turn
out to be fairly important, especially for the length of the first step and the level of the
second step.
In addition, our results show that even when allowing for employer screening, the second
benefit level for the long-term unemployed is relatively low. In general, with duration
dependence - which refers to declining job-prospects over the spell -, it is theoretically
open if benefits for the long-term unemployed are higher or lower than for the short-term
unemployed, primarily because duration dependence decreases the moral hazard cost of
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providing benefits for the long-term unemployed. This is due to the fact that as the overall
job finding rates of the long-term unemployed decrease, they become less responsive to
benefits. Therefore, it could be the case that introducing employer screening, relative to the
case without screening, makes it optimal to provide high levels of insurance for the long-term
unemployed. Quantitatively, in the case of fixed hiring rates, we find that this effect mainly
increases the length for which workers can receive the first level, but has a smaller effect
on the levels. Taking the adjustments of hiring rates into account, the optimal level for
the long-term unemployed is even lower than in the case without screening. These results
suggest that while employer screening increases the length for which benefits should be paid,
it does not necessarily provide a reason for giving high benefits to job-seekers with very long
durations.
Related Literature. This chapter contributes to the literature on optimal unemployment
insurance by providing a model of the hiring process that can be used to quantify the impact
of employers’ screening behavior on optimal benefit schedules. Many papers in the literature
focus on partial equilibrium models and distortions in search effort, where unemployment
insurance is a trade-off between moral hazard and consumption smoothing, e.g. Baily (1978),
Gruber (1997), Chetty (2006), Chetty (2008). The optimal schedule is often argued to be
declining with duration or flat, as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Shimer and Werning
(2008), respectively. Related to our approach, Lentz (2009) estimates a search model with
savings to analyze optimal unemployment insurance levels. In Schmieder and Von Wachter
(2016) the authors extend the standard optimal unemployment insurance setting to a case
where not only benefit levels but also the benefit duration is optimally chosen by the planner.
The policies we look at are comparable to their setting. Most related to this chapter, Lehr
(2017) and Kolsrud et al. (2018) theoretically show that allowing for firms’ screening behavior
changes the optimality conditions for benefit levels by introducing an externality term, so
that the standard Baily-Chetty formula does not hold. The contribution of this chapter is
that we build a quantitative model that can match the relevant empirical features of the
recruitment process and use the model to assess the role of the equilibrium effects relating
to employer screening. Our results suggest that these equilibrium effects are quantitatively
important and should be taken into account when designing unemployment policies.
There is relatively little other work on the implications of duration dependence for optimal
policy. Shimer and Werning (2006) investigate optimal unemployment insurance in a
setting with exogenously falling wages or job arrival rates. Pavoni (2009) focuses on human
capital depreciation. These papers analyze duration dependence in models where duration
dependence is exogenous and invariant to unemployment insurance policy while screening, on
the other hand, is endogenous to the benefit system. As a result, screening has different policy
implications than other forms of duration dependence since we find that the equilibrium
adjustments of the hiring rates are quite important.
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In addition, this chapter is related to the literature on duration dependence and recruitment
behavior. Lockwood (1991) was an early paper in this literature. In his setting, firms
test the unemployed before hiring and a high unemployment duration can be a bad signal.
The idea of ranking applicants by unemployment duration was first explored by Blanchard
and Diamond (1994), who assume that firms with multiple applications always hire the
applicant with the shortest unemployment duration. Recently, the results from the audit
studies have led to a growing amount of work on the role of employer screening. Jarosch
and Pilossoph (2018) investigate the quantitative link between the decline in callback rates
and duration dependence and emphasize that statistical discrimination may not always lead
to lower job-finding rates. Doppelt (2016) models the role of information contained in the
history of unemployment spells, thereby stressing the life-cycle dimension. Fernandez-Blanco
and Preugschat (2018) consider a directed search model with endogenous wages, in which
firms rank applicants by unemployment duration. There are two important features of
our model relative to these papers. First, in our setting, firms rank multiple applicants
according to unemployment duration and a signal, whereas previous models of ranking
assume that firms only use duration. As a result, unemployment insurance changes how
informative duration is relative to the signal. When policy makes the selection of types by
duration weaker, firms rank applicants less by unemployment duration and more by the
signal. Second, we integrate search effort and savings, which are crucial for the analysis of
optimal unemployment insurance.
There have been recent studies that emphasize the role of equilibrium effects and market
externalities, e.g. Michaillat (2012), Landais et al. (2018) and Landais et al. (2016), Mari-
nescu (2017) and Lalive et al. (2015). These papers argue that search externalities among
job seekers might be important for job outcomes which in turn has implications for the
design of unemployment insurance benefits. Our concept of multiple applications generates
search externalities among job seekers and the higher the applications-per-vacancy ratio the
more important are search externalities. Hagedorn et al. (2019) argue that unemployment
benefit extensions can have externalities on labor demand and decrease the incentive to
create vacancies. Our model also allows for vacancy creation to close the model and to
account for this effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we focus on the data and some
descriptive facts. Sections 1.3 presents the model and policy problem. Section 1.4 describes
the estimation and discusses estimation results and model fit. In Section 1.5, we discuss
welfare and the corresponding policy results. In Section 1.6, we discuss some extensions of
our model and conclude in Section 1.7.
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1.2 Data & Descriptive Facts
This section presents the data we use and empirical facts about job search behavior and the
hiring process.
1.2.1 Data
In this chapter we consider the case of Germany. In Germany most unemployed receive
unemployment benefits for up to 12 months of unemployment and are eligible for unem-
ployment assistance if they stay unemployed for longer than 12 months. Older individuals
are eligible for longer unemployment insurance payments, but we restrict to individuals
that receive 12 months of benefits. Unemployed individuals receive benefits that amount to
60% or 67% of their past wage, depending on their marital status. After individuals run
out of unemployment insurance (UI) they receive means-tested unemployment assistance
benefits (UA) which are on average around 40% of the past wage for the average unemployed.
Unemployment benefits are financed by social security contributions of workers and firms.2
The German setting allows us to base the design and estimation of our model on several
datasets that contain information on job-finding rates, search effort and vacancies. First,
we use the German social insurance data (IEB) which provides us with information on the
characteristics of the unemployed; in particular the length of their unemployment spell and
their wage history. The data contains all individuals that were ever unemployed or regularly
employed through an employment relationship that is subject to social insurance. We have
access to a 2% random sample of the population and restrict ourselves to unemployment
spells starting in the years from 2000 until 2011. Second, we use the IZA Evaluation dataset
(IZA ED) which is a representative survey performed among UI entrants between June 2007
and May 2008. The data is a panel where participants were interviewed up to four times after
their unemployment spell has realized. The first interview took place close to the beginning
of unemployment. Additional interviews took place six, twelve and thirty-six months after
the start of the UI spell, respectively. Participants are asked about their individual search
effort, e.g. the number of applications or number of search channels, and they are asked to
report their reservation wage. Third, we use the IAB Job Vacancy Survey (JVS) which is a
representative survey conducted among firms on open vacancies and hiring decisions made
by firms. The survey contains information on whether unemployed applicants were hired
and how many applicants firms invite to an interview. Fourth, we use the Bundesbank Panel
on Household Finances (PHF), which contains information on savings, liquid assets and
2The German unemployment insurance system compares relatively well to unemployment insurance
schemes in other developed countries, like the US or many other European countries. However, the US
system has somewhat less generous potential benefit durations and replacement rates than Germany and no
unemployment assistance system. For further details on the institutions in Germany we refer the reader to
the appendix.
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debt levels. In the data individuals are also asked to report whether they are unemployed or
employed.
Table 1.1 summarizes some of the main characteristics of the data sources. The average
monthly re-employment wage after unemployment for job seekers is 1,606 euros. The re-
employment wage is defined as the average monthly earnings an individual receives in the
year after the UI spell has ended. Table 1.1 also reports some observable characteristics of
unemployed job seekers. In the IZA ED data, individuals use roughly four to five search
channels, where most people in the sample look for job advertisements, ask friends or
relatives for jobs or use online search. Many individuals are also offered help from the local
employment agencies. Table 1.1 shows that agents send out 13 applications on average at
the beginning of the UI spell. From the PHF dataset we extract some information regarding
assets, in particular liquid assets, of the unemployed. In Table 1.1 we show different quantiles
from the net liquid asset distribution of the unemployed in the sample. We see that asset
holdings are indeed very heterogeneous where nearly half of the individuals barely have any
assets.3 In contrary, 10% of individuals have more than 40,000 euros in liquid assets. Net
assets, which also include real estates, are on average larger. Finally, the JVS shows that
firms receive on average 15 applications and that it takes around two months to fill an open
vacancy.4
1.2.2 Descriptive Facts
Standard job search models assume that job finding rates are only determined by agents’
search effort, potentially with declining job prospects in the form of duration dependence
or heterogeneity in job finding rates.5 However, whether agents find jobs to exit unemploy-
ment also requires a firm to actually hire the job seeker. This drives a wedge between the
search effort of an agent and the job finding rate of an agent. In addition, firms’ hiring
probabilities are potentially dependent on the policy context. Hence, in the following we
provide some evidence on job seekers search effort as well as on firms screening and in-
terview decisions. Based on this evidence we build a job search model that incorporates
all of the discussed features and makes distinct predictions along the evidence that we provide.
Job finding rates. The job finding rate of unemployed job seekers in Germany is shown in
Figure 1.1 panel (a). In the first months of unemployment, exit rates out of unemployment
are above 10%. However, job finding rates decrease throughout the spell and are only 5%
3Net liquid assets are defined as the difference between liquid assets and short-term debt, like credit card
debt.
4This time is defined as the difference between the acceptance of a job offer by an applicant to the release
of the job advertisement.
5See e.g. Chetty (2008), Lentz (2009), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
Variables N mean s.d.
Panel A: Employment Register
Re-employment wage (euros) 55,420 1,606.17 (1,059.95)
Unemployment duration (months) 59,793 12.57 (12.71)
Female 59,793 0.446 (0.497)
Age 59,793 30.80 (9.12)
Married 59,793 0.325 (0.468)
Children 59,793 0.302 (0.459)
College 56,727 0.096 (0.294)
Apprenticeship 56,727 0.751 (0.432)
Panel B: IZA Evaluation Dataset
Number of applications Month 1 6,815 13.49 (14.95)
Number of applications Month 6 377 9.15 (10.09)
Number of applications Month 12 1,710 8.11 (9.78)
Search channels Month 1 6,898 4.78 (1.78)
Panel C: Panel on Household Finances (Quantiles)
Net liquid assets (euros, p10) 295 -1,003 -
Net liquid assets (euros, p25) 295 0 -
Net liquid assets (euros, p50) 295 247 -
Net liquid assets (euros, p75) 295 4,885 -
Net liquid assets (euros, p90) 295 40,497 -
Net assets (euros, including home, p50) 295 894 -
Panel D: Job Vacancy Survey
Number of applicants 62,904 14,79 (36.96)
Time vacancy is open (days) 76,240 56.88 (67.08)
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics from our different data sources. Panel A
shows descriptive statistics from the administrative employment registers of individu-
als who experience their first unemployment spell at the time the spell starts. Panel
B summarizes search effort measures from the IZA evaluation dataset. Panel C uses
the Bundesbank Panel on Household Finances for information on assets. In Panel D
statistics on vacancies are shown, coming from the IAB Job Vacancy Survey. N denotes
the number of observations behind each statistic, and s.d. the standard deviation.
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(a) Job finding rate (b) Search effort
(c) Distribution of applications (d) Share of interviewed applicants
Figure 1.1: Descriptive Facts
Notes: Panel (a): This figure shows the job finding probability (hazard rate) of individuals on the y-axis as a
function of the unemployment duration on the x-axis. Source: SIAB. Panel (b): This panel shows the mean
number of applications unemployed agents send out in the first month of unemployment, the sixth month
of unemployment and after one year of unemployment. Source: IZA ED. Panel (c): This figure illustrates
the distribution of applications across vacancies. The y-axis denotes the fraction of vacancies that receive
a certain number of applications. Source: JVS. Panel (d): This panel shows the fraction of interviewed
applicants as a function of the number of applications received. Source: JVS.
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after one year and 2.5% after two years of unemployment.6 Hence, the chance to find a job
becomes smaller and smaller the longer someone is unemployed. There are two explanations
for this decline in the hazard rate out of unemployment: (a) selection/heterogeneity, or (b)
(true) duration dependence. Heterogeneity can enter in the form of productivity differences of
job seekers. Duration dependence describes declining job prospects for individuals given their
type. Most likely, both, selection and duration dependence, contribute to falling hazard rates.
Search effort. Since we are interested in dynamic UI policies it is important how individuals’
search effort throughout their unemployment spell reacts, because search effort responses
are a main determinant of the moral hazard costs associated with unemployment insurance.
Figure 1.1 panel (b) illustrates the number of applications that agents write per month as a
function of their unemployment duration. At the beginning of the spell they send out more
than 13 applications per month, after six months around nine applications are sent out and
after twelve months only eight applications are sent out on average. Hence, the average
search effort seems to decrease over the spell.7 The graphs look very similar when restricting
the sample to individuals who are unemployed for 12 months and tracking their search effort
over time (see the appendix for details). Note, we have ignored other measures of search
effort for now, e.g. the number of search channels or time used for job search. Our choice is
motivated by the fact that our model explicitly allows agents to send out applications.8
Multiple applications per vacancy. A very important factor that determines job search
outcomes is how many other applicants are searching for a similar job. Hence, depending on
the number of applications per vacancy the job finding rate might be higher or lower for a
given search effort. The importance of these crowding out effects depend on the number of
competitors of an applicant for a job. Intuitively, if there are many applicants per vacancy
some job searchers will get no offer for the job and need to continue their search. Figure 1.1
panel (c) plots the histogram of the number of applications an open vacancy receives. The
average number of applications is around 15, with a median of 5 applications per vacancy.
This panel suggests that firms have considerable levy to pick the best applicant and that the
outside option of a firm is to screen or hire alternative applicants.
Employer screening. Employer screening by vacancies takes usually place by restricting
first to a subset of applicants that get invited to an interview. In panel (d) of Figure 1.1
we show that the share of applicants that receive an interview invitation depend on the
number of applications a vacancy receives. One can see that the more applications there
6The small spike at 12 months is due to the benefit exhaustion which leads more people to exit unem-
ployment. See DellaVigna et al. (2017) for a detailed exploration of the benefit exhaustion spike.
7Declining search effort over the UI spell was also documented for the US by Krueger and Mueller (2011).
8Lichter (2016) also uses the number of applications as a search measure and discusses this choice in more
detail.
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are, the less likely it is to get invited to an interview. The interview shares are around
50% for vacancies with 5 applications, i.e. at the median, and only 30% for vacancies with
15 applications, i.e. at the mean. In the job vacancy survey, employers are also asked
whether they consider unemployed applicants depending on the unemployment duration
of the applicant. Conditional on considering unemployed applicants at all only 75% of
firms consider applicants with more than a few months of unemployment duration and only
60% of firms consider applicants with more than twelve months of unemployment duration.
Hence, only 60% of firms that are in principle willing to consider unemployed applicants
are willing to accept long-term unemployed. Figure A.2 in the appendix illustrates this
graphically. Complementary to our survey evidence, the importance of employer screening
for true duration dependence was also studied by Kroft et al. (2013) in an experimental
audit study. They find that the callback rate (interview invitation) of an application that
was sent out to open vacancies strongly depends on the unemployment duration presented
in the CV of the applicant. In fact, the probability to receive a callback from an employer
declines by roughly 50% over the unemployment spell. Note that declining callback rates
can in principle also be generated by models of human capital depreciation. However, Kroft
et al. (2013) demonstrate that the decline of the callback rate is much weaker when the
unemployment-to-vacancy ratio is high. This finding is hard to rationalize with human
capital depreciation, since human capital would depreciate independently of labor market
conditions. Employer screening, on the other hand, predicts that unemployment duration
is less informative about productivity under adverse labor market conditions, since then
individuals with high productivity also stay unemployed longer. This is in line with the
evidence provided by Kroft et al. (2013).9
1.3 Model
We extend a standard search model with risk aversion, endogenous search effort and savings,
that has been used to study optimal UI, by incorporating firms’ hiring decision to account
for the empirical patterns described in the previous section. The key feature of our model
is that workers are heterogeneous in productivity and firms have to select candidates from
a pool of multiple applications. Since productivity is only observed by workers, firms base
hiring decisions on the expected productivity of each worker, taking unemployment duration
and a noisy signal about worker quality into account.
9In addition, note that they find that the callback rate declines strongly within the first six months of
unemployment and is essentially flat afterwards. If the decline in callback rates would mostly be about
human capital depreciation, one would expected a more gradual decline that also affects the long-term
unemployed.
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1.3.1 Workers
Time is discrete and each period corresponds to a month. We follow the literature on optimal
unemployment insurance by assuming that workers are born unemployed (Chetty (2006),
Shimer and Werning (2008)) and that there is no job destruction, so that finding a job is an
absorbing state. Workers live for T periods and in every period of the model, a unit mass of
newly unemployed workers is born. Workers who have been unemployed for t periods get UI
benefits that depend on t:
bt =
b1 if t ≤ Db2 if t > D
Thus, workers can get an initial level b1 for up to D months and a level of b2 afterwards.10
Workers differ in their productivity pij and each generation of workers contains a share αj of
type j = 1, ..., J . In addition, each type has an exogenous initial level of assets, denoted as
k0,j.
Employed workers only decide on the optimal level of consumption and savings and the
corresponding value function and budget constraint for duration t < T are:
V e(k, t) = max
kt+1≥0
{
u(ct) + βV e(kt+1, t+ 1)
}
ct = Rkt + (1− τ)w − kt+1
kt and kt+1 are the asset levels in each period. Workers are risk-averse and discount the
future at rate β and the interest rate is given by R. There are no separations and employment
is an absorbing state.11 In addition, note that all workers face a no-borrowing constraint
(kt+1 ≥ 0).12
Unemployed workers decide on both consumption and savings and their search intensity.
Searching with intensity s has a cost ψ(s), but leads to a match probability p(s) = s, which
can be interpreted as sending an application to a firm.13 Importantly, the probability of
exiting unemployment - the hazard rate - contains both the probability of meeting a firm
and of actually being hired by the firm:
10Note that in practice, the amount of unemployment benefits is often tied to the pre-unemployment
wage. Because our model abstracts from wage heterogeneity the pre-unemployment wage is conceptually
indistinguishable from the post-unemployment wage.
11Allowing for separations is in principle possible but would complicate the model by generating an
endogenous initial asset distribution. Hence, for simplicity we assume that jobs last forever.
12The no-borrowing assumption is standard in the literature, see e.g. Chetty (2006), and creates an
insurance motive for the government in the first place. Without borrowing constraints, individuals would
just take a loan and there would be no need for the government to provide insurance to the unemployed.
13For simplicity, we focus on the case where workers may send out a single application, as is also done in
Fernandez-Blanco and Preugschat (2018) or Villena-Roldan (2012). The implications of multiple applications
per worker are discussed in Section 1.6.
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hj,t = sj,t · gj(t) (1.1)
gj(t) is the expected hiring probability and is determined in equilibrium, as will be discussed
in the next sections.14 Jobs start in the next period. The survival rate in unemployment, i.e.
the probability of still being unemployed after t periods, is then defined as
Sj,t =
t−1∏
t′=0
(1− hj,t′)
Taken together, the value function for unemployed workers is given by:
V u(k, t) = max
s,kt+1≥0
{
u(ct)− ψ(s) + βhj,t(s)V e(kt+1, t+ 1)
+ β(1− hj,t(s))V u(kt+1, t+ 1)
}
The budget constraint is ct = Rkt + bt − kt+1. Note that changes to the benefit system
influence the value of unemployment relative to employment and therefore affect workers’
search decisions.
In each period of the model, there is a pool of unemployed workers that consists of the new
generation and workers from previous generations that did not find a job in previous periods.
While further details will be discussed in the equilibrium section, it is useful to note that the
number of workers of type j and duration t that are matched with firms in each period is
given by:
aj,t = αj · Sj,t · sj,t (1.2)
Here, αj is the unconditional type share, Sj,t is the survival rate until duration t and sj,t is
the search effort at that duration. Aggregating over types and duration, this leads to a mass
of matched workers that will be considered by firms, which we will refer to as the pool of
applications.
1.3.2 Firms
When workers are matched with a firm, the match-specific productivity q ∈ {0, 1} is drawn
and the probability that it takes the value 1 is given by worker productivity pij. Thus,
high-productivity workers have a high chance of being productive in any match. We refer to
the case of q = 1 as the worker being qualified for a vacancy.15 Firms produce an output y
14Note that we use the term hiring probability for the probability of being hired conditional on being
matched (as also e.g. Lehr (2017)), while similar terms are also often used in the literature to describe to
number of new hires by firms over total employment.
15This is similar to the set-up of Fernandez-Blanco and Preugschat (2018), who also assume that workers
differ in their probability of being qualified for vacancies. In a similar spirit, Jarosch and Pilossoph (2018)
assume that both workers and firms differ in their (deterministic) productivity and production only takes
place when worker productivity is higher than firm productivity.
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when employing a qualified worker and zero otherwise. Thus, note that conditional on being
qualified, workers produce the same output.16
Workers are matched to firms according to an urn-ball matching technology, where each
matched worker randomly arrives at a firm. From the point of view of the firm, the number
of applications it receives follows a Poisson distribution with parameter µ = a
v
, where a
is the mass of matched workers and v is the mass of vacancies. For each candidate, firms
do not observe if they are qualified, but only their unemployment duration and a noisy
signal about the type of the worker. The signals sent by type j are drawn from a normal
distribution, where we normalize the mean to j and estimate the variance σ to match the
data. Thus, high types on average send better signals. Firms can interview applicants and
thereby perfectly reveal their productivity. We restrict firms to pay the exogenous wage.17
Firms rank applicants by their expected productivity and sequentially interview applicants
until one applicant turns out to be qualified.18. The other applicants are not hired. Since
the firm always has to pay the wage, it will never hire an unqualified worker. A key feature
of this framework is that firms rank applicants not only based on unemployment duration,
but also take the signal into account.19 Note that ranking is justified as long as there is a
positive screening cost.20.
Thus, a firm first computes the expected type probabilities of each applicant. Firms know
the composition of the overall pool of applications, i.e. the mass of applications aj,t sent by
agents of type j and duration t. Firms also know the distributions of the signals. Conditional
on the realized signal φ and unemployment duration t, the probability of an applicant being
type j follows from Bayes’ rule:
P (j|φ, t) = fj(φ) · aj,t∑
k fk(φ) · ak,t
(1.3)
This probability corresponds to the share of applications of type j in the overall pool of
16Allowing the output to differ between low and high types would in principle be feasible in our framework
and an interesting extension because it would allow to investigate the trade-off between providing information
about the quality of applicants for firms and veiling information to protect unproductive types from statistical
discrimination. In our setup, the planner would like to eliminate statistical discrimination because it reduces
the job prospects of the long-term unemployed. In contrast, when productivity differs the planner also has
an incentive to provide information to firms to maximize production. Note, however, that in the current
framework, reducing screening can also have an adverse effect on firms if it is achieved by increasing the
search effort of low types and increasing the effort of high types, which would reduce vacancy creation.
17The implications of endogenous wages are discussed in Section 1.6. Assuming a fixed wage is broadly in
line with evidence about constant reservation wages over the spell and a moderate decline in re-employment
wages by duration.
18An alternative approach that would give similar outcomes is to assume that firms choose which share of
applicants they screen, while discarding the others. This second approach to recruitment selection is used
e.g. in Villena-Roldan (2012) or Wolthoff (2017).
19In other ranking models in the literature (Blanchard and Diamond (1994), Fernandez-Blanco and
Preugschat (2018)), the ranking is only based on duration.
20In the main part of the analysis, we focus on the case of a screening cost C → 0
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applications from agents with duration j, weighted by the density of the signal. Since the
mass of applications is given by aj,t = αjSj,tsj,t, a high duration of unemployment is a
negative signal about productivity when a large share of applicants with duration t has a
low productivity. Note that this does not only depend on the relative survival rates, but also
on the relative search effort. For example, if there are many more low types than high types,
but low types do not search. Firms will takes this into account and infer that the applicant
must be a high type. Finally, note that in the limit case σ → 0, the signal perfectly reveals
workers’ type and there is no reason to take the duration into account. Conversely, when
σ →∞, the signal contains no information and firms only rank applicants based on duration.
For intermediate cases with σ ∈ (0,∞), firms weigh the information contained in both
components and their relative importance is endogenous. When the benefit system keeps
productive types in the pool longer, duration can become less informative about productivity
and the ranking order depends more strongly on the signal.
To arrive at the expected hiring rate, we first define the expected profit based on the
conditional type probabilities:
Π(φ, t) =
∑
j
P (j|φ, t) pijy − w (1.4)
It is useful to first focus on the case of an applicant i with fixed (φ, t, j), with j being the
type, who is matched with a vacancy that has just one randomly drawn other applicant
i˜ with characteristics (φ˜, t˜, j˜). Applicant i˜ is interviewed before applicant i whenever
Π(φ˜, t˜) ≥ Π(φ, t) and hired if also being qualified for the job, which happens with probability
pij˜ . We define p(φ, t) as the probability that given φ and t, agent i is not interviewed, because
the firm interviews and hires worker i˜ before, integrating over (φ˜, t˜, j˜):
p(t, φ) =
J∑
j˜=1
aj˜
a
· pij˜ · P
(
Π(φ˜, t˜) ≥ Π(φ, t) — j˜, t, φ
)
(1.5)
aj˜
a
is the probability of drawing type j˜ from the pool of all applications, with a being the total
number of applications and aj˜ the number of applications sent by type j˜. This is multiplied
with the probability that type j˜ is hired according to the intuition described above.21 The
probability p(φ, t) describes how likely it is to not be invited for the interview when there is
one other applicant. In general, the number of other applicants follows a Poisson distribution,
where the mean µ is the mean number of applications per vacancy. In addition, the signal φ
that the agent sends is stochastic. Integrating over both the number of other applicants and
the signal, we get the following expression for the expected hiring rate:22
21In the appendix, we describe how the probability that the competitor sends a better signal is computed.
22This expression follows from the fact that the number of other applicants for a vacancy is Poisson
distributed. The Poisson probability density function is f(k) = exp(−µ)µkk! . The probability that agent (j, t)
with signal φ is the best applicant is
∑∞
a=0(1− p(t, φ))af(a), since given a other applicants (1− p(·))a is the
probability that none of them is hired first. This can be simplified to to the expression used for gj(t).
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Figure 1.2: Timing of the model
gj(t) = pij
∫
φ
exp
(
− p(φ, t) · µ
)
dFj(φ) (1.6)
The expected hiring rate of worker i consist of the integral, which is the probability that
no other applicant is screened and hired before, and the probability pij that the worker is
qualified for the job. The integral can be interpreted as a callback curve: it represents the
probability of being contacted and screened by an employer. Thus, it is the model analogue
to recent audit studies which measure the decline in the callback rate (e.g. Kroft et al.
(2013)). Callback rates map into hiring rates by pre-multiplying the probability of being
qualified for the vacancy. Note that there are two components that lead to a decline in the
callback curve with duration. First, for a given agent with a high duration, p(φ, t) tends to
be high, which means that the firm is likely to first interview and potentially hire one other
randomly drawn applicant. This depends on how informative duration is about types and on
the composition of the pool of applications - if the short-term unemployed search a lot, it is
more likely that a random other applicant has a short duration and is potentially considered
first. Second, this effect is scaled by the mean number of applications per vacancy, which is
given by µ. In the limit case of no competition (µ = 0), the hiring rate is flat and equal to
pij. In the case of a large applications-per-vacancy ratio µ the competition for jobs is large
and callback rates are lower.
The mass of vacancies is pinned down by a free-entry condition. As in Lise and Robin (2017),
firms can pay c(v) to advertise v vacancies. Vacancies last for one period. The value of an
additional vacancy is the net output multiplied by the probability of receiving at least one
qualified application:23
Jv = y − w1− β
(
1− exp
(
−
∑
pijaj
v
))
In equilibrium, the marginal vacancy costs are equal to the expected value of an additional
23Note that we assume that vacancies survive forever and that after the vacancy is filled it stays filled
forever. This is a helpful approximation especially when T is large enough.
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vacancy:24
c′(v) = Jv
Conceptually, free entry ensures that firms punish redistribution towards workers by exiting.
Hence, vacancies might negatively or positively react to changes in unemployment policies.
In our framework, different benefit schemes can reduce firm profits by either reducing overall
search effort or by reducing the applications of high types relative to low types, because
each case makes it less likely that vacancies receive at least one qualified candidate. As a
result, firms would reduce the amount of vacancies being posted. Later, when we discuss
optimal policy, these incentives for vacancies must be taken into account. In Figure 1.2 we
summarize the timing of our model graphically.
1.3.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model consists of
• Policy functions for search effort sj,t,kt and savings kt+1 = gu(kt, t, j) for the unemployed
and kt+1 = ge(kt) for the employed, for each type j, duration t
• Survival functions Sj,t
• Expected hiring rates gj,t
• A mass of vacancies v
such that the policy functions of workers solve the problems described by the value functions
for the employed and unemployed, and such that the expected hiring rates are optimal
according to equation (1.6) given the implied survival rates.25
1.3.4 Optimal Policy
The governments’ set of policy instruments P = (b1, b2, D, τ) consists of the benefits b1 that
are paid from period t = 1 until period t = D. D denotes the last month until benefits b1 are
received and represents the potential benefit duration. From period t = D + 1 until period
T agents receive benefits b2. This defines the policy schedule bt, where bt = b1 if t ≤ D and
bt = b2 if t > D. The proportional income tax τ is collected from the employed to finance the
expenditures. The tax has also the interpretation of an actuarial fair insurance premium here.
We restrict the analysis to this class of schedules because it facilitates numerical optimization
24Depending on the functional form of c′(v) vacancy creation rents accrue to firms if vacancy costs are not
constant. However, it is not obvious how to interpret these rents and we ignore them throughout the rest of
the paper.
25While uniqueness of the equilibrium cannot be proved analytically, we checked for the possibility of
multiple equilibria, especially around the estimated parameter values, and always converge to the same
equilibrium.
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over the policy space. In addition, these schedules are fairly close to the policy instruments
that are used in practice.26
The objective of the planner is to maximize the value of a newly born generation of
unemployed. We assume that every unemployed individual has the same welfare weight
when born, which amounts to a standard utilitarian welfare criterion as in Chetty (2006):
W (P ) =
∫
j
V uj (P )αjdj (1.7)
However, the government can only maximize the welfare of agents subject to the following
budget constraint, that balances expected revenue and expenditure from a cohort:
G(P ) =
∫
j
( T∑
t=0
R−t(1− Sj,t)wτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected revenue
−
T∑
t=0
R−tSj,tbt︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. expenditure
)
αjdj (1.8)
Note that revenues and expenditures are weighted by the survival rates, because individuals
receive only benefits if they are still unemployed in period t and only pay taxes (wτ) if they
work in period t. The budget constraint implies that expected revenue generated with the
employment tax must equal expected expenditures. As in Kolsrud et al. (2018) we assume
that the budget must be balanced within a certain generation and therefore benefits and
revenues are discounted by the interest rate.27
Discussion. In this framework, the screening mechanism matters for optimal policy through
various channels. First, there is the classical trade-off between providing insurance to risk-
averse individuals and distorting their search incentives (see e.g. Chetty (2006)). Insurance
is valued because agents are credit constrained and cannot borrow. Hence, agents deplete
their assets throughout the unemployment spell until they become hand-to-mouth consumers.
Depending on the initial asset position, agents move closer to becoming hand-to-mouth
if they stay unemployed for longer. The key measure of moral hazard is the elasticity of
search effort with respect to UI benefits. Note that introducing screening changes the extent
of moral hazard: forward-looking individuals will anticipate that they will have lower job
prospects if they become long-term unemployed and search more intensively in the beginning,
which can reduce their responsiveness to benefits.
Second, the presence of screening gives rise to equilibrium effects: the UI system changes not
only search decisions, but also the expected probabilities of being hired. On the one hand,
this is due to the fact that UI policy changes the selection of types over the unemployment
26See Section 1.5 for a discussion of the shape of more flexible classes of schedules.
27Alternatively, one could remove the discounting and collect taxes from the steady state distribution
of employed and pay benefits to the steady state distribution of unemployed. We prefer our specification
because then the tax τ has the interpretation of an actuarial fair insurance premium assuming that agents
do not know their type ex-ante or that insurance pricing by type is not feasible.
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spell. For example, consider the case of raising benefits at each duration. This will lead
high types to stay in the unemployment pool longer and this makes being unemployed for a
certain time less informative about productivity, as the relative survival rates change. This
channel is also theoretically discussed in Kolsrud et al. (2018) and Lehr (2017). On the other
hand, in our framework, the size and composition of the pool of applications that firms get
matters for the determination of hiring rates. If policy changes search effort, this impacts
the applications-per-vacancy ratio and a higher mean number of applications reduces the
job chances of the long-term unemployed. In addition, if the short-term unemployed search
a lot, this reduces hiring rates for the long-term unemployed. In a similar spirit, if low types
search a lot, this decreases job chances of the high types who are unemployed for the while.
Furthermore, vacancies adjust in equilibrium and optimal policy must take into account that
different benefit schemes might lead to a different vacancy posting behavior because the
value of a vacancy might be affected, through a change in the composition of applicants or
their search effort. Finally, since agents are heterogeneous, a utilitarian planner potentially
redistributes between them.
Combining these channels, the shape of the optimal schedule is theoretically open. With-
out duration dependence or heterogeneity, moral hazard considerations typically lead to
lower benefits for the long-term unemployed than for the short-term unemployed (see e.g.
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)). However, benefits for the long-term unemployed could
also be higher because the unemployed run down their assets during the spell or because
duration dependence reduces the moral hazard costs of providing benefits for the long-term
unemployed. In addition, the equilibrium effects have to be taken into account and it
is not clear if introducing screening matters mostly because of its influence on workers’
search incentives or because of the equilibrium effects. These questions are addressed in our
quantitative analysis in Section 1.5.
1.4 Estimation
So far we have described the data and some empirical facts followed by a discussion of the
model and the mechanisms. In this section we will connect both by connecting our model
to the data. We will first present the estimation setup and will then discuss the estimation
results.
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1.4.1 Setup
Specification. To estimate the model that we formulated in Section 1.3, we impose the
following functional forms on the instantaneous utility function and the search cost function:
u(c) = c
1−γ
1− γ
ψ(s) = s
1+ 1
λ
1 + 1
λ
where λ denotes the elasticity of search effort with respect to the value of employment. The
functional form is a common assumption and used in DellaVigna et al. (2017) or Lentz
(2009). The instantaneous utility function is a standard CRRA utility function where γ is
the risk aversion parameter and at the same time the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution.28
In our model agents are heterogeneous in two dimensions: (a) their probability of being
qualified and (b) their initial assets. In our baseline version of the model we allow for two
different productivity types pi and three different initial asset types k0, which in total leaves
us with J = 6 types.29 Signals are drawn from normal distributions with mean 0 for the
low type and mean 1 for the high type.30 We set initial assets for the unemployed to be
uniformly distributed with 0, 500 and 3,000 euros. These values are set in order to match
roughly the liquid assets of unemployed individuals in the PHF dataset. Every qualified type
generates a profit y > w for the firm in case he is qualified. y can be normalized because
only the wedge between the vacancy cost and the y−w gap is relevant for the determination
of the vacancies. High types differ in their idiosyncratic match productivity. High types are
qualified in piH cases, while low types are qualified in piL cases only. Unqualified applicants
are always rejected. Hence, firms have an incentive to screen types with respect to their
productivity in order to gain a higher expected profit. Since we do not aim to make any
statements about production one can see these profits as a normalization. The wage agents
receive during employment is fixed and we set w = 1, 606 euros, which matches the mean
re-employment wage in our sample of unemployed. The estimation is based on the current
schedule, so that benefits bt are set to a replacement rate of 63.5% within the first year and
social assistance is equal to 40% after one year.31 These numbers capture closely benefits
28Alternatively, one could think about a CARA utility specification. The constant relative risk aversion
choice is motivated by the possibility of wealth effects, which implies different attitudes toward gambles
with respect to wealth, i.e. individuals who have less savings will search more. Shimer and Werning (2008)
compare the implications of CARA and CRRA to optimal UI and find only minor differences, because wealth
effects are quantitatively very small in a search model like ours.
29Allowing for more types in both dimensions is easily possible but does not add any conceptual insights.
Productivity and initial assets are uncorrelated, however, this can also easily be relaxed but has only
negligible quantitative impacts.
30This is a pure normalization because we estimate the standard deviation of the normal distribution.
31UA is means-tested and a fixed amount. Hence we choose a value for the replacement rate that roughly
amounts to the replacement rate that a typical UA recipient would receive.
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paid to unemployed in our sample period. The vacancy posting costs are quadratic in the
number of vacancies and we calibrate ex-ante the marginal cost of a vacancy to be equal to
κ = 100. The functional form for the vacancy posting costs we use is c(v) = κv1+ρ, where
we set ρ = 1 to obtain quadratic vacancy costs. The time horizon in our model is T = 96,
which amounts to eight years. By choosing this relatively large time horizon we avoid that
agents’ search behavior is influenced by end-of-life effects.32
Estimation. Some additional parameters are set prior to estimation to standard values
from the literature. We set the monthly time discount parameter equal to β = 0.995, which
leaves us with an annual discount factor of roughly 5%. Risk aversion is equal to γ = 2 as
in Chetty (2008) and Kolsrud et al. (2018). The interest rate is set to R = 1
β
as in Chetty
(2008), Lentz (2009), or Shimer and Werning (2008). This leaves us with the following
parameters to be estimated:
θ = {λ, piH , piL, αL, σ} (1.9)
Thus the parameter vector contains the search effort elasticity λ, the productivity probability
of the productive type piH , the productivity probability of the unproductive type piL, the
unconditional type probability αL and the variance of the signal σ.
In order to estimate the parameter vector θ, we apply a classical minimum distance (CMD)
estimator as it is also applied by DellaVigna et al. (2017):
min
θ
(m(θ)− mˆ)′W (m(θ)− mˆ) (1.10)
where m(θ) is the vector of model-implied moments, mˆ is the vector of empirical moments,
and W is the weighting matrix which we set to be equal to the identity matrix. The theoret-
ical moments are simulated from the model and the reduced form moments are estimated as
described in Section 1.2.2. The CMD criterion essentially chooses parameters in such a way,
that the distance between the model-implied moments and the observed empirical moments
becomes smallest.33 For the estimation of the parameters we use a genetic algorithm, which
is a global optimization routine.34 Standard errors are then given by the diagonal elements of
(H ′WH)−1(H ′WΛWH)(H ′WH)−1/N , where W is the weighting matrix, H is the Jacobian
of the objective function evaluated at the estimated parameter values and Λ is a matrix with
the inverse of the empirical moment variances on the diagonal.
32Mechanically, in T = 96 agents stop to search because it only provides disutility to them. This end-of-life
effect also influences search effort in the periods before. However, in our specification these effects become
small very quickly and do not influence search in a quantitatively important manner in the first years of
unemployment.
33Note that in the estimation we use percent deviations instead of levels to give all moments the same
weight.
34Global optimization routines are helpful for possibly non-differentiable problems and problems with local
minima.
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Moments. First, our moment vector includes the hazard moments from the first 24 months.
Next, we include the average change in the search effort in month six and twelve relative to
the first survey interview conditional on staying unemployed for one year. We also include
the unconditional change in the search effort in month six and twelve relative to the first
survey interview. Then we add the average number of acceptable applications that a vacancy
receives as can be seen in Figure 1.1.35 Finally, we add six multiple spell moments where we
use the mean unemployment duration in spell two conditional on unemployment duration in
spell one. Note that we mimic the multiple spell sample in our model by simulating two
unemployment spells for workers with the same type and the identical level of initial assets.
This preserves the intuition of the length of the first unemployment spell being informative
about the second spell of a certain type, while avoiding to explicitly model job destruction
and keeping our framework more in line with standard UI frameworks.36 Figure A.4 shows
this non-parametrically. The Figure shows that the longer an individual’s UI duration is in
the first spell the longer is the UI duration in the second spell. As discussed in Alvarez et al.
(2016), the idea is that the stronger the correlation between the unemployment durations
in the two spells, the more important heterogeneity must be. The relatively small slope of
the curve suggests that duration dependence might be important and that heterogeneity
is not the sole driver of the declining hazard. This leaves us with a total amount of 35
moments to match. Minimizing (1) with respect to θ gives us the estimated parameter vector.
Identification. The parameters are jointly identified if any parameter vector θ has distinct
predictions for the behavior of agents. Intuitively, changing a certain parameter needs to
have different implications for the moment vector m(θ) than changing another parameter. In
our model, the level and slope of the hazard curve are closely aligned with the idiosyncratic
productivity parameters pij and the unconditional distribution of high types αL. The search
effort over the unemployment duration and especially the change in the search effort is
informative about the search cost elasticity λ. The multiple spell moments deliver additional
information on the unobserved heterogeneity in the model. The higher the slope of the
curve of the mean durations, the more heterogeneity in job finding rates there should be.
The intuition here is that the observation of two spells allows in principle to estimate a
fixed-effect for individuals. If the correlation between UI duration in spell one is strongly
correlated with UI duration in spell two, this hints towards sizeable heterogeneity (Alvarez
et al. (2016)), and vice versa. This information is particularly helpful to estimate σ since
the variance of the signal determines the importance of duration dependence in the model.
35To be very precise, we truncate the moment at 250 applications. However, only a handful of firms report
that many acceptable applications.
36Empirically, we extent our sample to the period from 1983 until 2011 such that we have a sufficiently
large sample of individuals with two unemployment spells.
26
Table 1.2: Estimation results
Parameter Estimate s.e.
λ 2.539 (0.001)
piL 0.213 (0.000)
piH 0.576 (0.001)
αL 0.648 (0.001)
σ 6.850 (0.003)
Notes: This table summarizes the estimation results of
our parameters. Column two shows the estimated pa-
rameters and column three the respective standard error.
1.4.2 Estimation Results
In Table 1.2 we show the estimated parameters and the respective standard errors. We
estimate the search cost elasticity λ to be 2.5, which is a relatively large elasticity of search
effort with respect to the value of employment. This implies that agents will react relatively
strong to benefit changes because a large responsiveness in search effort translates into
large responses to benefit changes. The productivity probabilities and unconditional type
probability suggest that the majority of individuals are of the low type (αL = 0.685), and
that low types fulfill the requirements of the firm in roughly 20% of all matches, while high
types fulfill the requirements of the firm in 58% of all matches. The heterogeneity in the
productivity will translate into a heterogeneity in hiring rates as shown in panel (b) of Figure
1.3. We estimate the variance of the signal to be equal to σ = 6.85 which implies that the
productivity is relatively noisy. In other words, signals are relatively informative and firms
have a relatively strong incentive to screen applicants according to their unemployment
duration because more high types are alive when an agent with a short duration is screened.
To get a feeling for the importance of the signal versus the importance of the duration
consider the case where only the duration is taken into account. Then the probability that
an applicant with a shorter duration is interviewed is one. In our estimated model, the
probability that a candidate with an unemployment duration of six months is screened
versus a candidate who is unemployed for five months is between 0.31-0.38, depending on
the agent type combination. Alternatively, the probability that a candidate with twelve
months is screened relative to an applicant with eleven months of UI duration is between
0.28-0.35, depending on the type. If duration would be uninformative, the probabilities
would be equal to 0.5. In panel (a) and (b) of Figure 1.3 we illustrate the screening and
hiring behavior of firms that the model implies. Panel (a) shows the average decline in
the callback rate of an application relative to period one. Our model suggests that the
probability to get screened by a firm, i.e. the probability of a callback, declines throughout
the unemployment spell and is only around 70% after one year and goes towards 60% after
two years of unemployment. Note that callback rates for both types are very similar due
to the large magnitude of σ. Hence, our model suggests only a small heterogeneity in
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(a) Average normalized callback rate (b) Hiring rates
Figure 1.3: Model-implied callback and hiring rates
Notes: The left panel shows the model-implied average callback rate of an application normalized to one in
period t = 1. The right panel shows the type-specific hiring rates for unemployed that the model generates.
The solid line corresponds to the low type and the dashed line to the high type.
the callback rate. This screening behavior translates directly into hiring rates since the
hiring probability equals the callback probability times the productivity of the type, as
shown in panel (b). For both types, hiring rates decline because the screening probability
declines. However, the hiring probability per application of a high type is around 50% in
the beginning because he is more qualified for firms than the low type. The low type has a
hiring rate of 20% in the beginning which also declines the longer he is unemployed. Hence,
we find considerable heterogeneity in productivity as well as important duration dependence
in the hiring rate. The estimated heterogeneity and duration dependence in hiring rates
then maps into job finding rates of agents. The job finding rate is the product of the
hiring rate and the probability to send out an application, namely the search effort of the in-
dividual. The dashed line in Figure 1.4 shows the model-implied job finding rate of our model.
Model Fit. How well does our model fit the targeted data moments and how well does
our model describe non-targeted empirical patterns? In terms of targeted moments the fit
is extremely good. Figure 1.4 shows the fit of the hazard rate where the solid line is the
data hazard and the dashed line the model-implied hazard. We are able to fit the hazard
curve in basically every month except the time around the benefit exhaustion.37 Table 1.3
shows the additional targeted data moments and the model implied moments. We can fit the
unconditional and conditional changes in the search effort very well and also the second spell
moments by capturing a positive slope. Finally, we slightly over-predict the mean number
37Here, other factors might be important, e.g. that people exit registered unemployment because they are
not eligible for social assistance. Because we do not model these features we disregard the spike at benefit
exhaustion. See DellaVigna et al. (2017) for an exploration with present-biased and reference-dependent
agents.
28
Figure 1.4: Model fit: Hazard rates
Notes: This figure illustrates the model fit of the job finding rate. The solid line corresponds to the data
hazard and the dashed line corresponds to the model-implied job finding rate.
Table 1.3: Data moments versus model moments (excluding hazard)
Moment Data Model
Unconditional change in search effort t = 6 0.710 0.763
Unconditional change in search effort t = 12 0.601 0.618
Conditional change in search effort t = 6 0.740 0.751
Conditional change in search effort t = 12 0.730 0.599
Mean duration second spell bin [1,4] 0.118 0.108
Mean duration second spell bin [5,8] 0.129 0.116
Mean duration second spell bin [9,12] 0.139 0.123
Mean duration second spell bin [13,16] 0.136 0.132
Mean duration second spell bin [17,20] 0.138 0.140
Mean duration second spell bin [21,24] 0.134 0.148
Mean acceptable applications 4.302 5.760
Notes: This table shows the fitted moments from our model. In the second column one
can see the data moments and in the third column the model-implied moments. The 24
hazard moments are excluded from the table and can be seen in Figure 1.4. The second
spell moments are divided by 100.
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of applications a firm receives. Indeed, the data moment is equal to 4.3 while the model
implied mean number of applications is 5.8.
These are two important pieces of evidence that we did not directly included in our estimation:
(a) callback rates and (b) duration elasticities with respect to potential benefit durations.
Kroft et al. (2013) find in an experimental audit study that the callback rate from an
application declines by about 40 percentage points after one year. In addition, the JVS data
suggest that 40 percentage points of firms are not willing to consider unemployed applicants
with an unemployment duration of one year or more as shown in Figure A.2. Our model
indeed implies a very similar pattern in terms of callback probabilities. As discussed above
our estimated model predicts a very similar average decline in callback rates. This makes us
confident that the magnitude of the estimated screening channel in our model is plausible,
since it compares well to the empirical findings on firm-induced duration dependence.
In Schmieder et al. (2012) the authors exploit quasi-experimental variation in age cutoffs
of potential benefit durations in Germany. If one looses his job above a specific age cutoff
the maximal potential benefit duration increases from 12 to 18 months. In their paper they
implement a regression discontinuity design and find that additional six months of benefits
increase the mean non-employment duration by 0.78 months. In our model, we can perform
this simulation and we find that a benefit extension of six months implies an increase in
the mean duration by 0.81 months. This is extremely close to the causal estimate from the
data and makes us confident that our estimate of the search elasticity λ is reasonable. It
ensures that the model-implied responsiveness to benefits is realistic. Since we are finally
interested in optimal unemployment insurance we want to have plausible behavioral patterns
with respect to benefit payments.
Robustness. Our model is estimated using a genetic algorithm routine. The advantage
of this approach is a solution that can better handle non-differentiable objective functions
and is better suited to find the global solution in a problem with possibly many local
minima. However, the drawback is that it is a stochastic optimizer and possibly delivers
different estimates in each estimation. Therefore we were running a bunch of estimations
with different bounds on the parameter spaces and different initial population spaces. The
estimates were always very similar to the reported ones above. We have chosen to report the
set of parameters that attained the smallest value of the criterion function. We also tried to
use different moments for the estimation including 12 or 35 hazard moments, dropping search
moments, dropping multiple spell moments and different definitions of the mean number
of applications. In all cases, the estimates were close to the reported ones. We also have
tried different functional forms and specifications of the pre-determined parameters. There
the estimated parameters naturally differ by more, however the qualitative features and
conceptual predictions stay the same. Note that two particular specifications are important
for the results: (a) the risk aversion parameter γ and (b) the curvature of the vacancy cost
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ρ, which we assume to be quadratic. The higher the risk aversion γ the larger demand for
insurance and the higher optimal UI benefits. Second, the larger the curvature of the vacancy
cost function the less responsive are vacancies in equilibrium. This can then determine the
sign and magnitude of the applications-per-vacancy channel which translates into either
increasing or decreasing hiring rates. For our baseline specification we have used parameters
that are either in line with previous literature as discussed above or deliver the best fit to
our data moments.
So far, we did not allow for observables like gender, education and other observables from
our model. One might suspect that job finding rates differ for these groups and that there
is sorting along the unemployment spell on observables which might affect our findings.
Therefore, we have computed observable-adjusted hazard rates which were extremely similar
to the average hazard rate that we report. We tried restricting the sample to men and
different time periods. Again, the hazard rates, the search behavior of agents and other data
moments were very similar. It might be that less educated individuals or older individuals
survive longer in unemployment and that this creates heterogeneity that our model wrongly
attributes to heterogeneity in unobservables. We have therefore created samples for observable
education, age and gender cells and compared job finding rates. Besides minor differences in
the level there was basically no difference in the decline in the hazard. This is a consequence
of only little sorting along the unemployment spell in terms of observables. In Figure A.5 and
A.6 in the appendix we have plotted the mean education of the unemployed sample along the
unemployment duration and the fraction of female along the unemployment duration. We
see that the curves are pretty flat and that there is not much sorting in terms of observables.
This makes us confident that ignoring observables in our model is a good approximation in
our setting and allows us to work with a more parsimonious model.38
1.5 Welfare Analysis
In this section we use the estimated model for welfare analysis by solving for the optimal
policy problem discussed in Section 1.3. Afterwards we compare the optimal policy to
different counterfactual policy simulations, followed by a discussion of more flexible UI
schedules.
1.5.1 Optimal Policy Results
To solve the optimal policy problem outlined in Section 1.3, we solve the model on a grid
for the policy parameters b1 and b2 and for each potential benefit duration D, using 1
percentage point steps for the benefit levels. The tax is automatically calculated via the
38To save space, we do not report figures and tables on the discussed robustness checks. All of the
robustness checks and alternative specifications are available on request from the authors.
31
Figure 1.5: Optimal UI versus current UI
Notes: In this graph we compare the current UI policy in Germany (solid line) to the optimal policy suggested
by the estimated model (dashed line). The x-axis shows the unemployment duration in months and the
y-axis the replacement rate of benefits in terms of the past wage.
Figure 1.6: Optimal UI versus current UI
Notes: In this graph we compare the current UI policy in Germany (solid line) to the optimal policy suggested
by the estimated model (dashed line). The x-axis shows the unemployment duration in months and the
y-axis the replacement rate of benefits in terms of the past wage.
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(a) Survival of unproductive type (b) Survival of productive type
(c) Search effort of unproductive type (d) Search effort of productive type
Figure 1.7: Counterfactual model simulations
Notes: The above panels show counterfactual model simulations of the search effort of unemployed and the
survival probability in unemployment. Panel (a) shows the survival in unemployment of the unproductive type
under the current policy (solid line) and the optimal policy ((dashed line) as a function of the unemployment
duration in months on the x-axis. Panel (b) shows the same for the productive type. Panel (c) shows the
search effort of the unproductive type under the current policy (solid line) and the optimal policy (dashed
line) as a function of the unemployment duration in months on the x-axis. Panel (d) shows the same for the
productive type.
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budget constraint. This gives us the global optimum of the welfare problem. The dashed line
in Figure 1.5 shows the optimal policy schedule implied by our model. To have a meaningful
benchmark we compare the optimal schedule to the current UI schedule in Germany as
shown in the solid line in Figure 1.5. The current policy pays benefits for one year and offers
social assistance thereafter. We find that the optimal policy should pay 73% of the wage in
the first 42 months and a 1% replacement rate afterwards.39 As one can see the optimal
schedule differs substantially from actual policies. Our main finding is that benefits should
be (a) higher in the first years, (b) paid for around three and a half years and (c) be very
low afterwards. The resulting optimal schedule is a combination of incentivizing agents to
search enough, providing insurance to budget constraint agents and to account for firms
hiring, screening and vacancy responses.
To build intuition for the relevance of equilibrium effects for the optimal policy result in
Figure 1.5 consider the average hiring rate of unemployed in Figure 1.6. Figure 1.6 plots the
average hiring rate of unemployed job seekers as a function of the unemployment duration.
The solid line shows the hiring probability under the current policy, i.e. at the estimated
level. In contrast, the dashed line shows that the hiring probability is less declining with
unemployment duration under the optimal policy. Hence, the planner reduces the importance
of screening by duration and shifts the hiring probability of agents upwards. A higher hiring
probability suggests that firms are more willing to hire the long-term unemployed. Panel (a)
and (b) of Figure 1.7 illustrates why this happens when the optimal policy is implemented.
Panel (a) and (b) show the survival probability of the unproductive and productive type,
respectively. Note that in the long term, under the current schedule some unproductive types
stay unemployed for very long, while under the optimal policy after four years almost all
unproductive types are working. In both panels the solid line shows the survival probability
at the estimated level and the dashed line under the optimal policy. One can see that
the optimal policy considerably alters the dynamic composition of the unemployment pool.
As panel (a) and (b) suggest, at any point of the unemployment duration the relative
composition changes towards the productive type, i.e. at any point there are relatively more
good types unemployed compared to the current setting. This in turn implies that firms are
more likely to consider long-term unemployed because the pool of applicants is of a better
quality under the optimal policy. The changed composition of unemployed is a result of the
change in search incentives for the two types as illustrated in panel (c) and (d) of Figure 1.7.
Again, the dashed line shows the search effort under the optimal policy and we compare it
to the setting with the current policy. Under the optimal policy the unproductive type is
incentivized to search more while the productive types searches less on average. Hence, the
composition of unemployed will move towards the productive types because now relatively
more unproductive types exit early in their spell. Hence, the planner considerably alters
39We solve for the optimal policy on a discrete grid and can therefore evaluate the welfare for each policy.
We find that the optimal policy is unique because no other policy schedule leads to the same welfare.
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search behavior of agents and hence the hiring and screening behavior of firms. However,
Figure 1.5 does not allow to distinguish how important these endogenous firm responses
are in terms of changing the optimal policy, relative to a setting without endogenous firm
responses where only search incentives and insurance motives are at work. We will discuss
the relevance of this firm adjustments and how they shape optimal policy in equilibrium in
the next subsection.
How large is the welfare gain of moving from the current policy to the optimal policy for the
unemployed? In other words, how much cash-on-hand would we need to pay an unemployed
individual under the current regime such that he is as well off as with the optimal policy?
When we implement this experiment we find that the gain of moving to the optimal policy
amounts to a lump-sum payment of nearly 5, 500 euros to an unemployed at the beginning
of his spell. This is a fairly large amount and moving to the optimal policy implies a large
welfare gain in our model.
1.5.2 Discussion
To show the quantitative importance of firm responses for the baseline result presented in the
last subsection, we perform various counterfactual simulations to decompose the importance
of firm responses for the optimal policy design problem.
Exogenous hiring rates. In the baseline model hiring rates for job seekers are endogenous
to UI policies. As we have illustrated in Section 1.3 higher benefits can lead to higher hiring
rates through the adjustment of firm beliefs about the pool of applicants and through changes
in the applications-per-vacancy ratio. If we fix hiring rates for job seekers at the level of
the estimated model under the actual policy in place and then re-solve the planner problem
we can decompose the component of the optimal UI policy that can be attributed to the
endogenous firm responses, namely hiring rates and vacancy creation. In panel (a) figure 1.8
we compare the optimal UI policy in the baseline model (dashed line) with the optimal policy
when hiring rates are exogenously set at the level of the estimated model (solid line). We
find that the schedules substantially differ and that UI with exogenous hiring is less generous
and paid for a shorter amount of time. Benefits after two years are however higher with
exogenous hiring rates, which is because with exogenous hiring more agents survive longer in
unemployment and the insurance motive becomes stronger. To be more precise, endogenous
hiring rates allow the planner to lift up these hiring rates by providing different incentives for
job seekers and firms. By implementing the optimal schedule the planner increases the value
of search and therefore reduces long-term unemployment. However, this is an equilibrium
effect, because more search effort of job seekers increases the value of a vacancy and the
expected profit of hiring. These equilibrium adjustments are absent in partial equilibrium
models. What panel (a) shows is that a large part of the benefit extension compared to the
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(a) Exogenous hiring rates (b) Exogenous vacancies
(c) No multiple applications (d) Full information
Figure 1.8: Counterfactual policy results
Notes: This figure compares the optimal policy of our baseline model (dashed line in both panels) with
different counterfactuals. Panel (a) compares to a setting where hiring rates are policy invariant at the level
of the estimated model (solid line in panel (a)). Panel (b) to a setting where the mass of vacancies is policy
invariant at the level of the estimated model (solid line in panel (b)). Panel (c) to a setting without multiple
applications and without screening (solid line in panel (c)). Panel (d) to a setting where firms observe agents’
productivity, i.e. σ = 0 and signals are informative (solid line in panel (d)). In all panels, the x-axis shows
the unemployment duration in months and the y-axis the replacement rate of benefits in terms of the past
wage.
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(a) Optimal b1 benefits (b) Optimal b2 benefits
Figure 1.9: Non-linear optimal UI
Notes: Panel (a) illustrates benefits b1 for the baseline case (dashed line) and the case with exogenous hiring
rates (solid line) as a function of the potential benefit duration D on the x-axis. The y-axis denotes the
optimal benefit level for b1. Panel (b) shows the same two cases for optimal benefits b2 as a function of the
benefit duration D.
actually implemented schedules is driven by endogenous firm responses. The reason for this
finding is that even small changes of hiring rates can create large changes in search effort and
survival rates. This shows that incorporating endogenous hiring decisions is quantitatively
very important for welfare conclusions in terms of optimal UI policies, because it changes
the optimal benefit level and benefit duration in a non-negligible manner.
Exogenous mass of vacancies. The above finding in panel (a) of Figure 1.8 is a mix
between vacancy responses and hiring rate responses of firms. Therefore, in panel (b) of
figure 1.8 we exogenously fix the amount of vacancies in the economy at the level of the
estimated model and allow hiring rates to be endogenous. This experiment allows us to
decompose the importance of the hiring response, i.e. the applications-per-vacancy channel
and the firm beliefs, holding fixed the number of open positions. We find that the vacancy
channel is quantitatively very small and optimal benefits are similar to our baseline policy
where vacancies are allowed to adjust in equilibrium. Hence, the longer potential duration
and the generosity of benefits is mainly driven be the endogeneity of hiring rates, not vacancies.
No multiple applications. This naturally leads to the question how optimal UI would
look like in our model if there was only one application per vacancy, i.e. there are infinitely
many vacancies and no crowding-out among applicants. This limiting case where vacancy
costs κ are equal to zero is an important benchmark for our model, because it shuts down the
employer screening channel. This implies that every applicant gets screened and hired in case
he is qualified. The difference to the exogenous hiring case is that the callback rate is flat
and that there is no duration dependence in the model. The single applications per vacancy
limit is equivalent to a standard partial equilibrium search model with heterogeneity in job
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arrival rates. Figure 1.8 panel (c) illustrates the optimal policy in this setting compared
to our screening model with multiple applications per vacancies. The solid line shows how
optimal UI should look like in the absence of employer screening. Interestingly, the optimal
schedule is close to the actually implemented schedule. The only difference is that benefits
are paid a few months longer and that b2 is somewhat smaller. The optimal schedule is
similar to the case with exogenous hiring, however D is smaller when there are no multiple
applications. This is because if agents do not need to compete with other applicants their
job finding rates are higher and the demand for insurance is lower.
Full information of vacancies. One additional interesting comparison on the importance
of screening is the full information case where there are multiple applications but firms
perfectly observe agents’ types and productivity. In this case hiring rates become flat and
true duration dependence disappears, but the applications-per-vacancy ratio is endogenous
and not equal to one. The solid line in Figure 1.8 in panel (d) shows how optimal UI looks
like if there is full information about the productivity of applicants. Because this implies
lower job finding rates of bad types the demand for insurance, even in the long term increases.
Hence, optimal UI is paid for longer (48 months) and b2 is at a higher level.
Fully dynamic UI schedules. So far we have restricted to optimal UI schedules with four
policy parameters. This is for two reasons: (a) our optimal schedules mimic current policies
and (b) solving the government problem with more flexible parametrizations is numerically
not feasible. However, we can illustrate fully flexible optimal UI policies with a distinct bt for
each unemployment duration t by calculating the optimal b1 and b2 level for each potential
duration D. This gives some indication about the shape of a more flexible schedule. In
Figure 2.1 panel (a) the dashed line shows how the optimal b1 level in the baseline is set
as a function of the potential duration D on the x-axis. In panel (b) the dashed line shows
how the optimal b2 level is set as a function of the potential benefit duration D. Panel (a)
suggests that optimal benefits should follow a hump-shaped pattern and that UI benefits
should be increasing in the first months of unemployment and be decreasing thereafter. To
see this, note that if only paid for 1 month, the optimal level of b1 is only about 0.4. If
paid for two months, however, this level is higher, which can only be the case if the optimal
schedule is increasing at first.
The solid lines in the two figures allow us to compare the optimal shape to the setting
with exogenous hiring rates at the level of the estimated model. One can see that under
screening b1 is increasing faster and stays at a high level for longer than in the setting without
screening.40 Hence, fully dynamic optimal UI schedules under screening should follow a more
40Note that we restrict to policies with bt ≤ 1 because benefit levels above the wage are not of practical
interest. However, this restriction leads to numerical fluctuations in panel (b) as one can see with the spikes
in the optimal b2 level at durations where b1 hits the upper bound. The spikes disappear if the upper bound
is set to a higher level.
38
pronounced hump-shape and be more generous and paid for a longer time than in a setting
with exogenous hiring rates, which is perfectly in line with our more restrictive policy results
in the baseline case with four policy parameters.
Alternative Parametrizations. In the appendix Figures A.7, A.8, A.9 and A.10 we show
some additional alternative parametrizations of the model to check how important various
parameters and assumptions are for the optimal policy outcomes. Naturally, the risk aversion
of agents matters for the generosity of benefits. The more risk averse agents are the longer
the potential benefit duration and vice versa. As DellaVigna et al. (2017) suggests agents
seem to have large discount factors or behave as if they are present biased. Therefore, as an
alternative we use β = 0.95 which amounts to an annual discount factor of 0.54. If agents
discount the future at the higher rate, benefits are higher early on but lower later in the
spell, which is exactly what one would expect if agents value the present more relative to the
future. The elasticity of the vacancy creation channel seems to be not very important for
optimal UI schedules as we show in the appendix. Finally, if we assume that all agents start
without assets to the unemployment spell, then optimal UI policy hardly changes compared
to the optimal schedule.
1.6 Extensions
In this final section we will discuss three extensions of our model and how they would
alter our findings: multiple applications of the unemployed, screening costs of the firm and
endogenous wages.
Multiple applications per worker. While we focused on the case of each worker sending
out at most one application, it is also possible to consider the general case where workers
can send out more applications. The main advantage of this extension is that it allows the
model to replicate the observed facts about the number of applications individuals send (see
Figure 1.1) more directly.
Following Kaas (2010) and Shimer (2004), a convenient way to include multiple applications
is to allow workers to search with continuous search intensity s and stochastically send
out a number of applications that follows a Poisson distribution with mean s. In this
case, the hazard rate is the expected probability of at least one application resulting in an
offer, hj(t) = 1− exp
(
− gj(t)s
)
, and gj(t) has the interpretation of being the endogenous
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success probability of each application, while s is the expected number of applications sent.41
Introducing multiple applications in this way does not change the rest of the model.
We experimented with this version of the model and the results are qualitatively similar. A
main difference is that multiple applications, in principle, introduce another coordination
friction, since agents get multiple offers and can accept only one. As a result, some vacancies
make offers that are rejected. This gives rise to the question if these firms should be allowed
to contact other applicants, if their first offer gets rejected. Otherwise, the coordination
friction reduces firm profits and therefore the number of vacancies. There are different
approaches to this issue in the literature. Some recent paper allow for recalls, i.e. the
possibility to contact other applicants (see e.g. Kircher (2009)), while others do not (Kaas
(2010), Gautier et al. (2016), Albrecht et al. (2006)). Without recall, it can be desirable to
make workers search less, since this makes the additional coordination friction less severe
and increases entry. For simplicity, and since we do not want to focus on this additional
coordination friction, we restrict ourselves to the case of one application per worker, as is
also done in Fernandez-Blanco and Preugschat (2018) or Villena-Roldan (2012).
Screening costs. Another possible extension is to make screening costly for firms, rather
than assuming that screening costs are tiny. In our setting, firms would still screen all
applicants for most realistic values of the screening cost (since the lower bound of the
expected profit is piLy, which is the expected profit of the low type).42 While one could argue
that the screening costs are included in the vacancy posting costs, an interesting feature of
introducing screening costs is that it would make the vacancy cost partially endogenous:
when unemployment duration or signals are not informative, firms on average have to screen
more applicants before finding a qualified one and would have less incentives to create
vacancies. From a policy perspective, screening costs may provide a rationale for trying to
make duration informative, since this would make hiring easier for firms. In the current
version of the model, the potential welfare gains from a decrease in screening already have to
be weighted against the potential decline in the number of vacancies. Screening costs would
amplify the latter effect.
Endogenous wages. A further extension would be to depart from the assumption of a
fixed wage. Our main motivation for this assumption is that it is a reasonable approximation
of the empirical evidence, which is discussed below, and that introducing endogenous wages
in our framework likely makes the analysis much less tractable. In standard matching
models with just one applicant per vacancy, wages are often assumed to be determined by
41A worker who sends a applications gets at least one offer with probability 1 − (1 − gj(t))a and the
expression results from taking the expectation over a, which follows a Poisson distribution with mean s. It is
interesting to note that this setting provides a micro-foundation for using 1− exp(−λs) as a functional form
for the arrival rate, which is commonly used in partial equilibrium models.
42See Jarosch and Pilossoph (2018) for a discussion of how to calibrate a parameter for screening costs.
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(a) Reservation Wage (b) Wage ratio
Figure 1.10: Reservation wages and realized wages by unemployment duration
Notes: The left panel shows the mean reported reservation wage (from the IZA ED) of individuals who have
been unemployed for zero, six or twelve months. The right panel shows the (realized) ratio of the wage
before and after unemployment (based on SIAB data) by unemployment duration.
Nash bargaining. However, this is more problematic when there are multiple applicants
per vacancy, since firms would have to simultaneously bargain with each of the applicants.
With wage posting, on the other hand, characterizing the equilibrium becomes challenging,
especially in our context of endogenous search effort and savings, both of which are important
for the analysis of optimal UI.43
From an empirical point of view, there is increasing evidence to support the assumption of a
fixed wage, conditional on worker characteristics. For example, Krueger and Mueller (2016)
find that reservation wages stay remarkably constant over the unemployment spells. Hall
and Mueller (2015) show that individuals often accept the first job offer they get. Their
evidence also suggests that relatively few individuals have the opportunity to bargain about
their wages, but rather face the option to accept fixed offers. Our datasets support these
findings for reservation wages as can be seen in Figure 1.10 panel (a). There one can see
that self-reported reservation wages are essentially flat throughout the unemployment spell.
In addition, in the JVS data employers report whether the hiring process included some
form of wage bargaining with the applicant and only 34% of firms report that this was the
case. Looking at realized wages, Figure 1.10 shows that the average ratio between the post-
and pre-unemployment wage drops fairly moderately from 98% to 90% after one year, even
without controlling for selection on observables throughout the spell.44
43Fernandez-Blanco and Preugschat (2018) consider the case of wage posting with directed search, but
assume that workers do not know their type and that there is no effort or savings choice.
44See also Schmieder et al. (2016) for a more detailed analysis of the wage effects throughout the
unemployment spell.
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1.7 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed a dynamic search model where firms can choose from a pool of
applicants and have incomplete information about their quality. Firms rank applicants by
their expected productivity, which makes it less likely that the long-term unemployed are
invited for interviews in the presence of other applicants. The model is estimated to match
several important features of the data regarding job-finding rates, search effort and vacancies.
Our welfare analysis suggests that equilibrium effects in the form of endogenous hiring and
interview decisions are quantitatively very important for the optimal design of unemployment
benefits. We find that allowing for these equilibrium effects leads to benefit schemes that are
more generous in the first place, benefits are paid for a longer time, but benefits are very low
at longer unemployment durations. More generally, our results demonstrate that modeling
the details of the hiring process can have quantitatively sizable implications for optimal UI
policy and that this requires integrating features into search and matching models that have
often been abstracted from - most importantly, the possibility of multiple applications per
vacancy.
An interesting aspect that we have not made explicit so far is that long-term unemployment
is not such a bad signal in recessions when the applications-per-vacancy ratio is high. If
there are many unemployed applicants per open vacancy then screening matters more and
benefits can be more generous and paid for a longer time. Hence, our findings can rationalize
benefit extensions as those implemented through the Great Recession in the US. Another
important question for future research is to find additional quasi-experimental evidence on
the importance of competition for jobs among many applicants and employer screening.
Reduced-form evidence on how hiring decisions respond to unemployment policies would
nicely complement our more structural approach. Alternatively, one could think of non-
standard policy instruments, for example hiring subsidies for firms that are used in some
countries.45 Such an instrument could help to mitigate screening by giving firms incentives
to screen unemployed with a long unemployment duration.
45In 2014, the German government announced to spend 150 million euros on wage subsidies for the
long-term unemployed.
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Chapter 2
The Marriage Market, Inequality and
the Progressivity of the Income Tax
2.1 Introduction
A progressive income tax is a common policy tool to reduce inequality in consumption and
welfare. The debate on tax progressivity has largely focused on redistribution across families
and has paid little attention to the question how the allocation of consumption and time
within families could be affected.1 Recent empirical work finds that there is substantial
inequality in consumption and leisure within households and that intra-household allocations
depend on the relative income of spouses (Lise and Seitz (2011), Lise and Yamada (2018)).
This suggests that in marriages where one spouse has a higher earnings potential than the
other, increasing tax rates at higher incomes and lowering them for lower incomes could
improve the bargaining position of the lower-earnings spouse. This bargaining effect would
reduce intra-household inequality in consumption and leisure, on top of the usual effect
of redistributing from richer to poorer households. In addition, progressivity could affect
inequality through its impact on marriage and divorce. Whether an individual is single or
married, and whom they are married to, has a significant impact on their living standard.
How does tax progressivity affect intra-household inequality and the marriage market? And
how much do these channels affect inequality relative to the usual effects of progressivity?
To address these questions, I develop an equilibrium search and matching model with intra-
household bargaining, labor supply and savings. Wage inequality results from differences in
labor market ability and shocks over time. Couples benefit from joint consumption, can pool
home production time and share labor market risk, but not all goods are shared equally
between spouses. Personal consumption and leisure are private goods. Couples decide
efficiently on allocations, but are unable to fully commit to future allocations (as in e.g.
Mazzocco et al. (2013)). The bargaining position of a spouse is given by how well-off they
1See e.g. Heathcote et al. (2017) or Conesa and Krueger (2006).
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would be as single. Bargaining positions are linked to the marriage market, since being single
includes the possibility of marrying in the future. In the example of a high-wage husband
married to a low-wage wife, the husband would be able afford a higher living standard if
he was single and would have better future marriage prospects. In this case, a progressive
income tax improves the outside option of the wife, since it increases the after-tax income
she would earn as single. This raises her share of consumption and leisure in marriage and
reduces intra-household inequality.
Tax progressivity further affects marriage and divorce, besides the sharing of resources in
marriage. When meeting on the marriage market, individuals have to decide whether to
get married or to stay single and wait to meet someone else. They take both the economic
characteristics of their potential partner and a non-economic match quality into account.
The main mechanisms through which tax progressivity affects marriage and divorce are that
it influences the economic value of individuals on the marriage market and how selective
they are about potential partners. An increase in progressivity makes low-income individuals
richer and they become more attractive on the marriage market and can afford to be more
selective. The effects on high income individuals are the opposite. In addition, from the
point of view of each individual, progressivity makes all potential partners more similar in
their economic characteristics and reduces the value of staying single in order to continue
search.
I calibrate the model to Dutch survey data on intra-household allocations, labor market
outcomes and marital histories. Before turning to the policy analysis, I first decompose
cross-sectional inequality in private consumption and welfare for the status quo. I decompose
the population variance into contributions due to inequality within and between married
couples, and due to singles. The within-couple component captures that spouses consume
different amounts of private goods, which is typically absent in studies of progressivity. In
the calibrated model, the within-component accounts for 23.9% of the total variance of
private consumption, singles for 21.4% and the between-couple component for 54.3%. The
relative magnitude of the within- and between variance in the model compares well to the
data on private consumption from the Dutch LISS panel. On top of private consumption, the
calibrated model allows to study inequality in the utility from private and public consumption,
leisure and home production. The advantage of this measure is that it allows to aggregate
welfare from consumption expenditure and time use and takes all public and private goods
that are available into account. The contribution of the within-couple variance to total
inequality is 6.1% in this case. This reflects households spending part of their time and
expenditure on public goods, which are consumed equally by both spouses. As a result, the
contribution of the within-couple variance is smaller than for private consumption only.
I then study the effects of a reform that increases in progressivity and analyze the impact on
inequality within and across households. The main experiment is a budget-balanced increase
in progressivity, by 40%, which increase average tax rates at higher incomes and decreases
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them at lower incomes.2 As the majority of OECD countries, the Netherlands has a system
of individual taxation, in which spouses are taxed based on their individual earnings.3 The
focus of the analysis is to decompose the total reduction in inequality in terms of changes
in within- and across-household inequality. The reform decreases the variance of private
consumption by 10.9% and reduces both the within- and the between- household variance.
The contribution of the within-household component to the total reduction in inequality is
24.77% for private consumption and 11.93% for the utility measure. Thus, in terms of utility
from private and public goods, 11.93% of the total reduction in inequality would be ignored
by abstracting from intra-household inequality.
The increase in progressivity in principle affects inequality both through its effects on
bargaining positions and on marriage rates and assortative mating. Since there are economies
of scale in consumption and home production, married individuals have a higher living
standard than singles. Thus, changes in marriage and divorce contribute to the effect of
the reform on inequality. In particular, inequality across couples could be affected by a
change in the composition of couples. I further use the model to quantify the role of these
composition effects. The model rationalizes the observed gender imbalance in domestic work
hours with a gender asymmetry in the home production technology, which makes women
more likely to reduce their market hours in marriage. This is reflected in matching patterns
and low-wage men have a lower probability of getting married, relative to higher wage men.
The increase in tax progressivity induces a small increase in the probability than low-wage
men get married to higher-wage women. This mechanism alone would generate an decrease
in assortative mating. I decompose the variance across couples further to investigate whether
such composition effects have a noticeable impact on inequality and find that their role
is very small. Composition effects explain between −0.3% and −2.8% of the reduction in
inequality within and across couples.
In addition to cross-sectional inequality, I further study how the reform affects expected
life-time welfare. I isolate the role of the marriage market channels (marriage and bargaining)
by also computing the welfare effect of the reform for an alternative version of the model, in
which marriage and divorce decisions and the intra-household bargaining weight are fixed to
the pre-reform decision rules. This can be interpreted as the impact of the reform if marriage
market decisions were exogenous and would not react to the reform. I then compare the
welfare effect of the policy between the full and the alternative model. The contribution of
the marriage market is the difference between these two cases. Without the marriage market
adjustments, the reform leads to a welfare reduction by 1.22%, in terms of consumption
equivalents relative to the status quo, whereas welfare decreases by only 0.9% when taking
the endogenous marriage market responses into account.
2The change in progressivity refers to the progressivity parameter of the tax function used in Heathcote
et al. (2017) or Holter et al. (2019). For details, see section 2.3.3.
3Exceptions are Germany, the United States and France where tax liabilities are computed based on the
income of both spouses.
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The literature on tax progressivity has mostly focused on inequality across households
and abstracted from intra-household inequality and endogenous marriage and divorce. For
example, in the macroeconomic literature, Conesa and Krueger (2006) or Heathcote et al.
(2017) quantitatively characterize the optimal level of tax progressivity. Similarly, a large
literature in public economics (recently surveyed by Piketty and Saez (2013)) has studied
optimal non-linear tax schedule in models without intra-household inequality. A few papers
have studied the effects of tax policy in two-earner models (e.g. Guner et al. (2011, 2012), Bick
and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2017)), but typically take intra-household allocations and marriage
outcomes as given. Notable exceptions, where taxes are allowed to affect intra-household
allocations, are Alesina et al. (2011) and Bastani (2013), who study gender-based taxation
and thus a different policy than tax progressivity. Gayle and Shephard (2019) study the
optimal taxation of couples in a static matching model, in which taxes can affect intra-
household allocations, and focus on the optimal degree of jointness of the tax schedule. This
chapter contributes by focusing on progressivity and the relative importance of inequality
within and across households. Thus, this chapter sheds additional light on the role of
intra-household inequality. In addition, I analyze a dynamic marriage market, which leads to
different mechanisms relative to a static matching model as in Gayle and Shephard (2019).
My research is further related to papers which have used relatively similar frameworks -
dynamic bargaining models - to study different aspects of the tax and transfer system, such
as for how long individuals are eligible to receive social assistance benefits (Low et al. (2018)),
the EITC (Mazzocco et al. (2013)) or a comparison of joint and individual taxation (Bronson
and Mazzocco (2019)). Relative to these papers, this chapter adds the marriage market
equilibrium, so that the distributions of potential partners are endogenously determined
in equilibrium. Equilibrium models of marriage and intra-household allocations are still
relatively rare (see e.g. Shephard (2019), Ciscato (2019), Gousse´ et al. (2017), Chiappori
et al. (2018) or Reynoso (2019) for some recent work). Chade and Ventura (2002, 2005) study
the impact of the differential tax treatment between singles and couples on the marriage
market. In my analysis, the tax code is formally neutral with respect to marriage, due to
individual taxation, but tax progressivity affects marriage rates by reducing wage inequality.
The focus of this chapter on intra-household bargaining is also related to Knowles (2012),
who studies the role of bargaining for explaining the time trend in relative leisure between
men and women. Finally, several papers have highlighted the role of the marriage market for
inequality (e.g. Greenwood et al. (2016), Fernandez et al. (2005) or Ferna´ndez and Rogerson
(2001)). These papers abstract from bargaining and intra-household inequality, and thus
focus on different aspects of the marriage market. In addition, they do not consider the
impact of policies.
In the empirical literature, a growing number of studies has investigated the role of intra-
household inequality. Lise and Yamada (2018) analyze Japanese panel data and relate
allocations to differences in relative wages. Santaeula`lia-Llopis and Zheng (2017) study
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Chinese data and find that standard equivalence scales understate inequality in food con-
sumption substantially and emphasize the role of luxury goods. Other papers have estimated
collective household models to infer private consumption from micro-data on allocations (e.g.
Lise and Seitz (2011), Cherchye et al. (2012, 2015, 2018)). Lise and Seitz (2011) conclude
that intra-household inequality accounts for about 25% of consumption inequality in recent
years and that it is crucial for the assessment of the time trend. In addition, empirical studies
that test unitary and collective household models often reject unitary models (e.g. Attanasio
and Lechene (2014), Lundberg et al. (1997)) and find that intra-household allocations react
to changes in outside options, which is consistent with models of bargaining.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 first shows stylized facts about
intra-household allocations. Section 2.3 describes the model, which is calibrated in section
2.4. Section 2.5 shows the details of the policy simulations and discusses the results. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Motivating Facts
This section briefly describes stylized facts about intra-household allocations. The main data
set being used is the ”Time Use and Consumption” module of the Dutch LISS panel (see
Cherchye et al. (2012) or Cherchye et al. (2017) for a detailed description). The module
contains relatively detailed questions about household expenditures. Individuals are asked
about their private consumption as well as about overall spending for different categories
and kids. The survey questions refer to personal expenditure for food, clothing, cigarettes,
leisure time expenditure and a few other categories. At the same time, only a part of the
overall consumption expenditure is directly assignable to a household member; the larger part
is non-assignable (containing for example trips, housing expenditure or utility payments).
I follow Cherchye et al. (2012) in their classification of non-assignable consumption. In
practice, then, it is assumed that a fraction of non-assignable consumption is public.
In the following, I highlight several aspects which motivate some of the model assumptions.
First, panel (a) of figure shows the ratio of the wife’s private (assignable) consumption
relative to total private assignable consumption. This figure suggests that there are quite
many couples in which spouses consume different amounts of private goods, which supports
the notion of intra-household inequality in consumption.4 In a within-between decomposition
of the variance of private consumption, the within-couple component has 51.1% the size of
the between-couple component.5
Second, panel (b) shows the distribution of the leisure hours of the wife relative to total
4Note that consumption surveys likely contain some measurement error. While the LISS panel asks
individuals about their expenditure for an average month, a more detailed diary which keeps track of
infrequent purchases would be useful. As a result, there might be some measurement error resulting from
individuals incorrectly estimating their expenditure.
5The within-between decompositions are described in more detail in section 2.5.2.
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Figure 2.1: Distributions of consumption, leisure and wages
Notes: Panel (a) shows the share of private assignable consumption of the wife relative to total (assignable)
private consumption in the household. Panel (b) and (d) do the same for hourly wage rate. Panel (c) depicts
the share of expenditure used for non-assignable consumption. The data comes from the LISS panel.
leisure of the household. The figure indicates that it is often the case that one spouse has
more leisure than their partner, which suggests that the allocation of leisure can be an
important dimension of intra-household inequality.
Third, an important question regarding the potential for within-household inequality in
consumption is the role of public goods. Panel (c) depicts the ratio of non-assignable
expenditure, i.e. expenditure that cannot be attributed to the personal consumption of either
spouse in the survey, relative to total expenditure and shows that it makes up for a relatively
large fraction of consumption in many households (for example due to rent payments). This
indicates that accounting for the publicness of some consumption is important.6
Finally, panel (d) shows the ratio of the hourly wage of the wife relative to the sum of
wages. The figure is important since one would expect within-household inequality to be
most relevant when spouses strongly differ in their earnings potential. Thus, the relative
importance of within- and between household inequality should strongly depend on how
assortative matching is in terms of wages. The figure provides an indication of how many
couples there are in which either of the spouses has an economically stronger position. The
focus is on hourly wages, rather than on income, since wages are a better indicator of the
earnings potential of an individual, especially for married women. The data indicates that
6Note that classifying consumption as either private or public is not straightforwad and ultimately requires
making assumptions about preferences. For example, one could regard a car as a public good, since it can to
some extent be used by both spouses, or as a private good, if only one spouse cares about having a car. In
addition, spouses could disagree over which car to buy, so that a given purchase, while technically being
used by both spouses, is partly ’private’ in the sense that it fulfils the preferences of one spouse more than
the other.
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dispersion in wages is relatively large. In a within-between decomposition of hourly wages,
the within-household component accounts for about 40% of the total variation. Interestingly,
the distribution is relatively symmetric, in the sense that there are also many couples in
which the wife has a higher wage than the husband.
Lise and Yamada (2018) report similar graphs for Japan. The main difference between
the Netherlands and Japan is that the gender difference is much less pronounced in the
Netherlands, whereas Japan has a large gender wage gap and the mean share of private
consumption of women is considerably lower. In the Netherlands, by contrast, there is also a
noticeable fraction of couples in which the woman has the higher wage rate. Earnings also
exhibit a strong gender difference in the Netherlands, since part-time employment is very
common for women.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Overview
The model is an equilibrium search model of marriage, divorce, labor supply and savings. In
each period, a new cohort of men and women is born and lives for a finite time horizon T .
Each model period corresponds to two years and the terminal period is T = 30. Individuals
participate in the labor market until retirement age TR = 21. Individuals are heterogeneous
in their labor market ability and face shocks to their earnings potential over their lifetime.
They decide on consumption and savings, as well as on splitting their time use between
market work, home production and leisure. There are two consumption goods. One is
private and the other one is public within the household and consumed equally by both
spouses, in case an individual is married. The home good, which is produced using the time
inputs of spouses, is also public within the household. The main features of the model are
that it allows for within-household inequality in personal consumption and leisure, and that
marriage and divorce decisions are endogenous.
Individuals start their lives single and can find a spouse on a search-based marriage market.
In each period, singles may meet a potential partner from the distribution of available singles.
Singles only meet potential partners who are from the same cohort and thus have the same
age. At the time of a meeting, individuals take the economic characteristics of their potential
partner and a non-economic ’love’ component into account. Marriage takes place if both
individuals prefer getting married over staying single for another period. Couples exogenously
have children according to a stochastic process. The economic benefits from marriage are
economies of scale in consumption and home production, since the public consumption good
and home production time are public goods within the household, and the possibility to
share labor market risk. However, not all goods are shared equally by both spouses. Personal
consumption and leisure are consumed privately.
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Decision-making in marriage is modeled as a limited commitment contract (Mazzocco et al.
(2013)). This means that couples decide cooperatively on allocations. The Pareto weight
of a spouse determines the weight in the objective function of the household and thus how
favorable the allocation is towards this spouse. The Pareto weight is initially determined
by Nash bargaining in the period when the couple gets married. The outside option in this
bargaining situation is the value of staying single and meeting another potential partner in
the next period. After marriage, the Pareto weight can be renegotiated when one partner
would prefer to divorce given the current Pareto weight. The non-economic match quality
of the couple can deteriorate over time, which, together with the wage shocks, may lead
to divorce. Divorced individuals re-enter the marriage market and can remarry in future
periods.
The distributions of potential partners that singles can meet are endogenously determined
in equilibrium. For each age group, these distributions depends on which individuals got
married or divorced in previous periods and thus leave or reenter the pool of available
singles. In a steady-state equilibrium, individuals have correct expectations over the future
distributions of singles. Thus, finding an equilibrium corresponds to finding a fixed point
between the expectations of agents and the implied distributions of singles.
In the following, the model will be described in more detail. Section 2.3.8 then shows
illustrations about how intra-household allocations are determined and discusses how this is
affected by the tax system.
2.3.2 Preferences and Home Production
Individuals differ in gender g ∈ {f,m} and have preferences over consumption, leisure and
a home good, which is produced with time as an input. There is a private and a public
consumption good and both goods are available to singles and married individuals. The
public good C is consumed equally by both spouses when an individual is married, as
opposed to the private consumption good c. The home good is denoted as D and is a public
good within the household. Individuals have a total time budget of 1, which can be divided
between market work (hg), domestic work (dg) and leisure (lg):
hg + dg + lg = 1
The per-period utility function from consumption, leisure and home production is given by:
u(c, C, l,D) = αc
c1−γ
1− γ + (1− αc)
C1−γ
1− γ + αl
l1−γ
1− γ + αd(b)
D1−γ
1− γ
Married individuals further get utility from the match quality of their marriage which will
be discussed in more detail in section 2.3.5. The preference parameter for the home good D
is allowed to depend on the presence of kids (b), which captures that couples with children
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typically spend more time on home production. The home good is produced according to
the following home production technology, that takes the domestic work time of each spouse
as the inputs.7
D =
ηdg when single(ηf (b)dzf + ηm(b)dzm) 1z when married
The parameter z controls the substitutability between the two time inputs. I assume that
the productivity parameter of home time is the same for single men an single women, but
allowed to differ between genders in marriage, depending on whether there are children
(ηg(b)). When ηf(b) > ηm(b), married women spend more time in home production than
men do, even in couples where both partners have the same wage rate. This captures the
empirical observation that women take a disproportionate share of total home production
time. The specification could for example represent gender norms and does not necessarily
reflect actual differences in ’productivity’.
The productivity parameter for married men is set to ηm(b) = 1− ηf (b). Individuals discount
the future at rate β and have access to a risk-free asset that yields an exogenous interest
rate R.
2.3.3 The Labor Market and the Government
Labor supply choices belong to a discrete set of hours H = {h1, ..., hk}. The (log) wage of an
individual is given by:
logwi,t = κi + i,t + κGg + uit
κi represents the ability of the individual. κGg refers to the gender wage gap.8 i,t is a Markov
chain that represents persistent changes in earnings potential over the life-cycle. uit is a
temporary (i.i.d.) shock and follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σT .9 In
retirement, individuals get a fixed replacement rate of their full-time earnings.
The government collects revenue through a tax on labor income. The tax system is represented
7The advantage of this specification of preferences and home production is that is allows for closed form
solutions for consumption (cf , cm and C) conditional on total household expenditure and the Pareto weight,
which makes the model more tractable. It would be an interesting extension to consider a home production
function where the public good enters as a substitute to time (as in Knowles (2012) or Lise and Yamada
(2018)). For example, the interpretation could be that households can partially outsource their domestic
work. However, it would increase the computational burden. Similarly, allowing for non-separability between
consumption and leisure would be an interesting extension.
8Note that the model abstracts from human capital accumulation/learning by doing. This was included in
an earlier version of the paper, but replaced by a richer distribution of permanent types to model the income
distribution and assortative mating in a more realistic way, which is important for the study of inequality.
The current specification can be thought of as frontloading the earnings potential of an individual into the
ability type. Adding learning-by-doing on top of the heterogeneity and persistent earnings risk would lead to
a very large state space.
9The distinction between temporary and transitory shocks is often made in the literature (see e.g. Krueger
and Perri (2006)). In addition, the temporary shock is helpful for computational reasons, since it makes the
problem more smooth.
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by a parametric tax function, using the functional form from Heathcote et al. (2017):
T (y) = max
(
(1− ψ1y−ψ2) · y, 0
)
This tax function implies that the after-tax income (conditional on being positive) is given
by:
y − T (y) = ψ1y1−ψ2
The parameter ψ1 determines the level of the tax, since it proportionally shifts the after-tax
income. ψ2 determines the progressivity of the tax system. Progressivity can be defined as
the average tax rate (T (y)
y
) being increasing in income and is commonly measured by the
progressivity tax wedge (see e.g. Holter et al. (2019) for details). When y1 and y2 (y2 > y1)
are both in the region of positive tax payments, this can be computed as follows:
PW (y1, y2) = 1− 1− T
′(y2)
1− T ′(y1) = 1−
(
y1
y2
)ψ2
Thus, given the functional form for the tax function, the progressivity wedge only depends
on ψ2. Married couples are taxed individually in the Netherlands, so that the tax liability
is calculated for each spouse separately.10 For simplicity, this specification abstracts from
aspects like transferable deductions between spouses, which would introduce a small degree
of dependence between partners.11 Note that the tax function T (y) is restricted to be
non-negative. This has the interpretation that T (y) models only the tax and not the transfer
system.12
Transfers are modeled as a simple income floor depending on family income, which prevents
households from experiencing very low consumption levels. Households with an income
below Bmin receive a transfer to reach this level, that is financed out of tax revenue. The
budget constraint of the government equates the expected life-time revenue from a newly
born cohort to an exogenous spending requirement G¯:
Rev(ψ1, ψ2) = E
[∑
t
βt
(
(T (yi,t)−B(yi,t)
)]
= G¯
Here, B indicates whether an individual gets the social assistance benefit. The revenue G¯ is
used to finance non-valued government expenditure.13
10The actual Dutch tax schedule consists of several steps, within which the marginal tax rate is constant.
Approximating the schedule with a tax function with few parameters makes policy experiments more
straightforward. In the calibration section, I will discuss the choice of parameters and how it compares to
the actual schedule in more detail.
11See de Boer et al. (2018) for a detailed overview of the institutional setting in the Netherlands.
12Excluding transfers from T (y) is required since T (y) is applied to the individual labor income of spouses,
whereas transfer are typically computed on the basis of family income.
13This can also be interpreted as the government producing an economy-wide public good P , which provides
each individual with an additive utility uP (P ) and does not affect choices. An alternative assumption would
be to rebate the tax revenue to workers, which would provide an additional minimum income.
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Note that in addition to all family-related channels, the model features the standard policy
trade-off of progressive taxation (as in e.g. Conesa and Krueger (2006) or Heathcote et al.
(2017)). An increase in progressivity (ψ2) is potentially welfare-improving because it allows
lowering tax rates for lower incomes (through ψ1) while keeping the government budget
constant. On the one hand, this can be desirable since it redistributes to low-income
individuals who have a higher marginal utility from income. In addition, a budget-balanced
increase in progressivity provides more insurance against wage fluctuations. On the other
hand, the increase in progressivity can also reduce welfare because of the labor supply
disincentives through high marginal tax rates.
2.3.4 Singles
Singles decide on consumption, savings and the time spent for home production, leisure and
labor supply. They are characterized by their gender, ability, the productivity shock, the
presence of children, if there are any from a previous marriage, and assets. Thus, the state
vector of a single is:
ωSi,t = (g, αi,t, i,t, bi,t, Ai,t)
In the beginning of each period, individuals observe the realization of the persistent produc-
tivity shock and whether the children grow up. Their decision problem is described by the
following value function and budget constraint:
V Si,t = max
c,C,h,l,d,A′
{
u(c, C, l,D) + βEVSi,t(A′)
}
c+ C + A′ = wi,th− T (wi,th) +RAi,t
d+ h+ l = 1
The current asset level is denoted as Ai,t, while A′ is the amount of savings for the next
period. The continuation value EVSi,t(A′) includes the expected utility from being single
in the future, as well as from future marriage, divorce and remarriage. State variables, or
objects that depend on state variables, are indexed by the individual and period.
In addition to their ability, the initial condition of singles also contains a realization of the
productivity shock. To ensure that the initial draw is consistent with the earnings process,
it is obtained by drawing from the distribution of the process after two periods, starting
with the median wage shock. In addition, individuals draw a small initial amount of assets,
that could e.g. be interpreted as a parental transfer. The assets are drawn from a uniform
distribution between 0 and 10% of the full-time earnings of the individuals.14
14The initial asset endowment is useful for computational reasons, since it makes the (equilibrium) asset
distributions in the first periods more smooth.
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2.3.5 Couples
Before turning to matching and marriage decisions, it is useful to discuss the decision problem
of married couples and, in particular, the role of the Pareto weight in more detail. Married
couples decide on consumption, labor supply and home production time. The utility of a
married individual (g ∈ {f,m}), conditional on these choices is:
U gi,t(c, C, l,D,A′) = u(c, C, l,D) + θi,t + βEU
g
i,t(λi,t, A′)
On top of the economic utility u(c, C, l,D), married individuals also experience the additive
’love shock’ θi,t, which represents the non-economic quality of the current relationship. Match
quality evolves stochastically according to an AR(1) process with persistence ρθ and variance
σθ:
θi,t = ρθθi,t−1 + θi,t + θ¯αf ,αm
θi,t represents the innovation of the match quality process.15 θ¯αi,αj(i) is a preference term
that generates additional utility depending on the combination of ability types (αf and αm)
of the couple. In practice, I assume that
θ¯αf ,αm =
θ¯ αf and αm in same ability quartile0 else
The interpretation of this specification is that individuals enjoy additional utility when they
are married to someone with a broadly similar ability type, for example because of shared
interests or social conventions. Thus, θ¯ will be referred to as the homophily parameter. This
helps the model to generate a realistic degree of assortative mating.16
EUi,t(λi,t, A′) is the continuation value of marriage that includes the possibility of divorce in
the next period. Married couples exogenously have children with a probability pb(t), that
declines with age and is zero once the couple reaches the age of 40. Having children is a
binary state (b ∈ {0, 1}), which can be thought of as all couples having two kids. Children
leave the household with probability pb,g.17 The state space of married couples includes the
current Pareto weight λ, the ability level (α), and productivity shock () of each spouse as
well as the assets, the current level of match quality (θ) and the presence of children (b):
ΩC = {(λ, αf , αm, f , m, A, θ, b)}
15In practice, the match quality process is approximated with a discrete process using the Rouwenhorst
method.
16This is comparable to Greenwood et al. (2016), who have a similar preference term for college and
non-college individuals. In my context, some alternative speficiations would be possible, for example to
let the preference term depend more continuously on the type difference, for example as some function of
|αf − αm|.
17This assumption avoids keeping track of the age of kids, which would greatly enlarge the state space.
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The most important variable that determines the allocation within the couple is the Pareto
weight λi,t. The weights are normalized such that λi,t is the weight of the wife and 1− λi,t is
the weight of the husband. The Pareto weight is endogenously determined. For the moment,
focus on a couple with a given weight Pareto weight λi,t, which was obtained in a previous
period. The household problem is to maximize the weighted sum of utilities of wife and
husband, subject to the budget and time constraints:
max
C=(cf ,cm,C,A′,hf ,hm,df ,dm,lf ,lm)
λi,tU
f
i,t(C ) + (1− λi,t)Umi,t(C )
cf + cm + C + A′ = wf,thf + wm,thm − T (wf,thf )− T (wm,thm) +RAi,t
hf + df + lf = 1
hm + dm + lm = 1
Thus, a high value of λi,t corresponds to a high weight placed on the utility of the wife and a
large amount of private consumption and leisure for her, whereas a low value of λi,t leads to
high utility for the husband. The utility levels evaluated for the optimal choices are denoted
as U∗f,t(λi,t, ωMi,t ) and U∗m,t(λi,t, ωMi,t ), given λ and the state variables of the couple ωc.
Since spouses can unilaterally file for divorce in the beginning of a period, allocations have
to make sure each spouse prefers staying married over divorcing. If this is not the case, the
Pareto weight can be adjusted to ensure that the spouse who would want to divorce stays in
marriage (limited commitment).18 The participation constraint requires that each spouse is
better off in marriage than as a single:
U∗g,t(λi,t, ωc) ≥ V Sg,t
(
Ai,t/2, αg,t, g,t, bi,t
)
Assets are split equally in divorce and children stay with the mother, who also takes them
into the next marriage.19 The Pareto weight of the couple stays constant until a participation
constraint is violated. In case one spouse would want to divorce, it may be possible to
increase their Pareto weight to make them stay in marriage. If this is feasible and the other
spouse also still prefers staying in marriage, the Pareto weight is adjusted in favor of the
spouse who wants to leave otherwise. Efficiency requires making the minimal adjustment
relative to the previous Pareto weight, so that the spouse is just indifferent between divorcing
and staying in the marriage. If such an adjustment is not possible, divorce occurs.
The interpretation of limited commitment is that spouses behave as under a constrained
efficient contract, given the constraint that the contract can be renegotiated if the partic-
18See Chiappori and Mazzocco (2017) for a theoretical overview of limited commitment models.
19The equal division of assets is a simplification that is often made in the literature (see e.g. Fernandez
and Wong (2017); Mazzocco et al. (2013)) and close to the legal regime in the Netherlands. Importantly,
this assumption rules out that couples can write prenuptial contracts to e.g. keep separate property, which
is rare in practice. Note that allowing couples to keep separate property would increase the importance of
bargaining, since then the spouse with the higher bargaining power would be able to keep more property in
their name, increasing the share of assets in divorce.
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ipation constraint of a spouse is violated in a future period. As a result, risk-sharing in
marriage is imperfect. Shocks to wages and match quality can trigger changes in the Pareto
weight of the couple. This is the more likely the lower the match quality of the couple, since
rebargaining requires that one individual would prefer to get divorced given the current
bargaining weight, which is less likely when match quality is high.20
2.3.6 Meetings and Marriage
Singles participate in the marriage market with probability m(t). This probability declines
with age to capture that it is harder to meet potential partners later in life, when fewer
people are single.21 Singles who enter the marriage market randomly meet a potential partner
from the (endogenous) pool of available singles. For tractability, I assume that singles only
meet others from the same cohort, so that spouses have the same age.22 The characteristics
of the potential spouse are their ability, productivity, assets and children. The probability of
meeting a spouse with a state vector (, α, A, b) is given by:
Mt,g(, α, A, b) = m(t) · Λt,g(, α, A, b)
Λt,g reflects the likelihood of meeting a potential spouse with certain characteristics, given
the distributions of singles at each age. Λt,g is endogenously determined in equilibrium,
since it depends on which individuals got married or divorced at previous younger ages
and on how much they saved and worked. The characteristics of each potential spouse
are denoted as ωi,t. In addition, an initial realization of match quality θi,t is drawn from a
N(µI,σ, σI,θ) distribution for each match, which captures the non-economic quality of the
potential marriage.
At the time of a meeting, have to decide whether to get married and, if so, set an initial
value for the Pareto weight λi,t. They observe the match quality draw and the persistent
characteristics of the potential partner. For technical reasons, it is helpful to assume that
the temporary wage shocks are realized after individuals have decided on whether to get
married. This ensures that the expected utility from marriage EwV Mg,t (λ, θi,t, ωf,t, ωm,t) is a
smooth function of the Pareto weight, even though labor supply choices are discrete.23 The
expectation Ew refers to the expectation over the temporary wage shocks. Note that the
temporary shocks are i.i.d., so that the timing assumption should have a small impact on
20Evidence from Lise and Yamada (2018) supports these models of decision-making, as they find that
decision power changes infrequently and more often before divorce and for big shocks.
21A richer specification would be to model M(t) endogenously as a function of the fraction of singles at
each age group, as in Guvenen and Rendall (2015).
22Otherwise, one would need to keep track of the age of both spouses, which would greatly enlarge the
state space.
23The smoothness of the Pareto frontier is helpful when computing the bargaining solutions.
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marriage decisions or bargaining. Importantly, individuals observe the persistent wage shock
of the potential partner before making the marriage decision.
When deciding to get married, individuals compare the value from staying single for one
more period and drawing another potential partner in the next period (EwV Sg,t) to the value
of getting married to the current potential partner (EwV Mg,t ). Given a value for the Pareto
weight λ, the gain from marriage of individual g is:
Gg(λ, ωf,t, ωm,t, θi,t) = EwV Mg,t (λ, ωf,t, ωm,t, θi,t)− EwV Sg,t(ωg,t)
For marriage to take place, there must be a Pareto weight λ ∈ (0, 1) such that both individuals
prefer marriage over staying single:
Gg(λ, ωf,t, ωm,t) ≥ 0 ∀ g ∈ {f,m}
If there is no Pareto weight such that both individuals prefer marriage, the match is rejected
and the individuals stay single for another period. In other cases, there is an interval of
weights [λ, λ¯] ⊂ (0, 1) for which both individuals prefer marriage over staying single. The
Pareto weight also has the interpretation of a transfer, since spouses can reduce their own
utility in order to increase the utility of their partner.24 The Pareto weight is determined by
Nash bargaining, which chooses the weight λ which maximizes the Nash product:25
λ˜ = argmaxλGf (λ, ωf,t, ωm,t, θi,t) ·Gm(λ, ωf,t, ωm,t, θi,t)
Note that this is the most essential model ingredient that determines intra-household
allocations. Section 2.3.8 provides a more intuitive discussion of how Pareto weights are
determined and how this can be influenced by the tax system. Nash bargaining relates the
allocation in marriage to the relative ’outside options’ of each individual. The outside option
is the utility of staying single for another period, as previously defined:
V Si,t = max
c,C,h,l,d,A′
{
u(c, C, l,D) + βEVSi,t(A′)
}
With the notation from this section, we can state the continuation value of singlehood as
the expected utility from future periods of singlehood and the expectation over all potential
marriages:
EVSg,t(A′) =
∫
ωM=(ωf,t+1,ωm,t+1,θ)
M(ωMt+1) · EwV mg,t+1(λ(ωMt+1)) + (1−M(ωMt+1)) · EwV Sg,t+1 dF (ωMt+1)
24In technical terms, utility is imperfectly transferable, since giving up one util does not increase the utility
of the partner by an equal amount. See Galichon et al. (2018) for a theoretical discussion.
25Note that the general formulation of Nash bargaining contains a parameter for ’bargaining strength’,
which corresponds to the exponents of the Nash product. Here, it is assumed that this parameter is 0.5.
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ωMt is a vector containing the characteristics of both individuals and the match quality
realization. M(ωMt ) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if marriage occurs given
these match characteristics and λ(ωMt ) is the Pareto weight that is chosen in this case. In
particular, the expression for EVSg,t(A′) highlights that outside options are determined both
by the living standard while single and by the full distribution of potential marriages in the
future.
2.3.7 Marriage Market Equilibrium
2.3.7.1 Definition of Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium consists of distributions of singles, policy functions for singles and
couples and matching rules such that
1. the policy functions (A, c, C, h, l, d) = P Sg,t(ωS) solve the problem of singles
2. the policy functions (A, cf , cm, C, hf , hm, lf , lm, df , dm) = PMt (ωM) solve the problem
of married couples
3. separation and rebargaining (D, λ˜) occur according to the limited commitment proce-
dure
4. the matching rule (m,λ) satisfies the participation constraints and the bargaining
solution, where m is an indicator for getting married and λ the initial Pareto weight
5. the implied distributions of singles, Λt,g(,H, α,A), are consistent with the distributions
that are used to determine the optimal choices and value functions from (1) - (4)
2.3.7.2 Discussion and Computation
The main concern of the marriage market equilibrium is to find distributions of singles of each
gender and age group (Λt,g(, α, A, b)). Since these distributions determine which potential
partners an individual can meet at each age, they partly determine the forward-looking
decisions about marriage, divorce and savings. At the same time, these decisions feed back
into the distributions of available singles at each age. Thus, equilibria need to be computed
via fixed-point iteration. Starting with a guess for the distributions of singles at each age,
one can solve the life-cycle problem recursively to determine the value functions. Then,
the actual distributions of singles, given the guess of the distribution, are computed from a
simulated panel of 1 million individuals and the guess is updated. This is repeated until
convergence. Since there are relatively many state and choice variables, computing the
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equilibrium is fairly time-consuming - the parametrization used for the policy experiments
runs on a cluster using 448 cores.26 The computational details are described in the appendix.
2.3.8 How does Tax Progressivity affect Intra-Household Inequal-
ity?
To illustrate the mechanisms of the model, this section discusses an example to show how
Pareto weights are determined and highlights the aspects that are relevant for the effects of
progressivity. First, consider a simple static example, in which the economy consists of two
individuals. Individuals consume the public and the private good and labor supply is fixed.
The utility function over private and public consumption is given by:
u(c, C) = αc
c1−γ
1− γ + (1− αc)
C1−γ
1− γ
Figure 2.2 illustrates the bargaining situation. The individuals need to determine the weight
of the woman λ, the weight of the man being 1 − λ. The decision weight determines
consumption and leisure in marriage. Each value of λ corresponds to a point on the Pareto
frontier, which is a combination of utility levels for the individuals. The higher λ, the higher
the utility level of the woman. The black (vertical) line is the value of singlehood for the
woman and the green (horizontal) line is the one for the man. In the graph on the left side,
wages are unequal and the value of being single is lower for the woman than for the man.
The final allocation must lead to each utility level being higher than the value of singlehood.
This is the case for a range of values of the Pareto weight, which corresponds to the line
segment between the points where the Pareto frontier intersects the values of singlehood.
Whenever this is the case, marriage takes place. The bargaining solution picks one particular
point on the Pareto frontier, which is marked by the dot. In the case of unequal wages, the
Pareto weight is more favorable for the man, who receives more consumption, reflecting the
difference in outside options.
The graph on the right side shows the case where wages are equal. As a result, the value
of being single is now equal for the two individuals. The new allocation is marked by the
dot and assigns equal utility in marriage to each partner. In this example, total household
income and thus the Pareto frontier were unchanged. Such bargaining effects are in line
with a range of empirical studies that tests unitary and collective household models and
finds that allocations react to changes in outside options (e.g. Attanasio and Lechene (2014),
Lundberg et al. (1997)).
In addition to the outside options, intra-household allocations are also determined by the
shape and location of the Pareto frontier (which is unchanged in the example in figure 2.2).
26The state space for married couples includes 48960000 elements (the match quality realization, the
permanent wage shocks and ability types of each spouse, whether there are children, the Pareto weight and
the asset level).
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Figure 2.2: Illustration - Determination of Pareto weight
Notes: The graphs illustrate the impact of changing relative wages on the bargaining outcome in a simple
example. The blue line is the Pareto frontier. Each point on the frontier corresponds to a Pareto weight.
The dot shows the bargaining outcome given the outside options.
With Nash bargaining, the initial Pareto weight is chosen such that the product of the
gains from marriage is maximized.27 The main determinants of the Pareto weight are best
illustrated by the first-order condition of the bargaining solution:
V Mf,t (λ)− V Sf,t
V Mm,t(λ)− V Sm,t
=
∂V Mm,t
∂V Mf,t
(λ)
The terms V Mg,t (λ)− V Sg,t represent the gains from marriage for each individual g ∈ {f,m},
given a Pareto weight λ. Allocations are determined by the relative gains from marriage
of each individual and the slope of the Pareto frontier, which indicates how transferable
utility is between spouses. When both individuals have a relatively high gain from marriage
irrespective of the Pareto weight, which is for example the case when the match quality of
the marriage (θi,t) is high, the left-hand side of the equation is close to unity. This shifts the
Pareto weight towards 0.5, where the slope of the frontier is also close to unity. Besides public
consumption, home production and match quality, the gains from marriage also include
risk-sharing in this model, which affects the Pareto weight.
Influencing the intra-household decision weight can improve utilitarian welfare, since the
27Note that there are other bargaining solutions. A common alternative to Nash bargaining is the
’Egalitarian’ bargaining solution (see Kalai (1977) or Knowles (2012)), which chooses the Pareto weight to
equalize the gains from marriage (the surplus) of each spouse. With linear utility, Nash and Kalai bargaining
are equivalent. With concave utilities, Nash bargaining also takes the slope of the Pareto frontier into
account. The main difference is that Kalai bargaining leads to a higher elasticity of the Pareto weight with
respect to the utilities. Thus, with Kalai bargaining, there would be more intra-household inequality and a
stronger reaction of Pareto weights to the tax system. As discussed in section 2.4.2, the implied elasticities
of Nash bargaining seem quite in line with empirical evidence. A second difference is that utility terms which
are shared equally by both spouses (such as the non-economic ’love’ component θi,t) do not influence the
Kalai bargaining outcome, while the Nash outcome does depend on θi,t.
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gain of one person usually offsets the loss of the other (utility is imperfectly transferable). In
the example discussed above, equalizing wages, such that the decision weight is set to 0.5 is
the optimal policy for a utilitarian government that places equal weights on both individuals.
The discussion so far focused on static situations, in which the outside option is to stay
single for the period. In the full model, the outside option for each individual is not to
stay single for the rest of the lifetime, but includes the possibility of future (re-)marriage.
As a result, outside options depend on the distributions of potential partners that will be
available in the future, the probability of getting married in the future, and future Pareto
weights. Progressivity affects outside options by equalizing living standards while single
and also by changing future marriage market outcomes. Note that the marriage market
equilibrium implies that the distributions of potential partners that individuals meet are
endogenous and changes due to policy reforms. Changes in progressivity can lead to changes
in selection into marriage, which is reflected by the equilibrium distributions of types. In
addition, progressivity changes how much different individuals can save and therefore the
asset distributions of singles.
Before turning to the calibration and results, I briefly discuss alternative policy instruments
which could be used to reduce intra-household inequality. Since the source of intra-household
inequality in this model is differences in wages (which make the values of single life unequal),
tax progressivity is a fairly direct instrument to reduce these wage differences. To equalize
the threat points of spouses, one could in principle also tax only singles very progressively.
However, a highly progressive income tax for singles only would create large marriage bonuses
and penalties and is less likely to be implemented in practice. At the very low end of the
income distribution, the transfer system could also help to equalize bargaining positions.
While this is a very interesting issue, the transfer system affects only a part of the population
and the income tax would be more suitable to address intra-household inequality along the
whole distribution.
2.4 Calibration
2.4.1 Calibrated Parameters
A number of parameters are set before the calibration routine. The coefficient of risk aversion
is set to 1.5, which is a standard value in the literature. The discount factor is 0.9409, which
implies a yearly discount factor of 0.97 (one period are two years). The interest rate is set
to R = 1/β = 1.063. To set the preference parameter for the private consumption good,
αc, I use the fact that the preference specification implies a closed form solution for the
share of public consumption of total expenditure, which only depends on the Pareto weight
and the coefficient of risk aversion. Setting the preference parameter αc to 0.277 implies
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that households spend roughly 61% of their expenditure on public goods.28 Since wages
are exogenous in the model, the wage process can also be set externally. The parameters
that need to be set are the variance and persistence of the wage shock. This is done using
data from the Dutch Socioeconomic Panel, due to its larger sample size. The wage process
and the ability distribution are calibrated to match the cross-sectional dispersion of wages,
as well as within-individual wage changes. Thus, in particular, the calibration targets the
empirical degree of wage inequality. The fit of the wage moments and the corresponding
parameters are shown in the appendix. The remaining parameters are calibrated to match a
set of data moments. The calibrated parameters are the preference parameters for leisure and
the home good, the variance and persistence of the match quality shock, the meeting rate
in the last period and the homophily parameter for assortative matching.29 Regarding the
moments, I match the share of individuals that is currently married or cohabiting at age 20
and 36, the share that ever married or cohabiting by age 36, the share that ever experienced
a divorce or separation by ages 36 and 42.30 These moments are constructed based on the
Dutch Kinship Survey, which provides retrospective data on life histories. In addition, I
match women’s average hours spent on domestic and market work. These moments are
based on the LISS panel and included separately by the number of kids, since the preference
for home production is allowed to differ for couples with kids. Finally, to get a realistic
degree of assortative matching, I also target the share of the total variance of hourly wages
that is due to the variation within households. This moment is primarily matched by the
preference term for homophily. Intuitively, if couples were randomly matched, the share of
the within-variation would be high since there would be many couples with unequal wages.
Interestingly, this measure is relatively high in the data (0.4), suggesting that wage variation
within couples is quite substantial.
The model is calibrated by minimizing the distance between model and data moments. Solving
for the equilibrium distributions for each trial set of parameters would be computationally
very expensive. Thus, I experimented with different approaches to reduce this computational
burden. In practice, I start with a reasonable initial guess for the distributions, solve and
simulate the model only once for each trial parameter vector, then update the distributions
with a very small weight on the new distributions and proceed with the next trial parameter
vector. In particular, this avoids solving for the full distributions for parameter vectors
28The exact share varies a little depending on the Pareto weight. The motivation for the data target is the
procedure described in Cherchye et al. (2017): since only a part of the consumption expenditure is assignable
in the LISS data, the authors assume that 50% of the remaining expenditure is public and the rest is private.
With this assumption, I obtain 61% as the mean share of expenditure on public goods.
29Recall that the meeting rate is assumed to be linear, so that only the rate in the last period needs to be
determined. The meeting rate in the first period is set to 1. The decline in the meeting rate helps the model
to rationalize that the fraction of married individuals is lower than one at older ages.
30In the following, the term ’married’ will refer to both married and cohabiting couples in the context
of the data. Cohabitation is included in the data moments to accurately target the share of individuals in
long-term partnerships, which would otherwise be understated. Note that there are some legal differences
between married and cohabiting couples that are not captured by the model (relating e.g. to the division of
assets upon divorce).
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Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value
Scale of leisure, women (αl) 1.20
Scale of home production, no kids (αD(0)) 0.21
Scale of home production, kids (αD(1)) 0.68
Home productivity, women (ηf ) 0.62
Homophily term (θ¯) 0.73
Variance of match quality, married (σl) 1.29
Autocorrelation of match quality (ρl) 0.89
Mean of initial match quality (µI,θ) -0.21
Variance of initial match quality (σI,θ) 0.74
Meeting rate in last period 0.01
which would deliver a bad fit to the data anyway. After many iterations of the optimization
algorithm, the distributions are close to the equilibrium distributions. The final parameters
and distributions from this procedure are then used as starting points for the usual fixed
point iteration, which converges after a few steps and delivers a good fit to the data. The
calibrated parameter values are shown in table 2.1. Table 2.2 compares the model moments
to the data moments that are targeted in the calibration.
2.4.2 Model Implications and Comparison to Data
Before turning to the results, this section first shows how the model compares to the data,
in terms of inequality within and between households. Figure 2.3 shows the relative private
consumption and leisure within couples, expressed as the ratio of female consumption and
leisure relative to the sum of both household members. Thus, a value of 0.5 corresponds
to both spouses having equal amounts. Relative consumption and leisure are untargeted
in the calibration and are determined by the bargaining solution and the marriage market
equilibrium. Both in the model and in the data, there is more dispersion in consumption
than in leisure. In addition, the figure shows that the model generates less dispersion in
consumption and leisure than present in the data, leaving room for alternative explanations of
intra-household inequality (other than bargaining) that are not captured by the model, such
as preference heterogeneity, which could be introduced as a residual.31 To assess whether the
bargaining solution gives empirically plausible outcomes, one can compare the model-implied
31Preference heterogeneity would be an interesting extension, partly because it could increase the potential
for intra-household inequality: when the preferences of spouses differ, bargaining power becomes more
important.
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Table 2.2: Model fit
Model Data
Work hours, women, couples without kids 0.37 0.35
Work hours, women, couples with kids 0.20 0.20
Home hours, women, couples without kids 0.17 0.21
Home hours, women, couples with kids 0.42 0.48
Leisure, women, couples without kids 0.46 0.44
Leisure, women, couples with kids 0.39 0.32
Mean share of housework (women) 0.61 0.60
Currently married, age 20 0.25 0.24
Currently married, age 36 0.82 0.79
Ever married, age 36 0.93 0.92
Ever divorced, age 36 0.25 0.31
Ever divorced, age 42 0.32 0.31
Share of within-couple wage variance 0.37 0.40
Notes: This table summarizes the fit of the model. The time-use moments are
expressed as the fraction of total non-sleeping time which are used for the corre-
sponding activity.
elasticity of the Pareto weight with respect to relative wages to empirical estimates. Lise
and Yamada (2018) estimate that on average increasing the difference in wages at the time
of marriage by 10% translates into a 2.3% difference in the Pareto weight. In the model, the
corresponding change in the Pareto weight is 1.9%, indicating that the implied elasticity of
the Pareto weight seems reasonable and compares well to empirical studies.32 In particular,
this elasticity of the Pareto weight is an important statistic for policy analysis. Finally, the
figure also contains the distribution of household income of couples in the model and in
the data, indicating that the model does a reasonable job at capturing inequality across
households.
32Note that the model-implied elasticity of the Pareto weight could be increased by using Kalai bargaining
instead of Nash bargaining. However, in that case, the elasticity would be higher than the value found by
Lise and Yamada (2018).
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Figure 2.3: Inequality within and across couples
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of relative (private) consumption and leisure within households
and the corresponding distributions in the data. Relative allocations are computed as the amount of the wife
relative to the sum within the household (for example, cfcf+cm ). In addition, the figure shows the distribution
of (gross) household income.
To illustrate the Pareto weights underlying the intra-household allocations, table 2.3 shows
the mean Pareto weight for each combination of ability group. Each group contains three
ability types. The Pareto weights vary substantially across couples. In cases in which
husband and wife are in the same ability group, the weights are relatively even on average.
In unequal marriages, the individual with the better outside option gets a higher share of
the surplus. For example, in couples which the wife is in the lowest ability group (L) and
the husband in the highest (H), the mean Pareto weight is 0.26.
Table 2.3: Pareto weights by ability group of wife and husband
Men - L Men - LM Men - UM Men - H
Women - L 0.51 0.44 0.36 0.26
Women - LM 0.58 0.50 0.43 0.32
Women - UM 0.65 0.59 0.49 0.39
Women - H 0.74 0.68 0.60 0.48
Notes: The table shows the mean Pareto weights of couples across ability groups. ”L” is the lowest
group, ”H” the highest. For example, group ”L” contains types 1, 2 and 3.
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2.5 Results
In this section, I first use the calibrated model to analyze inequality given the current tax
schedule in more detail. How much of inequality is due to inequality within couples and
across couples? How much is due to singles and due to the difference in means between
singles and married individuals? I then describe the policy experiment - an increase in tax
progressivity - and show how the reform affects inequality through its impact on within-family
allocations, marriage and divorce. To complement the analysis of (cross-sectional) inequality,
I finally also turn to the effect of the reform on (ex-ante) welfare.
2.5.1 Inequality of What?
The model allows to go a step further than studying income inequality and consider inequality
in consumption and utility more generally. Consumption inequality has been widely studied
(see for instance Krueger and Perri (2006), Blundell and Preston (1998), Blundell et al.
(2008)). As demonstrated by Lise and Seitz (2011), consumption inequality is potentially
understated by ignoring within-household inequality and assuming that consumption is
shared equally within the household instead.
To get a complete picture of inequality, one would ultimately be interested in comparing utility
in the population, since this captures that individuals differ not only in consumption, but also
in their leisure and home production. This has recently been highlighted by Chiappori and
Meghir (2015) and Cherchye et al. (2018), who propose to compare the economic well-being
across individuals in terms of money-metric welfare indices, which take the full basket of
goods into account. Thus, in addition to consumption inequality, I also consider inequality in
utility (u(cit, Cit, lit, Dit)). Note that this requires a structural model, since utility depends
on the calibrated preference parameters, which attach weights to each good and are needed
to be able to summarize all goods in a single index. While the main analysis focuses on
inequality in utility directly, I also converted utility levels to a money-metric index, the
values of which are more easily interpretable, and obtained similar results for inequality.
These robustness checks are relegated to section 2.5.5.
Finally, I also consider inequality in expected life-time utility. The motivation for this is
that this is the broadest utility index, which does not only capture the current economic
well-being, that may be influenced by short-term shocks, but also the expectation about the
future. The expected remaining life-time utility of an individual with age t is denoted as
Eui,t:
Euit = u(cit, Cit, lit, Dit) + βVit
Here, Vit denotes the continuation value, conditional on being single or married and the
corresponding state variables. To focus on economic inequality, I subtract the expected utility
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from ’love’ (θ) from the continuation value, so that Eui,t only captures expected streams of
consumption, leisure and home production.33 Note that differences in (remaining) life-time
utility are partly due to a difference in the remaining number of periods when individuals
do not have the same age (for example, consider comparing Euit of a 20-year-old and a
40-year-old). To make utility levels comparable across age groups, I compute the per-period
value uLTit that would be required over the remaining life-time to achieve utility Euit:
T∑
t′=t
βt
′−tuLTit = Euit
Thus, uLTit converts the expected life-time utility to a per-period average and can be interpreted
as a measure of expected economic well-being.
2.5.2 Decomposition of Inequality
The variance of these outcomes, denoted as Xi, can be decomposed into components due to
inequality within and between households and due to singles.34 The variances within and
between couples are defined as follows (h is the index of the married household):
V W (Xi) = E
(
V
(
Xi|i ∈ h
))
V B(Xi) = V
(
E(Xi|i ∈ h)
)
The interpretation of the within-couple variance is that it measures how much allocations
differ between spouses and takes the expectation of this variance over all couples. The
between-household component is the variance of the household means, measuring inequality
across households.
To decompose inequality of the population, one further needs to take singles into account.
The shares of singles and married individuals in the population are ps and pm. Singles enter
through two separate terms. The first is the variance of Xi in the group of singles, V S(Xi).
The second term reflects that singles and married individuals differ in their mean outcome.35
33Since θ enters utility additively, one can compute the expected value of future realizations of θ for each
state and subtract this value from the continuation values of singles and married individuals as defined
previously. Note that the match quality shock θ would in principle introduce some interesting considerations
about inequality. Low-wage individuals might be more willing to accept and remain in ’bad’ marriages for
economic reasons, so that their poverty would be reflected in the non-economic match quality component.
34In the appendix, I also consider other inequality measures, such as the Theil index, for which the results
are very similar to the results from using the variance.
35This term is the between-variance that results from applying a within-between decomposition to the two
groups of singles and married individuals:
V(Xi) = pmVM (Xi) + psV S(Xi) + V BMS(Xi)
Here, VM (Xi) is the variance across married individuals.
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This is denoted as the variance ’between married and single individuals’:
V BMS(Xi) = ps
(
E(Xi| singles)− E(Xi)
)2
+ pm
(
E(Xi| married)− E(Xi)
)2
V BMS partly captures economies of scale. Married individuals can share the public con-
sumption good with their spouse and are able to afford a higher living standard than singles.
In addition, spouses can pool home production time and enjoy more leisure. Finally, the
term can also reflect selection into marriage - if, for example, high ability individuals were
more likely to get married, this would lead to a mean difference between singles and married
individuals even when there are no economies of scale.
Using these expression leads to the following decomposition of the population variance:
V (Xi) = pmV W (Xi) + pmV B(Xi) + psV S(Xi) + V BMS(Xi)
Note that the components are weighted by ps and pm. The higher the fraction of singles or
married, the higher is the contribution of the group to the population variance.
Table 2.4 shows the results of the decomposition based on the calibrated model. The
decomposition captures cross-sectional inequality, since it pools all age groups and reflects
the population in steady state. The first column reports the decomposition of log private
consumption. The single component accounts for 21.4% of the total variance. Note that
this value takes the population fraction of singles into account, which reduces the size of
the component relative to the variance of singles. The within household variance accounts
for 23.9% of inequality in private consumption, while the between household component
accounts for about 54.3%. The variance between married couples and singles is small (0.4%),
indicating that the mean difference in private consumption between the two groups is small.
The second column shows the decomposition for the per-period utility from private and public
consumption, leisure and home production. Thus, this measure takes all private and public
goods into account and weights them according to the calibrated preference parameters.
Reflecting the importance of public goods (public consumption and home production), the
within-couple component now accounts for 6.1% of total inequality. Interestingly, the variance
between singles and married couples gets more important in this case (8.9%), which shows
that the economies of scale in terms of public consumption and home production, which
couples enjoy relative to singles, are substantial.
The third column finally shows the decomposition for expected life-time utility (uLTit ). At
any point in time, some individuals may be worse (or better) off due to randomness in
wages, marital status and fertility, but this is mitigated when taking the expectation over
the future. Note that the presence of divorce creates additional differences in the well-being
of spouses. For example, consider a couple of a low-wage man and a high-wage woman,
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Table 2.4: Variance decomposition
log(cit) u(cit,Cit, lit,Dit) uLTit
Variance 0.1 1.26 0.64
Within couples (% of total) 23.9 6.1 9.5
Between couples (% of total) 54.3 65 72.9
Singles (% of total) 21.4 20 17.2
Betw. sin. and mar (% of total) 0.4 8.9 0.4
Notes: The table shows the variance decomposition for private consumption, the per-period utility and
(per-period) remaining life-time utility based on the model. Each row reports the fraction of the total
fraction due to this component.
which is likely to divorce soon. If marriages on average are substantially assortative, the
man would be worse off than the woman in terms of expected future utility, since he would
expect to get remarried to a woman with a lower wage than his current wife. This reasoning
also applies to inequality across couples, since a ’stable’ couple is better off than a couple
where divorce is impending. Overall, the within-household components accounts for 9.5% of
total inequality for the life-time utility measure, which is relatively similar to the case of
looking at per-period utility only. Note that the importance of inequality between singles and
married individuals drops significantly (from 8.9% to 0.4%). This reflects singlehood being
a transitory phenomenon for most individuals. While singles have a lower living standard
than married individuals, they mostly expect to get married soon.
For comparison and robustness, I also conducted the decompositions for alternative measures,
including measures that convert utility levels into money-metric indices. These cases are
discussed in more detail in section 2.5.5. The results from the alternative measures are very
similar to considering inequality in utility.
2.5.3 Experiment: Increase in Tax Progressivity
The policy experiment studies the effects of a hypothetical increase in progressivity, by
varying the progressivity parameter (ψ2) of the tax function
T (y) = max
(
(1− ψ1yψ2) · y, 0
)
The level parameter ψ1 is adjusted to keep the budget of the government balanced. The
policy experiment thus raises tax rates for higher incomes, while lowering them for lower
income. The current system is approximated by a progressivity parameter of 0.15 and a level
parameter of 0.61, which results from fitting the tax function to income tax rates reported
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by the OECD. When the progressivity parameter (ψ2) is changed, the level parameter (ψ1)
is adjusted to ensure that the budget constraint of the government is balanced. The target
level of expenditure is set to the revenue that the government obtains for the current tax
system in the calibrated model. To study the effects of these reforms, I compare steady
states, which can be interpreted as analyzing the long-run impact of the reform.36
The hypothetical reform increases the progressivity parameter by 0.06. To illustrate the
magnitude of the tax change, figure 2.4 shows the change of the average tax rate due to
the policy change. The reform reduces the average tax rate at lower incomes by up to 4%,
while it increases the average tax rate for high income levels (around 150.000 e) by ≈ 5%.
The motivation for this particular reform is that it is within the range of the cross-country
variation in progressivity estimated e.g. by Holter et al. (2019). The focus of the policy
analysis is mainly to compare the relative magnitude of the different components of inequality.
I also conducted the analysis for different potential reforms and the relative importance of
the different components (in particular, the role of intra-household inequality) is similar.
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of policy experiment
Notes: The figure shows the change in the average tax rate due to the reform.
2.5.4 How does the Reform affect Inequality?
To analyze how the reform affects inequality along the dimensions of the marriage market, I
decompose the change in inequality. The variance before and after the reform are denoted
as V0 and V1:
Vk(Xi) = pm,kV Wk (Xi) + pm,kV Bk (Xi) + ps,kV Sk (Xi) + V BMSk (Xi)
36Computing the transition path would raise some complications regarding the marriage market equilibrium.
Following the reform, individuals would have to forecast how the reform affects the marriage and divorce
decisions of others, and thereby the pool of singles they will meet. Intuitively, the main difference between
the transition and the new steady state concerns the decision weight in existing couples: changes in the
weight would require that a participation constraint binds, which is more likely for larger reforms.
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The goal is to express the percentage change in the variance (Vˆ = V1−V0
V0
) as a weighted sum
of the change in each of the variances from the decomposition. The change in the variance
between the two policy regimes can be decomposed in the following way:
Vˆ (Xi) = ω1Vˆ S + ω2Vˆ W + ω3Vˆ B + CˆBMS + ω0pˆm + Rˆ
VˆS is the percentage change in the variance of singles, Vˆ B and Vˆ W are the changes of the
variances between and within married couples. These changes are weighted by the importance
of the component before the reform (ω1, ω2, ω3), to reflect that each of the percentage changes
acts on a different base. For example, consider a case where the within-couple component
declines by 20% and accounts for 10% of the total variance before the reform. This, in
isolation, would lead to a 2% (= 0.1 · 0.2) decrease in the total variance.37 I further separate
the effect of changes in the fraction of the population that is married (ω0pˆm). pm enters
all of the components of the decomposition and has two effects. First, an increase in pm
reduces the weight placed on the variance across singles and increases it for the variances
within and across couples. Second, pm enters V BMS. Separating the effect of pm introduces
a residual into the decomposition.38 Finally, CˆBMS is based on the variance between couples
and singles. The expressions for this term and each of the weights are described in more
detail in the appendix.
Table 2.5 shows the results of the decomposition for private consumption and the utility
measures. The first row contains the reduction in inequality due to the reform (for example,
10.9% for private consumption). The other rows decompose the total reduction into parts
due to each of the components. For private consumption, 24.77% of the total reduction is
due to a reduction of within-household inequality. Thus, a fairly substantial part of the
total reduction in private consumption would be missed by assuming equal sharing within
households. For the utility measures, the corresponding fractions are 11.43% and 9.84%,
which is smaller than for private consumption only, but still a noteworthy contribution to
the total reduction in inequality. The role of the between-couple component is largest and
ranges between 54.29% and 70.49%. The decomposition further allows to quantify the role
of changes in the fraction of singles. The fraction of singles shifts the weights of the variance
components in the decomposition. This, in itself, can generate a change in inequality. For
example, when the variance of singles is higher than the variance of married individuals, the
lower fraction of singles can decrease inequality. Based on the calibrated parameter values,
the fraction of singles declines by a very modest amount (0.2 percentage points) in the more
progressive tax system, which leads to very small implications for inequality (up to 2.86% of
the total reduction).
The decompositions from tables 2.5 and focused on the contributions of each component
37Formally, this corresponds to the formula ˆx+ y = xˆ xx+y + yˆ
y
x+y .
38The residual results from applying the approximation xˆy = xˆ+ yˆ + xˆyˆ ≈ xˆ+ yˆ.
71
Table 2.5: Variance decomposition - Policy change
log(ci) u(ci,Ci, li,Di) uLTit
Change (%) -10.9 -3.5 -6.1
Decomposition of change
Within couples (%) 24.77 11.43 9.84
Between couples (%) 63.3 54.29 70.49
Singles (%) 11.93 31.43 21.31
Betw. sin. and mar. (%) -0.92 0 0
Single probability (%) 0 2.86 -1.64
Notes: This table shows the effect of the policy change on the variance of private
consumption, the per-period utility and life-time utility. The first row shows the
total change. The other rows decompose this total change in inequality and add up
to 100%.
to the total change in variance. This depends both on how important a component is
under the status quo and how reactive it is to the tax system. Recall the example where
the within-couple component declines by 20% (this is the ’reactiveness’) due to the reform
and accounts for 10% of inequality under the status quo , resulting in a 2% decrease in
inequality. Table 2.6 focuses only the reactiveness, in terms of how strongly the within- and
between-couple variance decline. This is interesting because it could be that the reactiveness
of the components differs, which could be interpreted as progressivity being more ’effective’
at reducing either the within- or between couple variance.
Table 2.6 shows that the reactiveness of both components is quite similar for private consump-
tion. The between-couple component declines a bit more strongly than the within-couple
component (−12.7% vs −11.4%). Thus, the relative rate of decline is 0.89. Interestingly,
the within-couple variance declines more strongly than the between-couple component for
the per-period utility (−6.1% vs −2.7%), so that in this case the within-couple component
is more reactive. Note that differences in reactiveness imply that the composition of in-
equality is endogenous to the tax system. For example, for the utility measure, the fact
that the within-household component declines more strongly than the between-household
component suggests that a smaller fraction of the remaining inequality should be due to
within-household inequality.39 In practice, however, these composition changes are very
39An extreme example for this effect would be a case, in which a tax reform leaves intra-household inequality
unchanged, but completely eliminates inequality across households. Then, the ’remaining’ inequality would
entirely be due to intra-household inequality.
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small, which is shown in appendix table B.5. The share of the within-household component
declines only from 6.2 to 6.1%. Finally, table B.6 replicates the decomposition of the effect of
increasing progressivity for the case of decreasing it to a level of ψ2 = 0, which replaces the
tax function by a proportional tax. The relative importance of the changes in within- and
across-couple inequality are similar to the previous results. Introducing a flat tax increases
inequality and within-household inequality accounts for 25.4% of this increase for private
consumption and 8.33% of the increase for the per-period utility.
Table 2.6: Unweighted change in variance
Var. within
couples
Var. between
couples
Within rel.
to between
(a) log(ci)
Variance (ψ2 = 0.15) 0.029 0.066 0.439
Change (ψ2 = 0.21) -0.114 -0.127 0.898
(b) u(ci,Ci, li,Di)
Variance (ψ2 = 0.15) 0.095 1.033 0.092
Change (ψ2 = 0.21) -0.061 -0.027 2.259
Notes: This table shows the variance within and between couples and of
singles. The first row in each section shows the level of the variance for
the calibrated model and the other rows show the change (in percent) due
to policy reforms. The final column shows the ratio between the within
and the between component of each row.
2.5.5 Inequality Decompositions: Robustness
For further comparison and robustness, table 2.7 reports the results of the variance decompo-
sition for three additional measures of well-being. The first column reports the decompositon
results for inequality in total consumption expenditure (cit + Cit). The first noteworthy
feature is that the fraction due to the within-couple components drops significantly relative
to the case of private consumption only and becomes small (1.3%). This reflects household
expenditure being to an important extent public and indicates that there is a limited role for
intra-household inequality in total consumption, unless one makes further assumptions about
preference heterogeneity or reduces the share of consumption that is considered public. The
importance of the within-household component here is lower than found in Lise and Seitz
(2011), partly reflecting that they assume a lower fraction of public consumption. The second
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interesting feature is that the variance between singles and married individuals becomes
much more important for total expenditure than for private expenditure only, which is due
to economies of scale in consumption.
The motivation for the remaining three columns is that the main analysis has focused on
inequality in utility, the cardinal value of which is hard to interpret. Thus, one might wonder
if the results would differ for money-metric measures of well-being. The second column
computes the variance decomposition for ’full consumption’, as in Lise and Yamada (2018).
Full consumption is defined as the sum of consumption expenditure and the market value of
leisure and home production time. This is defined as follows:
Ii = ci + Ci + w˜ili + w˜idi + w˜jdj
Here, w˜i is the net hourly full-time wage of the individuals, which captures the opportunity
cost of leisure and home hours, and the index j refers to the home hours of the partner. Note
that tax reforms have a direct impact on net wages and therefore influence this measure
through their impact on w˜i and w˜j in addition to the impact on allocations. Still, the
measure can be considered as a useful reference and comparison point, especially since it can
in principle be measured in the data more easily than measures which require estimates of
preferences.
The third and fourth column is an equivalence scale in the spirit of Chiappori and Meghir
(2015) or Pendakur (2018). These measures are based on comparing utility levels across
people, but convert the utility level of each individual into the monetary amount that a
reference person would need to achieve this utility level. For the utility level of each person
(u(ci, Ci, li, Di)), one can compute the equivalent amount of resources the reference person
would need in order to obtain this utility level. The reference person is set to be a childless
man, who does not work and receives the equivalent amount as a transfer, while optimally
chosing leisure and home time. The fourth column applies this approach to the expected
life-time utility and computes the amount that the reference person would need to obtain
the expected per-period utility uLTit .
The overall take-away from considering these measures in table 2.7 is that the results are very
similar to considering inequality in utility (u(cit, Cit, lit, Dit) and uLTit ) directly. In particular,
this holds for the role of within-household inequality. Recall that for the per-period utility,
6.1% of inequality is due to the within-component. For the equivalence scale and full
expenditure, this value is 6.7% and 5.6%. Similarly, the equivalence scale for life-time utility
leads to a very similar result as previously. Table 2.8 further shows the decomposition of the
reduction in inequality due to these measures, which are also very similar to the previous
decompositions. For example, for the per-period utility, 11.43% of the total reduction is due
to the within component, while the corresponding number is 11.1% for the equivalence scale.
A final question for robustness is whether the choice of the inequality measure matters, which
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Table 2.7: Variance decomposition - alternative measures
log(ci + Ci) Log full exp. Log eq. sc. Log eq. sc. (LT)
Singles (%) 20.4 22.6 14.2 17.3
Within couples (%) 1.3 5.6 6.7 9.0
Between couples (%) 52.0 59.5 70.2 73.5
Betw. sin. and mar (%) 26.3 12.4 9.0 0.3
Notes: This table computes the variance decomposition for the status quo for the alternative measures
and reproduces table 2.4 for these measures. The columns contain log total consumption, log full expen-
diture and the logs of the equivalence scale values corresponding to u(cit, Cit, lit, Dit) and uLTit .
Table 2.8: Policy change - alternative measures
log(ci +Ci) Full expenditure Log eq. sc. Log eq. sc. (LT)
Total (%) -8.4 -10.9 -4.5 -7.7
Decomposition of change
Within couples (%) 1.2 4.6 11.1 10.4
Between couples (%) 81 60.6 62.2 68.8
Singles (%) 15.5 28.4 24.4 20.8
Betw. sin. and mar. (%) -1.2 4.6 0 0
Single probability (%) 3.6 1.8 0 -1.3
Notes: This table shows the effect of the policy change for different outcomes. The columns contain log total
consumption, log full expenditure and the logs of the equivalence scale values corresponding to u(cit, Cit, lit, Dit)
and uLTit . The first row shows the total change. The sum of the components from other rows is equal to the total
change in the first row.
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so far was the variance. Similar decompostions can be applied to the Mean Logarithmic
Deviation and the Theil Index, since they are subgroup-decomposable. The results are
qualitatively similar and relegated to the appendix.
2.5.6 Marriage Outcomes
In this section, I discuss marriage outcomes and how they are affected by the increase in
tax progressivity in more detail, focusing on differences by ability and gender asymmetries.
To facilitate the interpretation, the analysis groups individuals into ’ability groups’ ranging
from low (L) to high (H). Each of these groups contains averages over three types of the
actual type distribution.40 Table 2.9 shows marriage rates and the mean Pareto weight for
women and men from each of these groups. The table is based on considering all meetings
between individuals below age 30, which is the period in which most marriages occur, and
calculating the probability that the meeting results in a marriage, and the mean Pareto
weight conditional on marriage. For men, the table reports their Pareto weight (i.e. 1− λit).
Table 2.9: Marriage rates and Pareto weights
Women - L W - LM W - UM W - H Men - L M - LM M - UM M - H
(a) Status quo
Marriage probability 0.289 0.274 0.254 0.223 0.227 0.251 0.271 0.289
Own Pareto weight 0.453 0.472 0.496 0.526 0.451 0.487 0.528 0.584
(b) Reform
Change in mar. prob. (in pp) -0.22 -0.26 0.29* 0.7*** 0.38** 0.43** -0.29* 0.05
Change in PW (in pp) 0.31*** 0.45*** 0.52*** 0.62*** -0.11* -0.38*** -0.43*** -0.94***
Notes: The table reports the marriage market outcomes under the status quo and after the reform. The asterisks indicate
whether the difference of each outcome between the two simulations is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level.
The table shows an interesting gender asymmetry with respect to marriage rates. Low ability
women are more likely to get married than high-ability women, whereas low-ability men are
less likely to get married than high ability men. Quantitatively, these effects are modest and
the marriage probability varies by up to 6 percentage points across the ability groups. The
reason for this effect is that marriages in which men are from a higher ability group than the
women have a higher surplus than the opposite combination, since women are more likely
to reduce their market hours in marriage. For both men and women, the Pareto weight is
increasing in the own ability type and the average ranges between 0.45 and 0.58.
The second part of the table shows how these outcomes differ in the new steady state under
the more progressive tax system. The changes are expressed in percentage points. Since some
40For example, group L contains individuals of type 1, 2 and 3.
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of these are quite small, the table also reports whether the difference is statistically significant
from zero, rather than representing simulation noise. The changes in the Pareto weight
are mostly significant on the 1% level. Women on average receive higher Pareto weights,
whereas the opposite is the case for men.41 Regarding marriage rates, only the rate of the
highest two groups of women and the lowest two groups of men increase in a statistically
significant way. The magnitude of these changes ranges between 0.29 and 0.7 percentage
points. To further illustrate these patterns, table 2.10 shows how the marriage probability
and the Pareto weight change for each combination of types - for example when a women
from the highest group meets a men from the lowest group. While the magnitude of these
changes is again modest, the table reveals some further gender asymmetries. For marriage
rates, most of the significant changes occur for meetings between high ability women and
low ability men, whereas there is no significant change for the high ability men and low
ability women. For example, the reform increases the probability that a women from the
highest group gets married to a men from the lowest group by 0.64 percentage points. For
Pareto weights, the pattern is different since the effects are largest for low ability women
getting married to high ability men. The Pareto weight of the woman increases by up to
1.52 percentage points (recall that Pareto weights are scaled between zero and one).
2.5.7 Relating Changes in Marriage and Divorce to Inequality
Changes in marital behavior can contribute to the effect of the reform on inequality. For
example, a decrease in the assortativeness of matching would decrease inequality across
couples, since more high-income individuals get married to low-income individuals. At the
same time, this would increase inequality within couples, since the fraction of couples with
unequal earnings potential would rise. The goal of this section is to quantify the role of such
composition effects and analyze whether they contribute to the results from the variance
decompositions of section 2.5.4.
I perform further decomposition of each of the components of the variance decomposition,
focusing on the role of the ability types. To illustrate the general approach, I first focus
on the variance across couples. The share of couples, in which the wife has type k and the
husband has type j is denoted as skj. The across-couple variance can be rewritten in the
following way:
V (X¯h) =
∑
kj
skjV (X¯h|k, j) +
∑
kj
skj
(
E(X¯h|k, j)− E(X¯h)
)2
E(X¯h) = skjE(X¯h|k, j)
Here, X¯h is the mean outcome for couple h (recall that the across-couple variance is the
41This results from the gender wage gap, since each type of woman on average have a lower wage than the
corresponding type of man.
77
Table 2.10: Changes in marriage rates and Pareto weights - by
type combination
Men - L Men - LM Men - UM Men - H
(a) Marriage probability
Women - L -0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.22
Women - LM 0.2 -0.87** -0.21 -0.13
Women - UM 0.46** 0.78*** -0.34 0.17
Women - H 0.64*** 0.83*** 0.41* 0.59
(b) Pareto weight
Women - L -0.06 0.74*** 0.96*** 1.52***
Women - LM 0.28 0.17*** 0.91*** 1.4***
Women - UM -0.24 0.45*** 0.31*** 1.45***
Women - H -0.39* -0.62*** 0.07 0.59***
Notes: The table reports changes between the status quo and the new
steady state, expressed in percentage points. In this table, the Pareto
weight always refers to the weight of the woman. The asterisks indicate
whether the difference of each outcome between the two simulations is
statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level.
variance of the household means). Thus, the variance across couples can be expressed as
a function of the variance among couples of type (k, j) (V (X¯h|k, j)), the mean outcome of
couples of this type (E(X¯h|k, j)) and the type share skj. The idea of the decomposition is
to use this formula to compute a counterfactual post-reform variance, in which only the
type shares skj are varied to their post-reform level and all the other components (variance
and mean conditional on type) remain at their pre-reform values. The interpretation of this
procedure is to ask to what extent the change in the type probabilities alone can explain the
total change in the variance.42
Similar formulas can be derived for the other variance components. The variance across
singles can be analyzed completely analogousl¡ to the variance across couples, using the same
formula and only replacing the household mean (X¯h) by the value of the single (Xi). The
corresponding formula for the within-couple variance is:
E
(
V (Xi|i ∈ h)
)
=
∑
i,j
sk,jE
(
V (Xi|i ∈ h)|k, j
)
42An alternative approach which would yield very similar results would be to reweight the simulated
post-reform data to have the same composition of observables (in terms of types k and j) as the pre-reform
data and compute the variance decomposition based on the reweighted data, as is done in Lise and Seitz
(2011).
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Like for the case of the across-couple variance, changes in the within-couple variance are in
principle driven by the type shares (sk,j) and the variances conditional on the types. Finally,
the variance between singles and married individuals can be further decomposed using the
following formulas:
V BMS(Xi) = (1− pm)
(
E
(
Xi|S
)
− E
(
Xi
))2
+ pm
(
E
(
Xi|M
)
− E
(
Xi
))2
E(Xi|S) =
∑
k
sSkE
(
Xi|S, k
)
E(Xi|M) =
∑
kj
sMk,jE
(
Xi|M,k, j
)
E(Xi) = (1− pm)E
(
Xi|S
)
+ pmE
(
Xi|M
)
sSk is the fraction of singles of type k and sMk,j is the fraction of couples with types k an j. The
common feature of these formulas, for each of the components of the variance decomposition,
is that they allow to vary only the type composition of the groups of married and single
individuals.43
Table 2.11 shows the results for this decomposition for inequality in private consumption
and the per-period utility. The interpretation of the first row (’fixed pm’) is that it adjusts
sjk to the values in the new steady state, but keeps everything else (including pm) constant.
The interpretation is that only the type composition of the pools of married and single
individuals are varied. The second row also lets pm adjust and considers changes in the
weighted contribution to the total variance, i.e. each of the following four summands:
V (Xi) = pmV W (Xi) + pmV B(Xi) + psV S(Xi) + V BMS(Xi)
For example, the interpretation of the very first table entry is that changes in sjk explain
−1.91% of the reduction in the within-couple variance, which means that these changes by
themselves would marginally increase within-couple inequality. The overall take-away from
considering the ’fixed pm’ case for both outcome variables is that the effect of composition
effects alone is small. Only for the variance between married and single individuals (BMS),
the composition effect can generate a change of a noteworthy magnitude (relative to the
change in this component). An interesting aspect of these results is that the results from the
previous section suggested that the increase in tax progressivity could decrease assortative
mating, since there was a small increase in the likelihood of low-ability men getting married
to higher-ability women. However, this effect is not strong enough to lead to a quantitatively
remarkable reduction in inequality.
43Note that this in an accounting decomposition, since endogenous quantities are varied independently.
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Table 2.11: Fraction of variance change explained by type probabilities (in %)
Within couples Between couples Singles BMS
(a) log(cit)
Fixed pm -1.91 -0.37 2.75 24.45
Flexible pm -3.53 -1.8 20.01 13.99
(b) u(cit,Cit, lit,Dit)
Fixed pm -2.8 -0.29 1.34 -23.95
Flexible pm -5.82 -7.79 14.91 37.75
Notes: The table reports the share of the change in each of the variance components
that can be explained only by the change in type probabilities.
When also letting the fraction of married individuals adjust (’flexible pm’), the explained
fraction become somewhat larger. Note that the outcome is now for example pmV W (Xi)
(instead of V W (Xi)). Since the reform increases the fraction of married individuals, this in
itself increases the contribution of inequality within and across couples and decreases the
contribution of singles. Thus, the explained fraction is negative in the first two columns and
positive in the third. The explained share is overall largest for the per-period utility and
ranges between −7.8% and 14.91%.
2.5.8 Social Welfare
In this section, I show how the reform affects expected life-time welfare. While inequality is
strongly linked to social welfare, the most natural social welfare function in my model is
based on the expected life-time welfare of a newly born cohort. Thus, the analysis in this
section is concerned with the overall welfare impact of the reform, and to what extent it is
driven by marriage market adjustments.
2.5.8.1 The Comparison Case
To assess the role of the marriage market, I consider an alternative version of the model in
which the decision rules for marriage, divorce and the Pareto weight are exogenous and set
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to exactly reproduce the decision rules of the calibrated model. Then, I simulate the reform
in this alternative model. The interpretation is to ask what the effects of the reform would
be if marriage and divorce decisions and the Pareto weights were exogenous and would not
react to the change in tax policy. I will refer to the initial equilibrium given this policy
parameter as the benchmark case/schedule. In addition, I will refer to the model with fixed
decisions as the alternative or fixed marriage market model.
More concretely, suppose that the initial progressivity parameter is ψ02. Solving the model
leads to decision functions which map the state variables of two singles that meet, ωf and
ωm, and the realization of the match quality shock θ into a decision whether to get married
(M ∈ {0, 1}) and an initial Pareto weight λ ∈ [0, 1]:
M = m0(ωf , ωm, θ)
λ = m1(ωf , ωm, θ)
ωf = (f , αf , bf , Af )
ωm = (m, αm, bm, Am)
The state variables ωg comprise the productivity shock, the type, the presence of children,
and assets. Similarly, there are decision functions d0 and d1 which map the state variables
of any couple (ωc) into the decision whether to get divorced (D ∈ {0, 1}) and whether to
renegotiate the current Pareto weight λ to a new Pareto weight λ˜:
D = d0(ωc)
λ˜ = d1(ωc)
ωc = (θ, f , m, αf , αm, b, A, λ)
In the comparison case, I solve the model for a new tax schedule ψ12, but use the decision
functions m0, m1, d0, d1 that were obtained given ψ02, instead of allowing individuals to
determine these outcomes endogenously. In particular, this procedure does not allow the
Pareto weights to adjust following a reform. Instead, spouses are exogenously assigned
the ’old’ Pareto weight, which would have been the bargaining outcome given the old tax
schedule. As a result, comparing the alternative and the full model allows to study the
implications of the endogenous adjustment of the Pareto weights. The exercise is related to
the exercise conducted in Knowles (2012), who compares a model with flexible and fixed
Pareto weights in order to quantify the error one would make with a unitary version of the
model relative to a model with endogenous Pareto weights. Note that in the alternative
model used here, the exogenous Pareto weight depends on the characteristics of the couple
and is allowed to change exogenously over time.44
44Further note that when there are no dynamic choices (savings), the alternative model always delivers
exactly the same marriage market outcomes that are obtained under the benchmark schedule. In other
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The alternative model has different implications for how intra-household inequality changes
with progressivity. When Pareto weights are fixed, the tax system can influence intra-
household inequality mainly by changing the relative leisure of spouses. A less progressive
system can increase leisure of secondary earners with low Pareto weights if it leads to a
reduction in their labor supply and home production hours increase less than work hours are
increased. With flexible Pareto weights, progressivity directly affects relative consumption
by changing the Pareto weight.
2.5.8.2 Results
Table 2.12 shows the overall welfare change for the increase in progressivity for each ability
type, averaged over men and women. These are also illustrated graphically in figure 2.5. The
welfare change is expressed in terms of equivalent variation. This is the percentage change
in consumption in each state under the status quo, which makes individuals indifferent
between the status quo and the reform.45 The second and third columns show the equivalent
variation (in percent) for the full model and for the comparison model and the fourth column
contains the difference between the two. This difference can be interpreted as the effect of the
endogenous marriage market adjustments: it is the equivalent variation that the full model
generates relative to the case of fixed marriage market decisions. To ease interpretation of
these numbers, the final column converts the difference to a percentage amount, relative to
the welfare impact in the fixed marriage market case. Note that ”1” is the lowest ability
type and ”12” is the highest.
As one would expect, the lowest ability types benefit from the increase in progressivity,
whereas the highest ones lose, both for the full model and the fixed marriage market. In the
middle of the distribution most types are made worse off. This can be the case because of the
labor supply disincentives generated by a more progressive tax system. Note that the fact
that most types lose is also reflected in the aggregate welfare change, which averages over all
types and therefore corresponds to a utilitarian welfare objective. The aggregate welfare
loss is −0.92% for the full model and −1.22% for the fixed marriage market model. Thus,
in relative terms, the difference amounts to 24% of the impact without marriage market
adjustments.
The welfare difference between the full model and the fixed marriage market is largest for
the two lowest types. In particular, the lowest type experience a welfare gain of 1.98% of
words, the cross-sectional distribution of marriages and Pareto weights is identical to the benchmark model.
With dynamic choices, policy changes can still affect marriage and divorce rates and Pareto weights even
when decision functions are fixed. This is the case because decisions are fixed conditional on state variables
and state variables (i.e. assets) are partly endogenous and affected by the reform. Thus, the interpretation
of the exercise is how much the endogenous adjustment of the decision functions matters for welfare, rather
than marriage market outcomes per se.
45Since the model features both private and public consumption, the equivalent variation is computed by
increasing consumption of both of these goods by a certain percentage amount in each state of the world.
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Table 2.12: Welfare effects - by ability type
(1) Full model (2) Fixed MM Difference: (1) - (2) Relative
1 1.98 0.86 1.12 1.31
2 1.37 0.53 0.84 1.61
3 -0.03 -0.29 0.26 -0.89
4 0.37 -0.25 0.62 -2.50
5 0.04 -0.49 0.54 -1.09
6 -0.47 -0.70 0.22 -0.32
7 -0.92 -1.29 0.36 -0.28
8 -1.46 -1.66 0.19 -0.12
9 -1.88 -1.74 -0.15 0.08
10 -2.62 -2.87 0.25 -0.09
11 -3.48 -3.27 -0.21 0.07
12 -3.94 -3.44 -0.51 0.15
Total -0.92 -1.22 0.30 -0.24
Notes: This table shows the difference in the welfare change between the
full model and the fixed marriage market case. It is based on the values
shown in figure 2.5.
consumption in the full model, whereas it would only be 0.86% if marriage market decision
are fixed. These differences get somewhat smaller for higher ability types. In the upper half
of the ability distribution, the marriage market adjustments generate between −12 and 15%
of the welfare impact with a fixed marriage market. In general, these values illustrate the
importance of the marriage market relative to the ’standard’ channels of tax progressivity
and show that while the marriage market does not dominate the welfare calculation, it
contributes in a non-negligible way.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ability type
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
Eq
ui
va
le
nt
 v
ar
ia
tio
n
Case
Full model
Fixed marriage market
Figure 2.5: Welfare impact along the ability distribution
Notes: The figure shows the change in welfare (expressed as percent of consumption) for the full model and
the fixed marriage market case.
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies how the progressivity of the labor income tax affects inequality through
the marriage market. Progressive taxation reduces intra-household inequality because it
makes the relative outside options of spouses - the values of being single - more equal. In
addition, single rates, marriage and divorce are also affected since progressivity changes
the economic value of individuals on the marriage market and how selective they are about
potential partners. To study these effects, I calibrate an equilibrium model of marriage,
divorce, labor supply and savings to data from the Netherlands. The main question that the
analysis addresses is to what extent the marriage market channels - bargaining and marriage
- affect inequality on top of the usual effects of progressivity.
The model is first used to decompose inequality in consumption and welfare into components
due to within and between married couples. The within-couple component captures that
spouses consume different amounts of private goods and has received little attention in
studies of progressivity. In the calibrated model, intra-household inequality accounts for
23.9% of the cross-sectional variance in private consumption. The model further allows
to study inequality in the utility from private and public consumption, leisure and home
production. In this case, the intra-household component accounts for 6.1% of the total
variance. The model is then used to study a hypothetical reform that increases progressivity
by 40% relative to its current level. The contribution of the intra-household component
to the total reduction in inequality is 24.77% for private consumption and 11.9% for the
utility measure. These quantitative finding shed light on the question of how important
intra-household inequality could be relative to overall inequality, which has received little
attention in the literature so far. The model further suggests that the induced changes in
marriage and divorce have small implications for inequality.
There are several interesting dimensions in which the present analysis could be extended.
While my chapter has focused on the role of the labor income tax, it would be very interesting
to model the transfer system in more detail, which has an important redistributive function
at the lower end of the income distribution. Another very interesting extension would be to
consider the role of endogenous skill formation. Tax progressivity can reduce the incentive
the accumulate human capital in working life and to invest in skills in terms of education
and both of these aspects interact with marriage and intra-household bargaining. Finally,
while I have focused on intra-household inequality in personal consumption and leisure,
allowing for heterogeneous preferences, for example regarding public good expenditure or risk
aversion, would increase the scope for disagreement between spouses. This would amplify
the importance of intra-household inequality and thereby the welfare implications of changes
in bargaining positions.
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Chapter 3
Fertility and Women’s Occupational
Choice: Germany, 1975 - 2007
3.1 Introduction
Men and women differ in many important labor market outcomes. Gender gaps in employment
and especially earnings and wages have received the most attention (see Blau and Kahn (2017)
for a survey). Using an event-study methodology, a number of recent papers describe how the
gender gap in these outcomes widens after the birth of the first child (Ferna´ndez-Kranz et al.,
2013; Angelov et al., 2016; Kleven et al., 2018, 2019). The employment costs of motherhood
seem to be partly unexpected, and have probably risen in recent decades (Kuziemko et al.,
2018).
This chapter goes beyond the standard extensive and intensive margins of employment and
studies the relationship between motherhood and the type of work that women do. Our large
administrative dataset allows us to observe life-cycle patterns of occupations for women born
between the 1940s and the 1970s. We merge this dataset with information on the typical
tasks performed in these occupations, which we aggregate into four dimensions (analytical,
interactive, routine, and non-routine manual). We document differences in these patterns
by cohort and by the number of children, and trace out the dynamics of the substantial
child-related differences using an event-study framework.
By focusing on women’s tasks on the job and their relationship to motherhood, our chapter
speaks to the debate about the role of job characteristics for the last chapter of the ’great
gender convergence’ (Goldin, 2014). Using a similar event-study approach, Felfe (2012)
shows that while the main adjustment after childbirth is in terms of working hours, mothers
who switch employers also tend to favor jobs with more flexible schedules, less night work
and lower levels of stress. Pertold-Gebicka et al. (2016) and Kleven et al. (2018) show that
the share of public-sector jobs (already higher for women at the beginning of their careers)
increases after the birth of the first child. Hardoy et al. (2017) and Kleven et al. (2018)
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document that the gender gap in management opens up considerably with motherhood.
Albrecht et al. (2018) find that men and women do not differ much in the rate of firm-to-firm
mobility, but that men experience faster wage growth both as stayers and as switchers.
The literature on tasks and the importance of ocupations and task-specific human capital has
mostly focused on men, as for instance Autor et al. (2003), Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010)
or Yamaguchi (2012). Relatively little attention has been devoted to gender differences
and women’s task content, with Cerina et al. (2018); Ngai and Petrongolo (2017); Rendall
(2018) or Yamaguchi (2018) being some notable exceptions. In this chapter, we add to this
literature by studying the relationship between tasks and fertility and in particular how
occupations change after women have their first child.
As a first step and motivation for our analysis, we document the life-cycle patterns of
employment and task intensities, focusing on gender differences and differences by completed
fertility. Women from recent cohorts, such as those born between 1975 and 1979, on average
work in slightly more analytical and interactive occupations than men. The picture is
different for older cohorts, in which men work in more analytical occupations. Thus, there
has been a remarkable gender convergence over time. However, there is still some life-cycle
divergence differences. Especially women with three or more children work in occupations
with lower analytical and interactive task intensities at later ages.
We then study the dynamics around childbirth in more detail. To this end, we estimate
the child-related effects on labor market and task variables in an event-study framework.
The results show that the effect of childbirth on employment and earnings are very large
in Germany and strongly increase in the number of children. The estimates suggest that
analytical and interactive task intensities fall after childbirth relative to the age trend. In
other words, women’s analytical task intensities on average rise less than would be predicted
in the absence of children. This could contribute to the gender wage gap, since analytical
tasks are typically associated with a wage premium.
These event-study estimates take both variation in tasks due to occupational switches and
due to selection resulting from participation decisions into account. Thus, we also use our
data to exclusively focus on the role of occupational switches. Our main results for this
analysis, where we compare occupational switches of mothers and childless women, are as
follows. Mothers switch their occupation more often than childless women, in particular those
with a long career break. While there is little evidence for direct occupational downgrading -
which would imply that on average mothers return to work in occupations with worse-paying
task combinations (such as those that involve little analytical work) - mothers increase their
analytical task intensity less than childless women. This can be interpreted as stagnation
relative to childless women, in the sense that mothers’ analytical task intensity would have
grown more strongly in the absence of children. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that this effect can explain a reduction in the hourly wage rate by 7%. In addition,
we find that mothers, again in particular those with a long career break, tend to work in
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occupations with a bigger distance in the task content relative to their pre-birth occupation.
A final result is that there is occupational switching towards occupations with a high
fraction of part-time workers, which could be interpreted as a switch towards ’family-friendly’
occupations.
Our empirical findings can be related to and interpreted in the light of some theoretical
and empirical work in the literature. For example, the increased rate of occupational
switches would be consistent with a model of human capital depreciation (such as Adda et al.
(2017)), in which long breaks from the labor market decrease the attachment to the previous
occupation, or search frictions, in which losing the attachment to the previous employer
leads some women to enter employment in a different occupation. From the perspective of
models of task-specific human capital (see Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010)), the bigger
distance between current and pre-birth tasks for mothers could also imply that they are less
able to transfer their previously accumulated human capital to the new occupation, since
the new tasks differ from what they did before. This could in principle also contribute to a
wage loss. In addition, the results from Goldin (2014) suggest that a key characteristic of an
occupation is its family-friendliness. As a result, it could be the case that having children
increases the need to work in a family-friendly environment, so that women increasingly
switch towards these occupations. Our results are consistent with such a story. From this
perspective, changes in the task composition of work would be byproduct of the increased
orientation towards family-friendliness, but the changes in tasks can still contribute to the
wage cost that women accept in exchange for the higher amenity value.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data on labor
market outcomes and task intensities which we use for the analysis. In Section 3.3, we
analyze the cohort profiles. Section 3.4 focuses on the dynamics around childbirth. Finally,
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 The BASiD data
The BASiD dataset contains information on the employment and fertility histories of a
sample of the German population. The sample is based on registers maintained by the
German Pension Insurance (Versichertenkontenstichprobe/VSKT). This dataset contains
information on fertility, employment and social security claims for the period from between
1951 and 2007. In addition, the dataset is merged with information from the Integrated
Employment Biographies (IEB) of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), which
is available beginning in 1975. Among other aspects, the IEB contain daily information
on employment, earnings, occupation, education, whether an individual works full-time or
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part-time and information on establishments. The data is collected from employers, who
have to report this information for all jobs subject to the Social Security system.
We restrict our sample to the time period between 1975 and 2007 to focus on the period for
which the labor market data from the IEB is available.1 Based on the data on employment
spells, we construct a quarterly panel using the longest employment spell in the quarter as the
main job. We restrict the sample to individuals who start their employment history in West
Germany. The IEB do not contain information on self-employed individuals, public servants
and employment spells abroad, since these cases are not covered by the social insurance
reporting. Therefore, we treat observations from terminal employment gaps, in which no
further employment spells are reported for an individuals for the rest of the life-time, as
missing rather than as voluntarily non-employed. For women, we only remove terminal gaps
which do not occur immediately following childbirth, since it is conceivable that they decide
to leave the labor force permanently in this situation.
The information on fertility results from the fact that individuals are required to report their
fertility history to the German Pension Insurance, since children are relevant for determining
retirement benefits. In almost all cases, households attribute the child to the retirement
account of the mother and there are only very few observations of men for whom fertility
information is available. Note that there are some individuals in the sample who have either
not reported a history yet or reported a history at a relatively young age, when they might
still have additional children in the future. As a result, we only focus on individuals with a
complete fertility history. Kreyenfeld and Mika (2008) validate the fertility information from
the VSKT and find that they reflect the official population statistics well once individuals
with incomplete histories are removed.
The earnings variable from the IEB is top-coded at the maximum earnings that are relevant
for social insurance payments (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). This affects around 12% of
observations for men and 4% of observations for women. We follow the procedure from Card
et al. (2013) to impute censored wages based on tobit regressions by gender, age, education
and year. Since the definition of the earnings variable changed in 1984, due to the inclusion of
bonuses and one-time payments, we further apply the correction approach from Fitzenberger
(2012) and Dustmann et al. (2009) to correct for this structural break. Earnings are deflated
so that 2010 is the reference year.
3.2.2 The BIBB Qualifications and Careers Survey
Our data on tasks that workers typically perform on the job comes from the Qualification
and Career Surveys, which are conducted by the Federal Institute for Vocational Education
and Training (BIBB) and have previously been used to study task intensities (see for instance
1While some information on employment and earnings is also included in the VSKT, the earnings variable
is not directly comparable to the variable from the IEB and no information on occupation is available.
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Spitz-Oener (2006), Black and Spitz-Oener (2010) or Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010)).
These are representative cross-sectional surveys with roughly 20000 - 35000 respondents in
each wave. There are six waves available, which were conducted 1979, 1985/86, 1991/92,
1998/99, 2006 and 2012. The surveys contain detailed questions about tasks that are required
in an occupation, such as how often workers repair objects or how often they have to persuade
co-workers. We classify each question as representing either analytical, interactive, routine
or manual tasks and assign a value of 0, 13 or 1, depending on whether the answer is ’never’,
’sometimes’ or ’frequently’ (or 0/1 for yes/no questions). Since the questions are not always
comparable across waves, we pool all waves to compute task intensities by averaging over all
responses.2 Note that the intensities are constructed in a way so that the four dimensions
do not sum to 1, which follows the approach in Spitz-Oener (2006).3 This can be interpreted
as some occupations being generally more intensive or demanding in tasks than others.
We merge the information on tasks to our BASiD sample on the occupation level, using an
occupational code with 120 occupations. This classification is relatively fine, since it allows
for a variety of different occupations, while typically grouping occupations which are close to
each other into a single occupation (such as mathematicians, physicists and chemists).4 In
the appendix, we include a list of all occupations according to our definition, which illustrates
our classification.
We compute the task intensities in each occupation based on a pooled sample of men and
women.5 To illustrate how task intensities vary across occupations, table 3.1 shows the task
indices for three particular occupations.
2This assumes that the task intensities are stable over time within occupations.
3There are two cases that lead to this. First, it can be the case that individuals in one occupation state
that they perform more different tasks that are classified to a certain dimension. As an example, consider
the simple case with two questions about analytical tasks and individuals in one occupation doing two of
these tasks and individuals in the other occupation only one. Second, it could be the case that individuals in
one occupation state more often that they only ’sometimes’ perform certain tasks, which also leads to a
lower absolute intensity. As a robustness check, we also rescaled the task variables (ti) to sum up to one in
each occupation (by computing ti∑
i
ti
) and the results are qualitatively similar.
4With a finer classification, which allows for more different occupations, there would be more moves
between occupations, but the additional moves would be smaller in terms of the task distance.
5This increases the sample sizes for each occupation. As a robustness check, we also computed separate
task intensities for men and women and the results are qualitatively similar.
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Table 3.1: Task variables: Examples
Analytical Interactive Routine Manual
Plumber 0.1 0.23 0.29 0.37
Nurse 0.25 0.34 0.28 0.41
Architect 0.49 0.38 0.18 0.14
Plumbers are an example for a highly manual occupation, which also involves some routine
and interactive tasks and fewer analytical tasks. Being a nurse also involves a large extent of
manual tasks, but also more analytical and interactive tasks. Architects, finally, are one of
the most analytical occupations according to our measure, while doing a substantial amount
of interactive tasks. Tables C.1, C.2 and C.3 in the appendix contain a complete list of the
task intensities for each occupation. As examples for the ’task distance’ between occupations,
the two most distant occupations according to our classification are ’mechanical and motor
engineers’ and ’household cleaners’, whereas the two closest occupations are ’carpenters’ and
’plasterers’.6 Figure C.1 further illustrates the task variables by showing their distribution
across occupations. Table 3.2 reports the correlation coefficients of the task intensities across
occupations. In particular, there is a fairly strong positive correlation between analytical
and interactive task intensities, whereas routine and manual tasks are negatively correlated
with analytical task content. Note that occupations with a higher earnings potential on
average involve more analytical and interactive tasks, whereas routine and manual tasks
correlate negatively with the earnings potential. The correlation coefficients between the
median earnings of (childless) women and the task intensity are 0.82 for analytical, 0.66 for
interactive, −0.33 for routine and −0.38 for manual tasks.
6We use the sum of the squared differences between tasks as a measure of occupational ’distance’. For
the main analysis, we also used the absolute value of the differences in task intensities and obtained similar
results.
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Table 3.2: Correlation of task intensities across occupations
Analytical Interactive Routine Manual
Analytical 1.00 0.73 -0.31 -0.31
Interactive 1.00 -0.53 -0.14
Routine 1.00 0.11
Manual 1.00
To build further intuition about how task intensities vary across occupations, it is also useful
to consider the mean task intensities for broader occupational groups. In table 3.3, we group
the 120 occupations into 5 ’sectors’ and report the mean task intensities for each sector.
Workers in the sector ’Manager/Professional/Technicians’ (MPT) perform the most analytical
tasks, followed by ’Sales/Office’ and ’Care’. The across-sector differences in interactive task
content are smaller and only the ’Production/Operators/Craft’ (POC) sector involves much
less interactive task content than the others. Routine work is most prevalent in the POC
sector. Manual task content is also high in this sector, but also important in ’Services’ and
’Care’.
Table 3.3: Tasks by occupational sector
Analytical Interactive Routine Manual
Manager/Professional/Technician 0.34 0.36 0.17 0.13
Sales/Office 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.14
Production/Craft 0.10 0.19 0.42 0.29
Service 0.12 0.31 0.21 0.37
Care 0.20 0.31 0.18 0.31
3.3 Life-Cycle Profiles of Employment and Task Inten-
sities
We start our analysis by discussing the women’s career profiles over the life-cycle and their
relationship with fertility. While our main contribution is to document the patterns for task
intensities, we first briefly review the life-cycle profiles of employment and hours, which
provides some context for the analysis of tasks and occupations.7 The focus of the section is
to contrast men and women and document the relationship with women’s completed fertility.
7In the appendix, we also show the life-cycle profiles of yearly earnings (figure C.3). These broadly reflect
the patterns for employment on the extensive and intensive margin, which we discuss here.
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Figure 3.1: Participation rates by cohort
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(c) Women (no children)
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(d) Women (one child)
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(e) Women (two children)
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(f) Women (three or more children)
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Since both women’s employment and their task intensities have changed substantially over
time, it is crucial to distinguish different cohorts for this comparison.
3.3.1 Employment: Extensive and Intensive Margins
Figure 3.1 shows the lifecycle of men’s and women’s employment for eight cohorts born
during five-year intervals between 1940 and 1979. For the five youngest cohorts, we start at
age 20; the oldest age that we consider is 60, for the cohort born in 1940-1944. The number
of observations underlying these figures is reported in tables C.5 and C.6. For the most part,
we will focus our discussion on ages 25-55, which are less affected by trends in education and
early retirement. The upper left panel shows the employment rates for men. Here, there is
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relatively little change across cohorts, at least for the prime working years. About 80% of
men in West Germany are employed between ages 30 and 50, before employment rates begin
to decline.8
The picture looks very different for women (panel (b)). After a first peak in the participation
rate when the women are in their 20s (the exact age depends on the cohort, with younger
cohorts peaking later), there is a marked decline in participation which, as many studies have
shown and the remaining panels confirm, is related to child-bearing. For women without
children (panel (c)), the lifecycle pattern of labor market participation is almost identical to
men’s. Women who have one child over their lifetime exhibit only a modest reduction in
the participation rate (panel (d)), while for women with two (the modal case, panel (e)) or
three or more children (panel (f)) there is a strong and sustained drop in participation. For
instance, women from the 1955–59 cohort with two children reach the maximum participation
rate of about 60% in their early 20s and reach this level again only in their late 40s, and
women from the same cohort with three or more children never return to the participation
rate of their early 20s.9
Looking again at all women (panel (b)), a comparison across cohorts suggests that the middle
cohorts (1950–1964) show a fairly similar pattern, while the oldest cohort (1940–1944) stands
out for having much lower participation rates past age 35 and the 1945–1949 is in-between.
This is not only a result of the decline in fertility rates (see C.2 in the appendix) and also
holds for a given number of children (panels (d)–(f)). Starting with the 1965–1969 cohort,
the reduction in the participation rate sets in later and becomes less pronounced; for the
two youngest cohorts, no such drop is visible at all.
The gender differences are equally striking for the intensive margin of employment. As shown
in Figure 3.2, the share of West German women working full-time (conditional on being
employed) rapidly drops during the prime child-bearing years and remains constant at about
60% after age 35 or so. This is in stark contrast with men for whom employment nearly
always takes the form of full-time work. Interestingly, comparing women of different cohorts
shows that women born between 1965 and 1974 tend to work full-time more often than
women from earlier cohorts during their 20s, but converge to the same low levels of full-time
employment in their mid-30s as women from older cohorts. Moreover, the youngest cohort
born in 1975–1979 is actually less likely to work full-time in their early 20s than women born
between 1970 and 1974.
The life-cycle patterns of employment and hours have received a considerable amount of
attention in the literature. McGrattan et al. (2004) focus on hours of work in the US. Since
8Note that the employment profiles are affected by the gaps due to self-employment, public service and
living abroad, which makes it likely to underestimate employment shares.
9Note that our data contains fertility information only for women, so that we cannot break down life-cycle
employment by the number of children for men. However, since the data from the Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP) shows that the reaction of men’s employment to the arrival of children is very small (see Kleven
et al. (2019)), so that one would not expect noticeable differences in the life-cycle profiles by the number of
children.
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Figure 3.2: Full-time employment conditional on being employed
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our data only contains a binary hours variable, it is easiest to compare our results to papers
that focus on participation rates over the life-cycle. Goldin and Mitchell (2017) review
cross-cohort differences in life-cycle employment rate in the US. While the shape of these
profiles is broadly similar to the German case, the level of the participation rate tends to be
lower in Germany than in the US.10 Relative to other work on Germany (such as Fitzenberger
et al. (2004)), the BASiD data provides longitudinal information on both employment and
fertility and covers a large sample, which allows the breakdown by fertility and cohorts.11
3.3.2 Occupations and Tasks
We begin by contrasting the task content of occupations for men and women (Figure 3.3).
Since women’s task intensities have changed substantially across cohorts, it is important
to consider different cohorts. Cohort by cohort, women have worked in occupations that
were more analytical, more interactive, and had higher demands in terms of (non-routine)
manual tasks. At the same time, there has been a shift away from occupations that featured
a high share of routine tasks. As the comparison with men shows, this pattern is not merely
driven by a general trend towards the automatization or outsourcing of routine tasks: if
anything, men in West Germany work more often in routine occupations in the younger
cohorts, and the highest values for both analytical and interactive tasks were reached for
the cohorts born in the early 1950s. Overall, however, the task content of occupations has
changed remarkably little for men over the cohorts studied here, in stark difference to what
we observe for women. While men and women in the 1940–44 cohort worked in occupations
10Goldin and Mitchell (2017) distinguish between an ’old’ and a ’new’ life-cycle pattern of employment.
In the ’old’ pattern, women’s employment rises until women reach their 50s and then starts to decline (a
hump shape), wheras the ’new’ pattern means that employment starts out high, somewhat drops in the age
window in which women have children, and then rises again. The cohort profiles for Germany mostly reflect
the ’new’ pattern, since employment tends to drop in the beginning of the life-cycle also for older cohorts,
such as the 1950-54 cohort. Cohorts older than that are only observed from a later age onwards.
11Fitzenberger et al. (2004) use repeated cross-sections from the German Microcensus to study participation
profiles. An interesting aspect of the BASiD data is that we can condition on completed fertility and use
information on the past labor supply of these groups to construct the life-cycle profiles.
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that were fairly similar in the extent to which they required interactive tasks, women now
work in more interactive occupations than men. At the same time, they have not only closed
the large gap in analytical tasks, but have slightly surpassed men in the more recent cohorts.
For non-routine manual tasks, the gap has been reduced, but here men still dominate by a
fairly large margin.
We now turn to the relationship between tasks and completed fertility. Figure 3.4 shows
how the analytical task content of occupations differs by the number of children. We focus
on only three cohorts here: women born in 1940–1944, 1950–1954, and 1960–1964. In each
case, there is a negative relationship between the number of children and the analytical task
content. From age 35 (the only age at which all three cohorts can be observed), in all cohorts
women with children have lower values than childless women, and the gap increases in the
number of children. However, the gaps have been reduced in the younger cohorts: while
all women increasingly work in more analytical occupations irrespective of the number of
children (which shows that the increase is not simply driven by changes in fertility), the
increase has been more pronounced for women with children than for childless women.
The two younger cohorts also allow us to get a first glance at potential selection effects, i.e.
differences in the analytical tasks contents of occupations that already appear at early ages,
before most women have children. Figure 3.4 suggests that there are some differences before
the prime child-bearing years (except for the case of the 1960-64 cohort), but that these
differences are smaller than the gap that opens up at later ages. Interestingly, for the two
younger cohorts, the relationship with the number of children is not monotonic at all ages:
women with two children first work in more analytical occupations than women with one
child in the beginning of their life-cycle and this pattern reverses at later ages.
A very similar picture emerges when not the analytical task content, but the share of women
working in managerial, professional, or technical occupations or the interactive task content
are considered (cf. Figures C.4 and C.5 in the appendix). For interactive tasks, the gap
between childless women and women with one or two children has become very small in the
youngest of the three cohorts, while women with three or more children are still far behind.
We also considered differences in task intensities by the total length of the (child-related)
career break, which could be more directly related to labor market outcomes than the number
of children per se. The total length of the break is defined as the number of years a woman
spends in non-employment after the birth of the first child. The patterns are very similar to
considering differences by the number of children and shown in Appendix Figure C.6. While
these comparisons are suggestive of a relationship between tasks and completed fertility, we
now turn more closely to the changes in task intensities around first childbirth.
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Figure 3.3: Task content by cohort
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(c) Interactive (men)
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
0.18
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.32
Int
en
sit
y o
f in
te
ra
cti
ve
 ta
sk
s
1940-1944
1945-1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964
1965-1969
1970-1974
1975-1979
(d) Interactive (women)
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(e) Routine (men)
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(f) Routine (women)
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(g) Manual (men)
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Figure 3.4: Analytical task content by cohort and completed fertility
(a) Cohort 1940-1944
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(b) Cohort 1950-1954
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(c) Cohort 1960-1964
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3.4 Dynamics around Childbirth
3.4.1 Estimation of Child-Related Effects
To investigate the role of changes around childbirth for the life-cycle patterns discussed
previously, we use the event-study approach, which have often been used in the literature
to investigate the impact of family-related events (see for example Kleven et al. (2018),
Angelov et al. (2016), Ferna´ndez-Kranz et al. (2013), Mazzocco et al. (2013) or Attanasio
et al. (2008)). Event time is denoted by t, and t = 0 is the quarter in which a woman has
her first child. For different outcome variables Yist, we estimate the following equation:
Yist =
∑
t6=−1
αt · EV ENTit +
∑
j
βj · AGEjis +
∑
s
γs · Y EARs + νist, (3.1)
where αt represents the deviation in the event-time t, i denotes individuals, s is calendar
time, EV ENTit is an event-time dummy, AGEjis is an age dummy for being j years old in
year s, and Y EARs is a year dummy. Omitting the contribution of αˆt we get a t-year-age
counterfactual Yˆt,s,j, and consequently a t-expected counterfactual Yˆt = E[Yˆt,s,j|t]. The
estimated impact of children is then defined as Pˆt = αˆt/Yˆt. The child-related effect represents
the mean deviation of the outcome variable in event time t relative to the average before
childbirth. In estimating this equation, we focus on the variation within the group of
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mothers.12 Our sample consists of mothers who are observed between 5 years before the
birth of their first child and 10 years afterwards. As a result, our analysis focuses on births
that occured between 1980 and 1997. Table C.7 shows some summary statistics for the event
study sample. In particular, the table shows the educational composition of the sample,
which mainly consists of medium and low-skilled women.
Before turning to the task intensities, we first discuss the impact of children on employment,
earnings of working hours. These are especially large in Germany, more so than in most
other countries, as has recently been pointed out by Kleven et al. (2019), who estimate the
effects of children on employment and earnings based on survey data from the SOEP.13 They
find an average long-run effect on earnings (including non-employment) of -61% for Germany,
-31% for the United States and -21% for Denmark. In the following, we add to these findings
by analyzing the role of the number of children, which shows that especially the effect on
participation increases quite drastically in the number of children.
These results are shown in Figure 3.5. Unless indicated otherwise, all confidence bands refer
to the 5% level. Panel (a) first shows the striking differences in the child-related effects on
employment. Women who have only one child reenter the labor force much more quickly
than the other groups. After 10 years, their employment rate is only reduced by 20%.14
For women who have 2 children, the corresponding effect is 50%, which is more than twice
as large. Women who have 3 or more children even reduce their labor force participation
by around 70% 10 years after childbirth. Comparing the two latter groups, an important
difference is also that women with two children start reentering the labor force around 6
years after the birth of the first child, so that the estimated effects begin to show an upward
trend again. For women with 3 or more children, the effect is much more persistent.
Panel (b) focuses on the intensive margin and shows the effects on the probability of working
full-time conditional on being employed. The long-run impact is between −42 and −58%.
Interestingly, the differences by the number of children become much smaller than for
participation. In other words, while women with one child take up employment earlier than
the other groups, they also largely work in part-time jobs.
Panels (c) and (d) show the effects on yearly earnings, first for the case of non-employment
being included as zero earnings and then for the case without non-employment. Comparing
this to the previous results, the figures show that the effects on earnings strongly reflect the
estimated effects on the extensive and intensive margin of employment. As a result, there
12Since the event time variable is only observed for mothers, we exclude childless women in this event
study. Including childless women requires assigning ’Placebo births’, as we will discuss in more detail in the
next section.
13The SOEP is also useful for comparison because fertility information is observed for men. Kleven et al.
(2019) find that the child-related effect on the earnings of men is slightly negative and close to zero.
14Note that we do not observe public servants and self-employed individuals in our data. This could in
principle affect these estimates if the proportion of women who become civil servants after childbirth is
substantial. However, supplementary analyses based on the SOEP, where these groups are observed, indicate
that this does not have a substantial effect on the estimates.
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Figure 3.5: Event studies of employment and earnings
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(b) Full-time employment (if employed)
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(c) Yearly earnings (including zero)
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(d) Yearly earnings (excluding zero)
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are large differences by the number of children when non-employment is included (panel (c))
and smaller differences when considering working women only (panel (d)).
The negative impact of childbirth on earnings could potentially partly be explained by
changes in task intensities. As a first step in the analysis of task intensities, we estimate
equation 3.1 for each of the task variables. The results are shown in figure 3.6. For the
analytical task intensity, the estimated effects are negative and grow over time. Having
more children amplifies the effects. In interpreting the sign of the effect, it is important to
keep in mind that equation 3.1 contains age and year effects. Thus, a negative event time
coefficient implies that the task intensity is lower than would be predicted based on the age
and year effects, rather than that the mean task intensity is lower than before childbirth.
In other words, a negative coefficient for analytical task intensities suggests that the task
intensity would be higher in the absence of children. An additional important issue for the
interpretation is the role of selection, which we will discuss in more detail below. Importantly,
a negative effect of having children on analytical task intensities could be reflected in wages
and contribute to the gender wage gap. We return to this issue in section 3.4.2.2.
The pattern for interactive tasks is quite similar, although its magnitude is smaller. Again,
the effects are increasing in the number of children and women with three or more children
show the strongest long-term change in interactive task content. The routine task intensity
increases for the groups of women with two and at least three children and is essentially
constant for women who have only one child. For manual task intensities, women with only
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Figure 3.6: Event studies of task intensities
(a) Analytical tasks
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(b) Interactive tasks
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(c) Routine tasks
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(d) Manual tasks
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one child show a small increase. The effect is strongest for women with two children, and
somewhat smaller again for women with at least three children.
As already noted, the estimated coefficients take both occupational switches and selection
due to some mothers exiting the labor force into account. To get a sense for the role of the
selection effects and their direction, we computed the mean task intensities that women had
in their last job before childbirth for mothers who work or stay at home at each point in
event time. Figure 3.7 shows the difference in the pre-birth task intensities for working and
non-working mothers. For example, the figure shows that mothers who work after 10 years
had a higher analytical task intensity (by roughly 0.02) before childbirth than mothers who
stay at home after 10 years. In other words, women in more analytical jobs before childbirth
are more likely to stay in the labor force after birth. Interestingly, this selection pattern goes
in the other direction than the estimated child-related effect from figure 3.5, where we find
a negative effect on analytical task intensities. The selection effect alone would lead to a
positive effect, since it is mothers in more analytical occupations who return to work at a
higher rate. Working mothers had higher interactive tasks and lower routine task intensities
than mothers who do not work. There is little selection on manual task content. Given the
presence of these selection patterns, it is important to also isolate the role of occupation
switches. To do so, we now turn to analyzing the within-individual changes in task content.15
15Note that it is not straightforward to directly correct for selection in the regression equation 3.1, since
this would require an instrument or a structural model, which provides the counterfactual task intensities for
women for whom they are not observed.
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Figure 3.7: Difference between pre-birth task intensities for working vs non-employed mothers
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Notes: The figure shows the difference in the mean task intensities before childbirth for mothers who work
and mothers who stay at home at each point in time after childbirth. Thus, a positive (negative) value
corresponds to working mothers having a higher (lower) task intensity along this dimension before birth.
3.4.2 Occupation Switches
3.4.2.1 Placebo Event Studies
We now focus on occupation switches following childbirth. To what extent do women increas-
ingly switch occupations after childbirth and how do the characteristics of the occupations
change? The main purpose of this analysis, as discussed in the previous section, is to shut
down the role of selection due to non-employment and only consider the within-individual
variation for all women who work at a given point in time.16
To create a control group for the analysis, we assign a ’placebo birth’ to each childless woman
by drawing the age at first birth from the empirical distribution of births of the group of
mothers from the corresponding education group, following the approach in Kleven et al.
(2018). This allows to study the labor market outcomes of childless women in event time
relative to the date of their placebo birth. The choice of childless women as a control group
deserves some discussion, since having children is an endogenous outcome and childless
women might differ from mothers in certain dimensions. In the following, we find that both
groups are on fairly similar trajectories before the (placebo) birth (the pre-trends are similar),
which suggests that childless women are a good control group. While one could also use men
as a control, this would similarly require assigning placebo births, since we observe fertility
only for women in our data. We restrict the sample to the cohorts born between 1955 and
1969, to come close to completed fertility.
Figure 3.8 compares the changes in outcomes for mothers and childless women and Table
3.4 summarizes the magnitude of the differences. Panel (a) of the figure first presents the
fraction of employed individuals from the group of mothers and the placebo group that work
16More concretely, we analyze changes in task intensities relative to the task intensity before childbirth
(∆tit) rather than the task intensity (tit) directly.
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in a different occupation than before childbirth. By construction, the fraction is close to zero
before childbirth for each group. After childbirth, mothers switch more often than women in
the placebo group. For example, after 10 years, 48% of working mothers are in a different
occupation than before childbirth, while it is 42% of non-mothers. Thus, mothers on average
switch 6 percentage points more often. As will be shown in Figure 3.10, the difference in
the switching rate grows with the number of children and the length of the career break -
in particular, women with very long career breaks switch occupations markedly more often
than childless women.
To assess the implications of this increased occupational switching rate, it is important to
consider additional characteristics of the occupations, such as tasks, the earnings potential or
the amenity value in terms of family-friendliness. On the one hand, switching could be a sign
of a worsening labor market situation and contribute to a wage loss. This would for example
be the case if mothers increasingly ’downgrade’ their occupation and return to work in less
skill-intensive occupations than they had worked in before childbirth. There are several
theoretical mechanisms that could lead to such downgrading. For example, models of human
capital depreciation (such as Adda et al. (2017)) predict that the skills in the pre-birth
occupation deteriorate over time and at some point, it might become hard to reenter to the
previous occupation. In addition, search frictions could prevent women from reentering in
their old occupation, especially when the career break is long enough so that they cannot
return to their old employer. Another potential reason for wage penalties resulting from
switching is that human capital is often argued to be task-specific (see for example in
Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) or Adda et al. (2017)). In such models, experience in
working with specific tasks increases the future productivity of these tasks. If the new and
old occupations differ strongly in the tasks that are required, women can only partially
transfer the skills they acquired in their previous working life. This would generate wage
losses especially for women who move to occupations with a very different task content. On
the other hand, Groes et al. (2014) highlight that occupational switching per se does not
necessarily lead to wage losses, since individuals can also progress to a ’better’ ocupation
with a higher earnings potential. In addition, it could be that the presence of children
amplifies the need to work in a family-friendly environment, so that women could switch
occupations to adapt to this. In the following, we use our data to investigate each of these
points in more detail.
In panels (b) - (e), we investigate the issue of occupational up- and downgrading in terms of
tasks. Skill-intensive and well-paying occupations tend to be more analytical and interactive
and occupational downgrading would be reflected in switches towards occupations with lower
task intensities along these dimensions. As discussed previously, this is closely related to the
event studies which were shown in figure 3.5. However, we now use different variation by
considering the difference between current and pre-birth tasks in order to isolate the role of
of occupational switching. Each occupation o is characterized by a task vector (tao, tio, tro, tmo ).
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Figure 3.8: Occupational switches for mothers and childless women
(a) Fraction of occupation switches
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Table 3.4: Differences between mothers and childless women
After 5 years After 10 years After 15 years
(1) Switched occupation 0.018 0.057 0.088
(2) Analytical -0.006 -0.009 -0.012
(3) Interactive -0.006 -0.006 -0.008
(4) Routine -0.003 -0.008 -0.012
(5) Manual 0.006 0.006 0.011
(6) Task deviation 0.001 0.004 0.007
(7) Median earnings in occupation -0.547 -0.930 -1.109
(8) Share of part-time work in occupation 0.016 0.025 0.040
Notes: The table shows the difference between mothers and childless women (i.e. yM − yC , with M and C
corresponding to the two groups) for each of the outcomes from Figure 3.8. The units of the outcomes are
percentage points for row (1), task intensity units for rows (2), (3), (4) and (5), the squared task distance for
row (6), yearly earnings (in thousand) for row (7) and percentage points for row (8).
Denoting oit as the current occupation and o¯i as the last occupation before childbirth, we
compute the following outcome variables:
∆tji,t = tjoi,t − tjo¯i
Variation in ∆tji,t purely reflects occupational changes, since the variable would always be
zero if all women stay in their previous occupation. As a result, focusing on changes relative
to the pre-birth occupation circumvents the issue of selection.17 Figure 3.8 then shows
the mean of ∆tji,t for mothers and the placebo group at each point in event time. Panel
(b) shows the results for analytical task content.18 Interestingly, mothers do not directly
downgrade their occupation, in the sense that they would start to work in occupations with
lower analytical task intensities after childbirth. Instead, they slightly increase the task
intensity relative to their pre-birth occupation. However, around childbirth, a gap emerges
between mothers and childless women, since the latter group still increases the analytical
task intensity on average by around 0.02, whereas the increase for mothers is marginal. To
put the magnitude of this change into perspective, it is useful to compare it to the mean task
intensity before childbirth. For childless women, this is 0.16. Thus, the average growth after
15 years for the placebo group is 12.5% as large as the initial level. Assuming that mothers
17Thus, there is no selection at each point in event time, since we only look at women who work in this
event quarter and before childbirth. Note that the composition of the labor force still changes between
different points in event time, since more and more women reenter over time.
18As a robustness check regarding the definitions of the task intensities, we also replicated these results
for alternative task measures, where task intensities are rescaled so that they sum to 1 for each occupation.
These results are shown in figure C.9 and broady similar. Mothers switch less to analytical and to less
routine-intensive occupations and to more manual-intensive ones. There is no noticeable difference in
interactive tasks between the groups for the rescaled task measures.
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would have faced the same career trajectory as childless women, these results suggest that
the ’penalty’ of motherhood with respect to analytical tasks mainly operates through the
effect that mothers would have been able to further increase their task intensity if they had
decided not to have children.
For interactive tasks, the point estimates suggest a small negative effect of motherhood on
task intensities. However, the confidence bounds, which are computed for the 5% level, are
relatively wide. Panel (d) and (e) finally show the event studies for routine and manual
tasks. Mothers reduce their routine task content more strongly than the placebo group. The
manual task intensity stays roughly constant, while the placebo group reduces its manual
task content. Note that the magnitude of these changes is relatively modest, compared
to the differences in task intensities across occupations. In general, with the exception of
interactive tasks, the difference between the two groups becomes more pronounced over time.
Panel (f) of Figure 3.8 shows the results for the ’distance’ between the current and the old
occupation. We compute the task distance between occupations as the sum of the squared
deviations between current and pre-birth tasks.19
∆Ti,t =
∑
j
(tjoi,t − tjo¯i)2
The results show that mothers overall work in occupations that are more distant from their
pre-birth occupations, particularly in later periods (such as 10 or 15 years after childbirth).
Interestingly, the effects closely mirror the increased rate of occupational switching, which
was shown in panel (a). This suggests that the increased task distance relative to the
pre-birth occupation is largely due to a higher number of occupational switches, rather than
moving towards more different occupations conditional on switching. Note the this task
distance is conceptually different from the task changes analyzed in panels (b) - (e). For
example, if equally many women increase and decrease their analytical task intensity, it could
be that the mean change is zero, but the mean distance is non-zero. From the perspective
of the model in Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010), the task distance reflects the matching
between the previously accumulated human capital and the current tasks. This implies
that having children could not only affect occupational choice in terms of moving between
’low-wage’ and ’high-wage’ (or ’skilled’ and ’unskilled’) occupations, but also the allocation
of individual skills to tasks, which is a unique implication of the task framework. In other
words, also a move between two ’unskilled’ occupations could be wage-reducing if the tasks
in the new occupation differ from the skills of the individual.
To complement our analysis of task intensities, the remaining two panels show additional
characteristics of occupations. First, we investigate whether women switch to occupation
19As a robustness check, we also compute the distance using the absolute rather than the squared value
and the results are very similar. The squared difference attaches a higher weight to large deviations from the
pre-birth tasks.
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with a higher or lower average earnings potential. As a proxy for the earnings potential
in an occupation, we compute the median (annual) earnings of all women working in this
occupation, focusing on childless women to reduce the impact of hours choices. Panel
(g) shows how the occupational earnings rank changes for mothers and childless women.
As in the previous analysis, the outcome is expressed relative to the earnings in the last
occupation before childbirth, so that changes only reflect occupation switches. The graph
shows that both groups switch to better-paying occupations over time, but this increase
is more pronounced for the placebo group. Thus, interestingly, there is again little direct
occupational downgrading, but rather a stagnation relative to childless women. Childless
women on average still advance to occupations where the median (annual) earnings are
around 2000e higher after 15 years, while mothers only experience a lower increase.
Finally, we consider a proxy for the family-friendliness of an occupation, which we define
as the fraction of women who work part-time in an occupation. Occupations in which this
fraction is low could be harder to combine with part-time work and might thus be seen
as less family-friendly. Panel (h) shows the results for the measure. This stays essentially
constant for the placebo group, while mothers switch to occupations with a higher fraction
of part-time work. Thus, taken together, these findings suggest that mothers switch less to
higher paying occupations (panel (g)) and more to occupations in which part-time work is
prevalent (panel (h)). Thus, our results are consistent with a trade-off between the earnings
potential of an occupation and its family-friendliness, which has recently been suggested by
Goldin (2014). While Goldin (2014) discusses the cross-sectional differences in occupations
in terms of their family-friendliness, there is not much direct evidence so far on the role of
switches towards family-friendly work environment following childbirth. Kleven et al. (2018)
find that mothers become more likely to work in the public sector and in family-friendly
firms, proxied by the presence of women with young children in the management, whereas
we add evidence on occupational switching towards family-friendly occupations.
In light of this discussion, an important question is whether there is a systematic relationship
between tasks and the family-friendliness of an occupation. If, for example, certain task
combinations often occur in less family-friendly occupations and mothers increasingly switch
to family-friendly occupations, this would explain part of the observed shifts in task intensity.
As a simple way of investigating such a relationship, we calculated the correlation coefficients
between the part-time share in an occupation and each of the task intensities. Interestingly,
analytical task content is slightly positively correlated with part-time work (0.04). This
suggests that is not necessarily more difficult to work part-time in more analytical occupations.
The correlation is also positve and somewhat larger for interactive tasks (0.23) and close to
zero for manual tasks (0.01). The association is strongest for routine work, which negatively
correlates with part-time work (−0.53).
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3.4.2.2 Implications for Wages
Given the previous results about changes in task intensities, an important question is to what
extent they could be reflected in hourly wages. We perform a simple back-of-the-envelope
calculation to assess how important the changes in tasks could be quantitatively, focusing on
the increases or decreases in task intensities of mothers relative to childless women, which
were shown in figure 3.8 (panels (b) - (e)).
To calculate the hourly wage rate in our data, we assume that individuals work 20 hours in
part-time and 40 hours in full-time.20 We then estimate the following equation:
log(wit) = β0 +
∑
k
βkt
k
it + uit
Based on the estimated coefficients for each of the task intensities, the effect of a task change
∆tk can simply be computed as follows:
∆wk = (exp(βk)− 1)∆tk · 100
Here, ∆wk is the percentage change in the wage which is associated with the task change
∆tk.
Table 3.5: Implications for wages
βk ∆tk ∆wk
Analytical 1.970 -0.012 -7.466
Interactive -0.230 -0.008 0.156
Routine -0.010 -0.012 0.012
Manual -0.307 0.011 -0.304
Notes: The table shows the results of the back-of-the-envelope calculation for wages. It reports the regression
coefficient (column 1), the average change in the task variable after 15 years (column 2) and the predicted
wage change (column 3). The wage change is expressed in percentage points.
Thus, this simple calculation suggests that analytical tasks have the most potential to
contribute to effect of motherhood on hourly wages. The calculation suggests that the
hourly wage rate of mothers would be 7.5% higher if they also increased their analytical task
intensity like childless women. For the other task dimensions, the quantitative implication
on wages is quite small, at least in the context of this simple calculation. This is mostly the
20Recall that the data only contains a binary hours variable, so that such an assumption is necessary. It
implies that more fine-grained differences in hours are captured as a difference in the hourly wage.
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case because the estimated regression coefficients suggest that analytical tasks have a much
larger impact on wages than the other tasks.21
3.4.2.3 Occupational Switching between Sectors
To better understand the occupational switches following childbirth and build more intuition
about the types of switches that occur, we also grouped the 120 occupations into broader
categories (manager / professional / technicians (MPT), sales / office, production / operators
/ crafts (POC), services and care) and studied switches between these five broad sectors
directly. Table 3.6 summarizes the occupational switches relative to the pre-birth occupation
ten years after childbirth and Figure 3.9 illustrates the transitions graphically and shows
the dynamics in more detail. For each pre-birth occupation group, the columns of Table
3.6 report the fraction of women who work in each of the occupation groups (conditional
on working). The diagonal reveals some heterogeneity in switching behavior across sectors.
Women who work in ’Sales/Office’ and ’Care’ are least likely to switch (around 80% stay
within their occupation group), whereas women working in the service sector and POC are
most likely to switch (only around 60% stay in their group). Managers, professionals and
technicians are somewhat in between these two cases, since 68% of women stay in the group.
The table further shows which type of broad occupational moves are most common. In
particular, there are noteworthy fractions of women switching from MPT to sales/office
(19%), from production, operators and crafts to sales/office (16%) and services (19%), and
from services to sales/office (20%) and POC (16%). Table C.4 shows the change in tasks
for different occupational moves between these sectors. Given that the calculation from the
previous section suggests that analytical task intensities have the largest implications for
wages, it is perhaps most interesting to look at changes in analytical tasks - for example,
a worker who moves from MPT to sales/office reduce the analytical task intensity by 0.11.
Moving from POC to sales/office increases it by 0.13 and moving from services to sales/office
increases it by 0.11.
21There are several important dimensions in which this simple calculation could be extended. In particular,
it would be interesting to allow for skill accumulation and depreciation, heterogeneity in ability and sorting
across occupations.
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Figure 3.9: Fraction working in different occupations conditional on occupation before birth
(a) Managers / Professionals / Technicians
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(b) Sales / Office
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(c) Production / Operators / Crafts
0 3 6 9 12 15
Years after first childbirth
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
M/P/T S/O P/O/C S C
(d) Services
0 3 6 9 12 15
Years after first childbirth
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
M/P/T S/O P/O/C S C
(e) Care
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Notes: The figure shows the transitions between occupational sectors for women who worked in a specific
occupation group before childbirth. The figure includes transitions into non-employment.
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Table 3.6: Occupational Switching - 10 years after childbirth
Post-birth Man./Prof./Tech. Sales/Office Prod./Op./Crafts Services Care
Pre-birth
Man./Prof./Tech. 0.68 0.19 0.03 0.02 0.08
Sales/Office 0.04 0.83 0.06 0.05 0.03
Prod./Op./Crafts 0.04 0.16 0.58 0.19 0.03
Services 0.04 0.20 0.16 0.57 0.03
Care 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.82
Notes: The table shows the transition rates between the 5 broad occupational groups. Each row corresponds
to a pre-birth occupation. The columns contain the probability of working in each of the occupations 10
years after childbirth, excluding transitions into non-employment (i.e. it focuses on women who work both
before childbirth and 10 years afterwards).
3.4.2.4 Heterogeneity
While the analysis of occupational switches so far has focused on the pooled sample of all
women, there are several interesting dimensions of heterogeneity along which the effects
could potentially differ. We also conducted the analysis separately by education group to see
to what extent the average effect is driven by one of these groups. For example, it could be
the case that highly educated women start their career in more analytical occupations, but
downgrade the occupation after childbirth. Instead, we find that highly educated mothers,
in terms of having a university degree, exhibit very small differences in their switching
behavior from the corresponding placebo group (Figure C.10). The effects are largest for
the medium education group, which consists of women with a high school degree (including
A-levels/Abitur) or vocational training. The average results from Figure 3.8 mostly reflect
the changes for this group of women. For the lowest education category, the effects are small
again.
We further investigate the role of the number of children and the length of the career
interruption. The theoretical arguments for why mothers might be more inclined to switch
occupations - such as a higher need to work in a family-friendly occupation or human capital
depreciation - are likely to be amplified by these variables. Note that the variables are
interrelated, since a higher number of children typically generates longer career breaks, as
was shown by Figure 3.5. In Figure 3.10, we show how the fraction of occupation switches is
related to these variables.
Panel (a) shows the fraction of women who has changed their occupation relative to the pre-
birth occupation by the number of children. Woman who have two or more children experience
a larger switching rate than the other two groups, for which the switching probabilities quite
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Figure 3.10: Occupational switches - by children and length of break
(a) By number of children
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similar. The differences between the groups become larger when comparing mothers with
different lengths of their career break, defined as the number of years that pass until the
individual is observed to go back to work (panel (b)). Women with a very long break exhibit
a markedly higher switching rate than women with short breaks.22 This is in line with
theoretical mechanisms such as increasing human capital depreciation or search frictions due
to an increasing difficulty to return to one’s old employer. Another interpretation would be
selection, in the sense that taking a long career break could be related to having worse labor
market prospects in the first place, which could also increase the likelihood to switch.
The higher rates of occupational switching, both for women with a higher number of kids or
a longer career break, are reflected in a greater distance between current and pre-birth tasks,
as is shown in Figure 3.11. Given the results from Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010), such a
task distance could lead to a reduction of the earnings potential of mothers, as they perform
tasks they have less prior experience with. In Appendix Figure C.12, we also computed the
task distance separately for each of the task intensities, to see whether the overall impact
shown in Figure 3.11 is driven by a particular task dimension. The qualitative pattern that
longer breaks tend to increase the task distance is present for each of the task intensities.
The magnitude is strongest for routine and interactive tasks, although it is comparable for
the other dimensions.
In Table C.11, we also look at up- and downgrading in the task content of the job. A first
issue to note is that breaking down the sample into subgroups makes the confidence bounds
for the task variables quite large. As a result, the figure shows the confidence intervals at
the 10% level, although they are still relatively wide for both the breakdown by the number
of children and by the length of the career break. For the number of children, the point
estimates suggest that more children lead to slightly less analytical jobs, whereas there is less
of a relationship between analytical task content and the length of the career break. Thus,
22Interestingly, mothers with very short career breaks (0-2 years) switch at a (slightly) lower rate than the
placebo group.
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Figure 3.11: Task distance - by children and length of break
(a) By number of children
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interestingly, these results suggest that women with long career breaks do not downgrade
their occupation in terms of the analytical task content.
Finally, in Figure C.13 we consider how the other occupation characteristics (the median
annual earnings and the fraction of part-time workers) vary with the length of the career
break. Another potential sign of occupational downgrading for women with a long career
break would be if they switched to occupations with lower median annual earnings than the
occupation they worked in before childbirth. Panel (a) shows the change of the occupational
median earnings (as was also defined previously). There are no statistically significant
differences (at the 5% level) by the length of the break. This is another indication that there
is little direct occupational downgrading, since even women who take very long career breaks
do not (on average) return to work in less well-paying occupations, but only experience
less of an increase than childless women. For the part-time intensity of the occupation,
the differences between the groups are larger. Especially women who who take the longest
breaks (between 7 and 12 years) switch more to occupations in which a higher fraction of
individuals works part-time.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the relationship between fertility and women’s careers, with a
particular emphasis on the role of occupations and the tasks that women perform on the job.
Our analysis was based on administrative labor market data from German social insurance
records and detailed survey data on tasks that individuals typically perform in different
occupations.
Our analysis started by comparing cohort profiles of participation, income and task intensities.
In particular, we document that women have experienced a strong rise in analytical and
interactive task intensities across cohorts, whereas the task intensities have changed little
for men. However, there still is some divergence in tasks over the life-cycle, particularly
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for women with a higher number of children. We then consider the role of childbirth
more explicitly by analyzing its impact in an event-study framework. The direct impact
of childbirth on women’s labor force participation is very large in Germany. Among the
task intensities, analytical and manual tasks react strongest to childbirth. In particular,
analytical task intensities increase less than would be predicted in the absence of children.
We finally consider the role of occupational switching in more detail and directly compare the
occupational switches of mothers and childlesss women. While mothers switch occupations
more often than childless women, their analytical task intensity increases less than for the
comparison group. This can be interpreted as mothers missing out on some career progression
relative to childless women. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the
hourly wage rate of mothers would be 7% higher if they experienced the same increase in
the analytical task intensity as childless women. Interestingly, there is little evidence for
direct occupational ’downgrading’ after childbirth, even for women with long career breaks,
which would mean that women return to the labor force in occupations with a lower earnings
potential or lower skill requirements. Another interesting aspect is that mothers switch
to occupations which differ more strongly from the task requirements of the occupation
they had before childbirth, particularly those who take a very long career break. In the
light of theories of task-specific human capital accumulation, this could imply that mothers
can transfer less of their previously accumulated human capital to the new occupation.
In addition, mothers tend to switch to occupations in which a higher fraction of women
works in part-time, which is consistent with an increased need to work in a family-friendly
environment.
There are some interesting directions in which our analysis could be extended. In particular,
it would be interesting to consider a more fine-grained classification of tasks, which would
allow to study more closely whether there are certain tasks, which are per se less suitable
for part-time work. For example, our definition of interactive tasks includes both ’selling’,
which is often done in part-time work, and ’supervising others’, which one would expect to
be more common in full-time work. This more fine-grained classification would allow to shed
more light on the relationship between occupational tasks and family-friendly jobs.
In addition, the simple back-of-the-envelope calculation about the potential implication for
wages could be extended to a more realistic empirical model which captures, for example, the
accumulation of experience. This would help to further quantify the wage impact of changes
in the task composition. Finally, it would be interesting to analyze the patterns documented
in this paper through the lens of a structural model, which would allow to assess the welfare
implications of occupational switching.
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Appendix A
Appendix to chapter 1
A.1 Numerical Solution of Model
In this section, we outline the algorithm used to solve for the equilibrium of the model.
General approach. We start by guessing a matrix of hiring rates gj(t). Given these values
and the functional forms described in Section 1.4, we can solve the agent problem backwards.
In each period, the optimal level of search intensity has a closed-form solution:
sj,t = A
(
βgj(t)(V ej (t)− V uj (t))
)λ
To obtain policy functions for savings, we use the method of endogenous grid points (Carroll
(2006)). In period T, agents will consume their remaining assets. For each previous period,
we can rearrange the Euler equations so that kt is expressed as a function of kt+1 and kt+2.
Since we know the policy function for period t+ 1 and can replace kt+2 by a function of kt+1,
this results in an equation that just contains kt and kt+1. We use a grid of 50 points for kt+1
and can compute the corresponding kt. To obtain the full policy function, we interpolate
linearly between the grid points (Judd (1998)).
Given the solution to the agent problem, the update of the firm problem consists of two
steps. First, we have to update the hiring probabilities gj(t) via the equation described
in the model section (and, in more detail, below). Second, we need to update v using the
free-entry condition. The equilibrium is computed by iterating these steps until convergence.
Computing the hiring rates. Recall the following two expressions needed for the hiring
rates:
p(t, φ) =
J∑
k=1
ak
a
· pik · P
(
Π(φ˜, t˜) ≥ Π(φ, t)|k
)
gj(t) = pij
∫
φ
exp
(
− p(φ, t) · µ
)
dFj(φ)
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We compute these expressions as follows:
• P (·|k) is the probability that a random draw of type j from the pool is better than a
given applicant. This is the following probability:
∫
φ˜
( T∑
t˜=1
1(Π(φ˜, t˜) ≥ Π(φ, t)) Sj,t˜sj,t˜αj∑
t Sj,tsj,tαj
fj(φ˜)
)
dφ˜
We evaluate the integral using Gauss-Legendre quadrature.
• Given these probabilities, we calculate gj(t) using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 5
nodes.
A.2 Institutional Details
We create two samples of unemployment spells. One from 2000 until 2011 as specified in
Section 1.2.1 and a sample from 1983 until 2010. The second is necessary to create a sample
of unemployed individuals that receive two or more unemployment spells in their work
history, because in the estimation part we use some moments from a multiple spell sample
to identify the heterogeneity parameters. In the following we describe the sample creation
for the 1983 sample, because the 2010 sample is just a simple subsample of the former. To
account for changing rules and laws over the sample period that determine UI eligibility we
use an eligibility simulator and drop all individuals that are not eligible for 12 months of UI.
The simulator includes age cutoffs (older individuals receive benefits for longer), employment
history regulations and drops individuals that might be subject to carry-forward rules that
come into play for individuals with multiple unemployment spells. Shorter durations are
applied to individuals with unstable working histories; longer durations to older workers. In
order to obtain a proper sample of unemployment spells it is necessary to implement the
main features of the German unemployment insurance system. To do so, we restrict ourselves
to unemployment spells starting from January 1st, 1983 until the end of the last day of 2011.
Since our data ends in 2014 we only consider unemployment spells that we observe for at
least three years. We choose 1983 as the beginning, since we need to observe the employment
history of individuals four years prior to their unemployment spell in order to determine UI
eligibility. In Germany, the duration of UI recipiency depends on the employment history
in the last four years from January 1st 1983 until June 30th 1987, the last three years from
July 1st 1987 until January 31st 2006 and the last two years from from February 1st 2006
until December 31st 2011. The number of years that are considered for the employment
history is legally called base period (Rahmenfristen). In our analysis, we will only consider
individuals that are eligible for 12 months of unemployment benefits when they lose their
job. The general rule is determined by an abeyance ratio (Anwartschaftsverha¨ltnis). The
abeyance rule says that the months worked in the base period divided by 3 (from 1.1.1983
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until 30.6.1987) or 2 (from 1.7.1987 until 31.12.2011) determines the maximal UI eligibility
(abstracting from age cutoffs). Table A.1 summarizes the mapping from the months worked
in the base period into the months of UI eligibility for the period from 1983 until 2011. (See
Hunt (1995); Schmieder et al. (2010) for similar tables.) For individuals with a certain age,
special rules apply that extend the potential UI duration to more than 12 months. For these
individuals the base period is seven years. These individuals are not in our sample and the
table does not show the potential durations for these individuals1. The table entries with
ages in brackets show when individuals become eligible for longer durations due to their
age. All individuals that are below the age cutoff receive 12 months of benefits. We drop all
unemployment spells from our sample to which certain age restrictions apply.
For the estimation, we use some moments that use information from the second unemployment
spell of individuals. However, for individuals that experience their second unemployment
spell complex carry-forward rules apply if the second spell is not more than four years after
the beginning of the first spell. To avoid modelling these rules we restrict second spells to be
at least four years after the beginning of the first spell. Second, we restrict unemployment
spells to individuals aged between 20 and 55. For individuals older than 55 the German
social security system offers several early retirement schemes. For individuals below the age
of 20, there is often the opportunity to go back to some form of school. We then drop third
and fourth unemployment spells from the data, even though only a handful individuals are
eligible for UI three or more times. Further, we exclude any ambigous spells from the sample.
These are in particular the following cases that can arise: (a) individuals that receive UI
and UA at the same time for more than 30 days and (b) individuals that are employed
and receive UI at the same time for more than 14 days.2 If we observe two consecutive
unemployment spells within 14 days we pool them together and count them as one spell.
With all these restrictions we arrive at a final estimation sample of 179, 696 individuals,
where 18, 432 individuals experience an additional second spells. In our sample from 2000
onwards we have 59, 793 first unemployment spells.
An unemployment spell is defined as the transition from employment to UI within 30 days.
Individuals that register more than 30 days after their last job has ended are dropped to avoid
voluntary quitters that have a waiting period of 3 months and to avoid to wrongly measure
unemployment spells due to individuals that do not take-up UI within a month. Employment
consists of either socially insured employment, apprenticeships, minor employment, or other
forms of registered employment. We define unemployment duration as the time between
the start of UI recipiency until next employment starts (similar as in Card et al. (2007) and
Schmieder et al. (2012)), though we also count moves to apprenticeship, or minor employment
relationships as re-employment. We also cap unemployment durations at 36 months. This is
necessary, because in the data there are many spells with long tails and some individuals
1I.e. the table ignores working histories of more than 48 months.
2It is not entirely clear where these cases come from, however there are only a few of them.
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that never return to work or have an additional entry. The re-employment wage is defined
as the wage the individual earns at the first employed position after unemployment.
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A.3 Additional Figures & Tables
Table A.1: Potential unemplyoment benefit durations
Months
worked in
base period
1.1.83 -
31.12.84
(4 years)
1.1.85 -
31.12.85
(4 years)
1.1.86 -
30.6.87
(4 years)
1.7.87 -
31.3.97
(3 years)
1.4.97 -
31.12.04
(3 years)
1.1.05 -
31.1.06
(3 years)
1.2.06 -
31.7.08
(2 years)
1.8.08 -
31.12.11
(2 years)
12 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6
16 4 4 4 8 8 8 8 8
18 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 8
20 6 6 6 10 10 10 10 10
24 8 8 8 12 12 12 12 12
28 8 8 8 14(≥42) 14(≥45) 12 12 12
30 10 10 10 14(≥42) 14(≥45) 15(≥55) 15(≥55) 15(≥50)
32 10 10 10 16(≥42) 16(≥45) 15(≥55) 15(≥55) 15(≥50)
36 12 12 12 18(≥42) 18(≥45) 18(≥55) 18(≥55) 18(≥50)
40 12 12 12 20(≥44) 20(≥47) 18(≥55) 18(≥55) 18(≥50)
42 12 14(≥49) 14(≥44) 20(≥44) 20(≥47) 18(≥55) 18(≥55) 18(≥50)
44 12 14(≥49) 14(≥44) 22(≥44) 22(≥47) 18(≥55) 18(≥55) 18(≥50)
48 12 16(≥49) 16(≥44) 24(≥49) 24(≥52) 18(≥55) 18(≥55) 24(≥50)
Notes: This table is based on Hunt (1995); Schmieder et al. (2010) and own calculations. For individuals with
a certain age, special rules apply that extend the potential UI duration to more than 12 months. For these
individuals the base period is seven years. These individuals are not in our sample and the table does not
show the potential durations for these individuals. The table entries with ages in brackets show, if individuals
become eligible for longer durations due to their age (for working histories of less than 48 months). All
individuals that are below the age cutoff receive 12 months of benefits.
Figure A.1: Conditional Search Effort
Notes: The figure shows the average search effort conditional on staying unemployed for at least one year.
Search effort is measured on the y-axis in terms of the number of applications. Source: IZA ED.
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Figure A.2: Consider unemployed applicants
Notes: This graph shows the response to whether vacancies consider unemployed applicants as a function of
the unemployment duration in months. The answers in the figure are conditional on reviewing unemployed
applicants at all. The x-axis shows the categories in the survey question (consider applicants with up to 6
months of UI duration, up to 12 months of UI duration or longer than 12 months of UI). The y-axis plots
the fraction of firms that still consider certain applicants. Source: JVS.
Figure A.3: Labor market tightness
Notes: This figure plots the labor market tightness for Germany from 2000 until 2014. Labor market
tightness is defined as the ratio of open vacancies over the number of registered unemployed. The horizontal
line denotes the average labor market tightness over the period. This figure shows that there are fewer
vacancies than unemployed and that even when each vacancy is filled there remain some job seekers, which
provides additional evidence that crowding-out factors and multiple applications among job seekers might be
of importance. Source: Insitute for Employment Research (IAB).
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Figure A.4: Mean duration in second unemployment spell
Notes: The x-axis of this figure puts the unemployment duration of the first UI spell into 4-month bins and
shows the mean duration in the second spell on the y-axis. The sample of spells is extended to the period
from 1983 until 2011. Source: SIAB.
Figure A.5: Mean education over UI spell
Notes: In this graph we plot the mean education of unemployed as a function of the UI duration. The
education variable is defined as follows: 0 no school degree. 1 school degree. 2 apprenticeship. 3 college.
Source: SIAB.
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Figure A.6: Fraction female over UI spell
Notes: In this graph we plot the fraction of female unemployed as a function of the UI duration. Source:
SIAB.
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A.4 Alternative Parametrizations
(a) Lower risk aversion (b) Higher risk aversion
Figure A.7: Different risk aversion
Notes: This figure compares the optimal policy of our baseline model (dashed line in both panels) with a
setting where agents are either less risk averse with γ = 1.8 (solid line, panel (a)) or more risk averse with
γ = 2.2 (solid line, panel (b)).
Figure A.8: Higher discounting
Notes: This figure compares the optimal policy of our baseline model (dashed line) with a setting where
agents have a larger monthly discounting factor, i.e. β = 0.95. The optimal policy under this assumption is
illustrated with the solid line.
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Figure A.9: Higher elasticity of vacancy creation
Notes: This figure compares the optimal policy of our baseline model (dashed line) with a setting where
ρ = 0.5, i.e. the vacancy creation is more elastic and vacancy costs are closer to linear. The optimal policy
can be seen in the solid line.
Figure A.10: No initial assets
Notes: This figure compares the optimal policy of our baseline model (dashed line) with a setting where no
agent has initial assets (solid line).
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Appendix B
Appendix to chapter 2
B.1 Computational Details
Solving the model requires finding a fixed point between the expected distributions of singles,
which individuals use to compute the expected valules over the future, and the actual
distributions of singles, which depend on the marriage and divorce choices that individuals
make. The equilibrium essentially requires rational expectations, so that the beliefs about
the future coincide with the actual distributions of singles. The basic algorithm is to
• start with a guess of the expected distributions of the characteristics of singles at each
age Λt,g(,H, α,A)
• solve the life-cycle problem for the value functions given these expected distributions
• simulate the model, where individuals make choices about consumption and time use,
marriage and divorce given the expected value functions from the previous step
• compute the implied distributions based on the simulations
• update the expected distributions and repeat until convergence
Note that little can be said about the theoretical equilibrium properties, regarding existence
and uniqueness, as is standard in search models of marriage (also see Guvenen and Rendall
(2015) or Greenwood et al. (2016)). In numerical checks, this does not pose an issue given
the calibrated parameter values.
The life-cycle problem
Given a guess for the expected distribution of singles at each age, the life-cycle problem
can be solved via backwards-induction starting in the terminal period T . The resulting
value function has the interpretation as the expected value function given expectations about
the future availability of singles. Both the assets and the Pareto weights are treated as
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continuous state variables. Values outside of the corresponding grids are interpolated linearly.
The distributions of singles at each age are discretized on a fine grid in the asset dimension.
Note that temporary wage shocks do not introduce separate state variables, which facilicates
including them without greatly increasing the size of the state space. Since the temporary
shocks are i.i.d. and do not influence continuation values, for example a positive wage shock
is equivalent to an increase in assets (conditional on labor supply), so that the temporary
shocks can be evaluated on the same grid that is also used to evaluate different asset levels.
Simulation and updating the distributions
Having computed the value function, one needs to update the guess of the distributions of
singles, which is done via simulation. In the simulation, potential partners are always drawn
from the actual distribution of singles, which can be computed from the currently available
singles in the simulation (given the assumption of meetings only occuring within cohorts).
The guess for the expected distributions of singles enters (only) through the value functions,
which individuals use for example to compare the value from getting married to the value of
staying single. In the end, the guess for the distributions is updated (with a weight κ on the
old distributions).
Implementation
The model is implemented with Python and Numba and solved on a computing cluster. The
parallelization is based on MPI. To get good performance for this type of model, it is helpful
to use MPI only for inter-node communication and use shared-memory parallelism (such as
Numba’s prange) within a node. This limits communication time and allows to have a full
node as a master MPI rank with sufficient memory for the simulations.
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B.2 Alternative Inequality Measures
For robustness, I also conducted the decompositions for two alternative inequality measures
that are commonly used. For the purpose of this chapter, the Theil index and the Mean
Logarithmic Deviation (TI and MLD in the following) are most suitable, because they can
be decomposed into within and between components. As a result, the same decomposition
formulas that were used in the main text can be applied. The two indices are defined as:
TI = 1
N
N∑
i=1
Xi
X¯
log
(
Xi
X¯
)
MLD = 1
N
N∑
i=1
log
(
X¯
Xi
)
The tables replicates the main results for these two inequality measures. Since they require
the variable to be positive, I report the results for the equivalence scale (instead of the utility
measure) and private consumption. The results are in tables B.1 and B.2. The first row in
each section shows the decomposition of the level of the inequality measure and the second
row shows the decomposition of the change. The main conclusions from the tables are similar
as when using the variance. In addition, the differences between the Theil index and the
MLD are small.
Table B.1: Decomposition of Mean Logarithmic Deviation
Total
Singles
(%)
Within
couples (%)
Between
couples (%)
Betw. sin.
mar. (%)
(a) ci
MLD (ψ2 = 0.15) 4.7 21.7 23.6 54.3 0.4
Change (ψ2 = 0.21) -11.2 0.15 0.23 0.62 -0
(b) Log eq. scale
MLD (ψ2 = 0.15) 9.8 13.5 6.5 69.7 10.2
Change (ψ2 = 0.21) -4.9 0.27 0.1 0.61 0.02
(c) Log eq. scale (LT)
MLD (ψ2 = 0.15) 6.9 16.9 8.5 74.5 0.1
Change (ψ2 = 0.21) -8 0.22 0.09 0.69 -0
Notes: This table replicates the decomposition for the MLD.
127
Table B.2: Decomposition of Theil index
Total
Singles
(%)
Within
couples (%)
Between
couples (%)
Betw. sin.
mar. (%)
(a) ci
Theil index (ψ2 = 0.15) 4.7 21.1 23.3 55.1 0.4
Change (ψ2 = 0.21) -11.4 0.16 0.24 0.61 -0
(b) Log eq. scale
Theil index (ψ2 = 0.15) 9.8 9.7 7.5 73.3 9.5
Change (ψ2 = 0.21) -5.4 0.19 0.13 0.67 0.02
(c) Log eq. scale (LT)
Theil index (ψ2 = 0.15) 7.2 16.8 8.3 74.8 0.1
Change (ψ2 = 0.21) -8.4 0.23 0.1 0.68 -0
Notes: This table replicates the decomposition for the Theil index.
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B.3 Details of the Decomposition Formula
The expression for the variance was given by:
V (X) = psV S + pmV M,W + pmV M,B + V BMS
The variance between couples and singles can be split into two parts:
V BMS = psV BMS,S + pmV BMS,M
V BMS,S = (E(X| Single)− E(X))2
V BMS,M = (E(X| Married)− E(X))2
Overall, this leads to the following decomposition of the growth rate:
Vˆ (X) = ω0pˆm + ω1Vˆ S + ω2Vˆ M,B + ω3Vˆ M,W + ω4Vˆ BMS,S + ω5Vˆ BMS,M + Rˆ
The weights ωi and Rˆ and residual are the following:
ω0 =
−pmV s + pmV M,B + pmV M,W − pmV BMS,S + pmV BMS,M
V
ω1 =
psV
S
V
ω2 =
pmV
M,B
V
ω3 =
pmV
M,W
V
ω4 =
psV
MBS,1
V
ω5 =
pmV
MBS,2
V
Rˆ = pˆmVˆ S · −pmV
s
V
+ pˆmVˆ M,B · pmV
M,B
V
+ pˆmVˆ M,W · pmV
M,W
V
+ pˆmVˆ BMS,S · pmV
BMS,S
V
+ pˆmVˆ BMS,M · pmV
BMS,M
V
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B.4 Calibration of the Wage Process
Since the stochastic process for wages in exogenous, it can be estimated separately from
the rest of the model. I estimate the parameters of the process by matching moments of
the process to data moments from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel. Since the process
is assumed to be the same for men and women, a convenient way to address potential
selection problems is to estimate the process on data for men only. The parameters that need
to be calibrated are the persistent and variance of the wage process (which is discretized
according to the Rouwenhorst method), the variance of the temporary earnings shock, and
the mean and variance of the ability distribution. The ability distribution is a discretized
log-normal distribution. To separately pin down variability over time (through shocks) and
persistent heterogeneity, I include moments on the variance of wage changes as well as the
cross-sectional variance of wages. In addition, I include two autocorrelation moments to pin
down the persistence parameter of the process and the variance of the temporary shock. The
fit of the wage process and the parameters are summarized in tables B.3 and B.4.
Table B.3: Wage moments - fit
Model Data
V ar(log(wt+1,i)− log(wt,i)) 0.03 0.02
Corr(log(wt+1,i), log(wt,i) 0.93 0.86
Corr(log(wt+2,i), log(wt,i) 0.89 0.75
E(log(wt,i)) 2.78 3.03
V ar(log(wt,i)) 0.21 0.15
q10log(wt,i) 2.19 2.60
q90log(wt,i) 3.43 3.49
Notes: This table compares the moments of the wage pro-
cess to the data.
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Table B.4: Parameters of the wage process
Value
σw 0.41
ρw 0.94
Variance of temp. shock 0.05
Mean of persistent heterogeneity 1.10
Variance of persistent heterogeneity 0.09
Notes: This table shows the calibrated wage parameters.
The process for women is identical to the process for men except for the parameter for
the gender wage gap. This parameter is set to 0.83, which reproduces the difference in
mean earnings between men and women in the data. Note that this abstract from potential
selection issues as well as from endogenous human capital accumulation, which could be
included in a richer specification.1
1With human capital accumulation, the gender wage gap would be endogenous.
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B.5 Additional Tables
Table B.5: Composition of inequality under the two policy
regimes
ψ2 = 0.15 ψ2 = 0.21
(b) log(ci)
Within couples (% of total) 23.9 23.9
Between couples (% of total) 54.3 53.3
Singles (% of total) 21.4 22.2
Betw. sin. and mar (% of total) 0.4 0.6
(a) u(cit, Cit, lit, Dit)
Within couples (% of total) 6.2 6.1
Between couples (% of total) 67.9 68.6
Singles (% of total) 17.3 16.4
Betw. sin. and mar (% of total) 8.6 8.8
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Table B.6: Variance decomposition - Reduction of progressivity to ψ2 = 0
log(ci) u(ci,Ci, li,Di) uLTit
Change (%) 27.8 12 17.5
Decomposition of change
Within couples (%) 25.54 8.33 9.71
Between couples (%) 61.87 53.33 70.86
Singles (%) 13.67 26.67 21.14
Betw. sin. and mar. (%) -1.08 10.83 -0.57
Single probability (%) 0 0 -0.57
Notes: This table shows the effect of the policy change on the variance of private
consumption, the per-period utility and life-time utility. The first row shows the to-
tal change. The other rows decompose this total change in inequality and add up to
100%. Compared to the results from table 2.5, the table illustrates that increasing
or reducing progressivity has relatively symmetric effects.
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B.6 More Detailed Description of Data
In this appendix, I discuss the data in more detail. For data on consumption and time use,
the LISS panel is used. I pool the surveys of 2009, 2010 and 2012 and keep households in
which there are two adult members between ages 20 and 55, which results in a sample with
2608 person-year observations. Note that the survey design has changed over time, so that
the questions about consumption from later surveys are only partially comparable to the
initial waves. The measure of assignable private consumption contains expenditure on:
• Food and drinks outside the house
• Cigarettes and other tobacco products
• Clothing
• Personal care products and clothing
• Health costs and medical care
• Leisure time expenditure
• (Further) schooling
• Donations and gifts
• Other personal expenditure
For the computation of the wage moments, I use data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel
(Sociaal-economisch panel onderzoek). This provides a significantly larger sample size and is
less subject to panel attrition than the LISS panel. Pooling the period of time between 1984
and 2002 yields 17973 person-year observations for men. Note that the time window of the
Socio-Economic Panel precedes the LISS panel.2
2As an alternative data source on wages, there also is the Arbeidsaanbodpanel, which is available between
1985 and 2014 and also provides a larger sample size than the LISS panel. However, this dataset only
provides information on net (rather than gross) wages, so that a tax simulator would be required to recover
the underlying gross wages.
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Appendix C
Appendix to chapter 3
C.1 More Details on Task Variables
In this appendix, we provide some additional information on our grouping of occupations
and the computed task intensities. Figure C.1 first shows the distribution of each of the task
intensity measure across the 120 occupations. The task intensities typically range between
values close to 0 and 0.5, with substantial variation across occupations. Interestingly, the
distribution is most skewed for analytical tasks, since a large number of occupations involves
low analytical task intensities, whereas the distribution is more centered for the other task
variables.
Tables C.1, C.2 and C.3 list all the occupations which we use in the analysis. The classification
is based on a broader classification with 343 occupations and groups related occupations
according to the digits of their code. The original classification is the KldB 1988 (Klassizierung
der Berufe), which was developed by the German Employment Agency. To keep the exposition
simple, the table lists the first occupation of the original classification which is in that group.
For example, the group ’gardeners’ includes the sub-occupations ’gardeners, garden workers’,
’garden architects, garden managers’, ’florists’, ’forestry managers, foresters, hunters’, and
’forest workers, forest cultivators’.1
1A complete list of occupations, including both German and English occupational titles, is provided by
the IAB (http://doku.iab.de/fdz/Klassifikationen_de_en.xlsx).
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Figure C.1: Distribution of task intensities across occupations
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Table C.1: Occupations and tasks
Occupation Analytical Interactive Routine Manual
Farmers 0.10 0.19 0.43 0.24
Gardeners 0.11 0.26 0.33 0.23
Miners 0.06 0.12 0.38 0.22
Ceramic workers 0.08 0.12 0.42 0.11
Chemical plant operatives 0.14 0.15 0.54 0.22
Chemical laboratory workers 0.15 0.12 0.40 0.13
Plastics processors 0.12 0.17 0.54 0.21
Paper makers 0.10 0.17 0.53 0.20
Typesetters 0.13 0.16 0.38 0.11
Special printers 0.05 0.11 0.44 0.13
Wood prepaper 0.05 0.11 0.41 0.18
Iron, metal producers, melters 0.08 0.13 0.48 0.17
Sheet metal pressers 0.04 0.10 0.41 0.11
Turners 0.08 0.13 0.49 0.15
Drillers 0.09 0.13 0.51 0.17
Metal grinders 0.07 0.12 0.50 0.20
Metal polishers 0.10 0.15 0.41 0.16
Welders, oxy-acetylene cutters 0.07 0.11 0.34 0.22
Steel smiths 0.11 0.17 0.29 0.31
Sheet metal workers 0.12 0.19 0.31 0.33
Plumbers 0.10 0.23 0.31 0.36
Locksmiths 0.05 0.09 0.25 0.25
Engine fitters 0.18 0.22 0.52 0.37
Plant fitters, maintenance fitters 0.13 0.22 0.39 0.40
Motor vehicle repairers 0.10 0.18 0.22 0.36
Agricultural machinery repairers 0.15 0.18 0.36 0.25
Other mechanics 0.11 0.17 0.30 0.27
Toolmakers 0.12 0.14 0.42 0.20
Dental technicians 0.16 0.27 0.43 0.24
Electrical fitters, mechanics 0.13 0.19 0.28 0.32
Telecommunications mechanics, craftsmen 0.11 0.18 0.23 0.27
Electrical appliance fitters 0.21 0.23 0.37 0.29
Electrical appliance, electrical parts assemblers 0.12 0.14 0.38 0.16
Other assemblers 0.09 0.14 0.37 0.17
Other metal workers 0.06 0.10 0.39 0.16
Spinners, fibre preparers 0.06 0.14 0.36 0.14
Cutters 0.04 0.11 0.30 0.10
Bakery goods makers 0.06 0.20 0.49 0.14
Butchers 0.05 0.20 0.45 0.14
Cooks 0.10 0.24 0.36 0.23
Wine coopers 0.12 0.18 0.55 0.23
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Table C.2: Occupations and tasks (continued)
Occupation Analytical Interactive Routine Manual
Wine coopers 0.12 0.18 0.55 0.23
Bricklayers 0.06 0.15 0.21 0.29
Carpenters 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.31
Roofers 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.40
Paviors 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.32
Tracklayers 0.09 0.16 0.27 0.29
Building labourer, general 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.28
Stucco workers, plasterers 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.31
Tile setters 0.09 0.20 0.24 0.30
Room equippers 0.12 0.23 0.29 0.24
Furniture makers 0.12 0.20 0.42 0.28
Painters, lacquerers 0.07 0.19 0.15 0.27
Goods painters 0.10 0.19 0.34 0.27
Goods examiners, sorters 0.24 0.20 0.31 0.12
Packagers, goods receivers 0.04 0.11 0.31 0.13
Assistants (no further specification) 0.02 0.07 0.29 0.11
Generator machinists 0.07 0.14 0.45 0.27
Machine attendants 0.13 0.17 0.50 0.26
Mechanical, motor engineers 0.54 0.36 0.20 0.08
Electrical engineers 0.51 0.38 0.25 0.12
Architects 0.49 0.38 0.18 0.14
Survey engineers 0.44 0.40 0.22 0.13
Chemists 0.46 0.36 0.25 0.09
Mechanical engineering technicians 0.45 0.33 0.31 0.17
Electrical engineering technicians 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.24
Measurement technicians 0.36 0.25 0.31 0.13
Other technicians 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.16
Foremen, master mechanics 0.26 0.37 0.35 0.23
Biological specialists 0.35 0.21 0.34 0.17
Chemical laboratory assistants 0.38 0.19 0.38 0.13
Technical draughtspersons 0.36 0.14 0.09 0.03
Wholesale and retail trade buyers, buyers 0.15 0.40 0.17 0.13
Salespersons 0.07 0.34 0.20 0.15
Publishing house dealers, booksellers 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.15
Commercial agents, travellers 0.23 0.46 0.12 0.14
Bank specialists 0.21 0.35 0.12 0.07
Insurance specialists 0.23 0.39 0.09 0.08
Forwarding business dealers 0.20 0.36 0.21 0.13
Tourism specialist 0.28 0.45 0.13 0.12
Railway engine drivers 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.25
Motor vehicle drivers 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.26
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Table C.3: Occupations and tasks (continued)
Occupation Analytical Interactive Routine Manual
Motor vehicle drivers 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.26
Navigating ships officers 0.16 0.25 0.28 0.24
Post masters 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.11
Warehouse managers, warehousemen 0.11 0.21 0.32 0.19
Transportation equipment drivers 0.04 0.11 0.28 0.21
Stowers, furniture packers 0.04 0.12 0.27 0.20
Entrepreneurs, managing directors 0.33 0.52 0.19 0.15
Management consultants 0.41 0.43 0.13 0.08
Members of Parliament 0.36 0.36 0.10 0.07
Cost accountants, valuers 0.17 0.22 0.10 0.04
Cashiers 0.03 0.27 0.10 0.13
Data processing specialists 0.47 0.36 0.26 0.13
Office specialists 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.07
Stenographers, shorthand-typists, typists 0.10 0.19 0.13 0.05
Office auxiliary workers 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.09
Factory guards, detectives 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.29
Doormen, caretakers 0.11 0.21 0.24 0.45
Soldiers, border guards, police officers 0.36 0.33 0.15 0.24
Journalists 0.33 0.38 0.14 0.08
Musicians 0.35 0.38 0.21 0.10
Artistic and assisting occupations 0.27 0.31 0.25 0.15
Physicians 0.34 0.42 0.24 0.24
Non-medical practitioners 0.26 0.36 0.12 0.24
Nurses, midwives 0.25 0.34 0.28 0.41
Nursing assistants 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.40
Nursing assistants 0.25 0.26 0.35 0.18
Medical receptionists 0.17 0.30 0.24 0.24
Social workers, care workers 0.30 0.42 0.15 0.33
Home wardens, social work teachers 0.31 0.50 0.13 0.32
Nursery teachers, child nurses 0.27 0.49 0.08 0.33
University teachers, lecturers 0.31 0.45 0.12 0.11
Music teachersr 0.27 0.48 0.14 0.17
Economic and social scientists, statisticians 0.37 0.40 0.11 0.08
Hairdressers 0.08 0.29 0.09 0.21
Restaurant, inn, bar keepers 0.09 0.31 0.16 0.30
Others guest attendants 0.06 0.26 0.17 0.27
Housekeeping managers 0.10 0.23 0.17 0.31
Laundry workers, pressers 0.03 0.12 0.26 0.20
Household cleaners 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.23
Street cleaners, refuse disposers 0.10 0.16 0.24 0.36
Table C.4: Task changes for switches between selected occupation groups
From To Analytical Interactive Routine Manual
MPT Sal./Off. -0.11 0.06 0.05 0.01
POC Sal./Off. 0.13 0.23 -0.20 -0.15
POC Serv. 0.02 0.12 -0.21 0.08
Serv. Sal./Off. 0.11 0.11 0.01 -0.23
Serv. POC -0.02 -0.12 0.21 -0.08
Care Sal./Off. 0.03 0.11 0.04 -0.17
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C.2 Additional Material on Cohort Profiles
Table C.5: Number of observations by cohort
Men Women
Cohort
1940-44 41247 63717
1945-49 46087 56718
1950-54 55063 56209
1955-59 72838 66582
1960-64 108488 88542
1965-69 121447 101265
1970-74 122364 121732
1975-79 100515 103458
Notes: The table shows the number of men and women, which are used for constructing the cohort profiles.
Since the panel data contains gaps, the number of observations fluctuates with age and we report the number
of observations at the age at which the cohort enters the sample.
Table C.6: Number of observations by cohort and completed fertility
No kids 1 kid 2 kids 3 or more kids
1940-44 7459 13100 22382 11042
1945-49 7077 11774 18614 7706
1950-54 7218 9804 15405 6357
1955-59 8400 8550 14740 5720
1960-64 9306 9094 15487 5706
1965-69 5178 4513 7305 2321
Notes: The table shows the number of women separately by completed fertility, which are used for constructing
the cohort profiles.
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Figure C.2: Fertility by cohort
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Figure C.3: Annual earnings by cohort
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
55000
Ye
ar
ly 
ea
rn
ing
s
1940-1944
1945-1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964
1965-1969
1970-1974
1975-1979
(a) Men
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
55000
Ye
ar
ly 
ea
rn
ing
s
1940-1944
1945-1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964
1965-1969
1970-1974
1975-1979
(b) Women
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
Ye
ar
ly 
ea
rn
ing
s
1940-1944
1945-1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964 1965-1969
(c) Women (no children)
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
Ye
ar
ly 
ea
rn
ing
s
1940-1944
1945-1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964 1965-1969
(d) Women (one child)
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
Ye
ar
ly 
ea
rn
ing
s
1940-1944
1945-1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964 1965-1969
(e) Women (two children)
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
Ye
ar
ly 
ea
rn
ing
s
1940-1944
1945-1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964 1965-1969
(f) Women (three or more children)
142
Figure C.4: Fraction of Managers/Professionals/Technicians by cohort and completed fertility
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(a) Women (cohort 1940 - 1944)
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(b) Women (cohort 1950 - 1954)
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Figure C.5: Interactive task content by cohort and completed fertility
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(b) Women (cohort 1950 - 1954)
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Figure C.6: Analytical task content by cohort and total length of breaks
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C.3 Additional Material on Event Studies
Table C.7: Summary statistics - Event study sample
Number of observations 22935
Fraction with low education 0.15
Fraction with medium education 0.76
Fraction with high education 0.09
Fraction with 1 child 0.39
Fraction with 2 children 0.45
Fraction with 3 or more children 0.16
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Figure C.7: Event studies by education
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(c) Yearly earnings
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(d) Yearly earnings (missing = 0)
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(f) Interactive tasks
4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Years relative to first childbirth
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Int
en
sit
y o
f in
te
ra
cti
ve
 ta
sk
s
low education medium education high education
(g) Routine tasks
4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Years relative to first childbirth
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Int
en
sit
y o
f r
ou
tin
e t
as
ks
low education medium education high education
(h) Manual tasks
4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Years relative to first childbirth
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Int
en
sit
y o
f m
an
ua
l t
as
ks
low education medium education high education
146
Figure C.8: Event studies by length of career break
(a) Full-time employment (if employed)
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(b) Yearly earnings
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(c) Yearly earnings (missing = 0)
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(f) Routine tasks
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Figure C.9: Robustness: Placebo event studies for rescaled task intensities
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Figure C.10: Occupation switches - by education
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0.04
0.02
0.00
0.02
Mothers
Placebo
(h) Routine (Medium)
5 0 5 10 15
Years relative to childbirth
0.030
0.025
0.020
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
0.005
Mothers
Placebo
(i) Routine (High)
5 0 5 10 15
Years relative to childbirth
0.025
0.020
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
Mothers
Placebo
(j) Manual (Low)
5 0 5 10 15
Years relative to childbirth
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
Mothers
Placebo
(k) Manual (Medium)
5 0 5 10 15
Years relative to childbirth
0.0125
0.0100
0.0075
0.0050
0.0025
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050 Mothers
Placebo
(l) Manual (High)
5 0 5 10 15
Years relative to childbirth
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015 Mothers
Placebo
Notes: The figure conducts the Placebo event study analysis separately by education group. ”Low”
corresponds to women with no degree, ”Medium” to women with a high school or vocational degree, and
”High” to those with a university degree.
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Figure C.11: Occupation switches - by children (CH) and length of break (B)
(a) Analytical (CH)
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2 children
> 2 children
(b) Analytical (B)
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7 - 12 years
(c) Interactive (CH)
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Years relative to first childbirth
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0.01
0.03
1 child
2 children
> 2 children
(d) Interactive (B)
5 0 5 10 15
Years relative to first childbirth
0.045
0.027
0.010
0.008
0.025
0 - 2 years
2 - 4 years
4 - 7 years
7 - 12 years
(e) Routine tasks (CH)
5 0 5 10 15
Years relative to first childbirth
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.03
1 child
2 children
> 2 children
(f) Routine tasks (B)
5 0 5 10 15
Years relative to first childbirth
0.045
0.027
0.010
0.008
0.025
0 - 2 years
2 - 4 years
4 - 7 years
7 - 12 years
(g) Manual tasks (CH)
5 0 5 10 15
Years relative to first childbirth
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.03
1 child
2 children
> 2 children
(h) Manual tasks (B)
5 0 5 10 15
Years relative to first childbirth
0.045
0.027
0.010
0.008
0.025
0 - 2 years
2 - 4 years
4 - 7 years
7 - 12 years
Notes: The confidence bands refer to the 10% level.
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Figure C.12: Task distance for each task intensity, by length of career break
(a) Analytical
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(d) Manual
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Figure C.13: Other occupation characteristics, by length of career break
(a) Change in occupational earnings
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